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1 Introduction 
In terms of level of economic development Vietnam has made significant progress over 
the past decade. Standards of living have improved significantly, and the country’s socio-
economic achievements are clearly impressive from a human development perspective. 
One of the main drivers of economic growth and development has been the 
implementation of various economic reforms, initiating the transformation from a 
centrally coordinated and planned economy towards a more market-oriented system. 
Although the uncertainty and lower economic growth following in the wake of the Asian 
Financial Crisis caused a temporary slowdown of the reform process, the momentum 
appears to have picked up again over the last two years. 
The financial sector takes centre stage in the renewed efforts to reform the Vietnamese 
economy. In part because of the extensive linkages between the predominantly state-
owned banking sector and the crisis-stricken State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and in part 
because the creation of a more market-based financial sector is expected to improve the 
mobilization of savings, the diversification of risks, and the allocation of resources in the 
economy. The current and planned reforms of the financial sector, however, also 
represent an opportunity to initiate a deeper and more structural break in the way in 
which the Vietnamese economy is managed. It is only fifteen years ago, during the era of 
central coordination and planning, that the financial sector was completely subordinate 
and instrumental to the achievement of government objectives in the productive, state-
owned sectors. Although the Vietnamese government has stopped using the financial 
sector as a direct instrument for the implementation of productive sector policies, 
considerable indirect government control of financial sector activities persist. It is in this 
context, that the recently initiated round of reforms bear promise of lessening the 
persistent (indirect) government control through the creation of a more market-based, 
autonomous financial sector.  
An essential prerequisite to the evaluation and continuation of the current financial sector 
reforms is that new information and analyses of the financial sector are provided on a 
recurrent basis. This has not been the case in Vietnam, where the World Bank performed 
the last comprehensive study of the financial sector seven years ago (World Bank 1995).  
Hence, one important objective of this report is to remedy the shortage of comprehensive 
financial sector analyses in Vietnam. It is, however, important to point out that the 
present report by no means should be regarded as a follow-up to the 1995 World Bank 
 10
report. The purpose of this report is to concentrate on performing in-depth analyses of 
selected issues of prominence and importance for the future success of the reform process 
rather than describing the current day-to-day operations and procedures in the financial 
sector. This eclectic approach implies that other important issues such as the development 
of a payment system, the state and prospects for the inter-bank markets, and the human 
capital and organisational issues in the state-owned banks are neglected and/or not 
analysed in depth. They are, however, omissions due to constraints imposed by funds and 
time available rather than a failure to comprehend their importance. In this context, the 
present report should thus be viewed as a first step towards establishing an open dialogue 
about the nature and speed of the financial sector reforms in Vietnam based on recurrent 
independent assessments of financial sector issues and problems. 
When commissioned to perform a study of this nature, one inevitably turns to consider 
the writings of economists and analysts specialising in the financial sector to see whether 
an established, commonly agreed upon framework for financial sector analyses exist. 
This rapidly turns out to be a futile exercise. Establishing a common ground among 
economists analysing the financial sector and its role in generating economic growth and 
stability is at best difficult. Views range from support to the Joan Robinson claim that 
‘where enterprise leads finance follows’ (Robinson 1952, p. 86), to those who like King 
and Levine (1993) hold that Schumpeter was right in suggesting that financial 
intermediaries promote and accelerate economic growth through the identification of and 
subsequent allocation of funds to high growth investments. Despite considerable recent 
progress in both the quality and range of financial sector data available and the methods 
used to analyse these, this dispute remains essentially unsettled, implying that no clear 
guidelines emerge here. This lack of analytical coherence also extends to more specific 
policy related decisions such as: (i) whether transitional economies should develop a 
securities market-based financial system (as that in place in the United States) or instead 
opt for a bank-based system (as that in place in Germany), and (ii) whether central bank 
autonomy should be strengthened through the legislative, political channels or through 
the establishment of non-governmental interests and powers advocating for lower 
inflation and increased central bank independence. It is thus important to realise that 
alternative, competing perspectives exist almost throughout all aspects of financial sector 
analysis. The approach taken in this report is to note and describe competing perspectives 
and their associated policy recommendations, while at the same time indicating which 
perspective/approach we find is best suited to the Vietnamese context. 
In addition to consulting recent research on financial sector regulation in developing 
countries and in Vietnam and South East Asia in particular, the research group 
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responsible for this report has employed the services of two local Vietnamese 
consultants, Mr. Tri and Mr Diem, who conducted commissioned background studies of 
the State Bank of Vietnam and the allocation of credit to the different sectors in the 
economy, respectively. The process of collecting and analysing data and writing the 
report was based on both desk studies in Copenhagen and field trips to Vietnam. The 
latter has been of vital importance, as the opportunity to present and discuss ideas and 
perceptions resulted in new and more productive analyses. The preliminary findings and 
conclusions were presented at a number of meetings and a seminar held at the Central 
Institute for Economic Management in Hanoi in October 2002.  
Numerous intellectual and creative debts are accumulated throughout the process of 
making a report of this nature. In this respect special thanks go to the President of the 
Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM), Dr. Dinh Van An, his Vice-
President Le Xuan Ba, and the Director of the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (NIAS), 
Dr. Jorgen Delman. We are also grateful to World Bank staff including Economist Theo 
Ib Larsen and other colleagues at CIEM and NIAS. All errors and omissions remain, of 
course, the sole responsibility of the authors. 
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2 Executive Summary 
This report is about the difficulties and problems encountered in the process of 
transforming the Vietnamese financial sector from a centrally coordinated financial 
system that was subordinate to government objectives and goals in the productive sectors 
to an autonomous financial sector based on and guided by market forces and competitive 
pressures.  
At the time of writing this report (November 2002), this process is far from complete. 
This is in part because historical events and structures continue to exert large and 
significant influence through both formal and informal institutional structures. While the 
former is in the shape of institutions and assigned tasks, which prevail from previous 
economic policy regimes, the latter take the form of the general reputation of and trust in 
the financial sector. Based on the identification of two distinct phases in the liberalisation 
of the Vietnamese financial sector Chapter 3 contains an analysis of historical 
determinants and constraints upon present day and future financial reforms. 
Phase 1 begins with the banking reforms undertaken from 1988 to 1991 and ends in 1997 
with the East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC). The initial wave of reforms resulted in the 
creation of a two-tiered banking system through the separation of the large State Owned 
Commercial Banks (SOCBs) from the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV). In addition, the 
entry of Joint Stock Banks (JSBs) and foreign bank branches (albeit under restrictions) 
were allowed. Overall the events in the first phase did little to curb government 
dominance over the financial sector. The persistent dominance of government controlled 
financial institutions implied the continuation of the intimate relationship between the 
SOCBs and the state owned enterprises (the SOE sector). Towards the end of the first 
period (1988-1997) economic growth and the reform process began to stall. The potential 
reasons for this slowdown in the growth rate of the Gross National Product (GNP) are 
manifold, ranging from adverse weather conditions, peasant unrest, problems of moral 
hazard, lack of incentives in the state owned enterprises, endemic corruption, and an 
inflexible bureaucracy. The result, however, was a visible deceleration of the economy 
and the first signs of vulnerability, already prior to severe regional financial crisis, which 
was waiting in the wings.  
The second phase extends from the post-crisis period until today. Although the second 
phase began with the adoption of the Banking Law in 1998, which formally established 
the extent of central bank autonomy and abolished the direct political control of interest 
rates, this phase can be characterized by reluctance towards continuing the deregulation 
and reform of the sector. Towards the end of the period the pace of reforms has, however, 
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picked up, culminating with the recent (2001) announcement of the forthcoming 
restructuring and recapitalisation of the four large SOCBs. The second phase can thus be 
characterized as a gradual return to the more comprehensive and fundamental reforms of 
the financial sector that were discarded following the East Asian Financial Crisis. It is 
important to note that most of the more fundamental reforms are still at an initial stage, 
implying that the official commitment and resolve towards reforms has yet to be 
seriously tested. In this context, a very important test of the political will to sustain the 
efforts to introduce a more market-based financial sector is the extent to which the 
government will seek to restructure and recapitalise the SOCBs and their Non-
Performing Loans (NPLs) in particular. Having completed the analysis of both periods, 
one can identify the following two events in the first phase, as events, which continue to 
exert considerable influence on present day financial sector dispositions and operating 
conditions: 
1. The virtual collapse and ensuing disappearance of the credit cooperative system 
during the second half of the 1990s may have had long-lasting detrimental effects 
upon the general level of trust in the formal financial system. 
2. The decision to liberalize the financial sector as one of the first sectors prior to 
both any attempts to liberalize the SOE sector and a decision to limit/stop 
directed lending is likely to have contributed greatly to the magnitude of the NPL 
problems, which are at the heart of the problems facing the financial sector today. 
The role of historic factors and path dependency is also identified in Chapter 4, which 
contains an analysis and regional comparison of the supervision and regulation of the 
financial sectors. Hence, following a brief introduction to the history of financial sector 
regulation in Vietnam, the analysis moves to consider the degree to which the regulatory 
framework in Vietnam is affected by historical determinants. Subsequently, the level of 
competitiveness measured on the Vietnamese financial sector is compared to other 
countries in the region and to developing countries in general. In this context, 
privatisation and entry requirements are considered as key examples of policies that can 
be used to generate more intensive competition between financial sector institutions. This 
leads to a comparison of the regulatory framework, the powers bestowed upon the 
regulator, and the accounting and auditing standards in Vietnam with that found in the 
countries in the region and to developing countries in general. The more specific 
regulatory issues such as safety nets, capital adequacy and deposit insurances are 
subsequently considered and compared in a separate section. 
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A number of key points emerge from the comparison of the conditions for and the 
performance of financial sectors in Vietnam and other countries in the region. It is thus 
found that although Vietnam in recent years has levelled the playing field for new 
entrants somewhat, there is still much to be done before the Vietnamese banking 
environment can be characterized as competitive or even partly competitive for that 
matter. The Vietnamese government should consequently consider policies that could 
make local financial markets more contestable such as liberalising entry requirements for 
foreign banks or strengthen efforts to establish gradual or full private ownership of the 
SOCBs. However, due to respectively the potentially destabilising effects of increased 
foreign bank presence and the still dormant problem of non-performing loans in the state 
bank sector it is important that both processes are managed, transparent and gradual. 
In addition, the analysis indicates that strengthening the capacity and autonomy of the 
regulatory framework should be another prerequisite to liberalising entry requirements 
and financial sector activities in general. More specifically, the analysis presented in 
Chapter 4 points to the following areas and issues: 
• While Vietnamese legislation is equal to or outperforms that of other countries of 
the region, the autonomy and power to rapidly implement these laws is lacking in 
Vietnam compared to the other countries in the region.  
• The type of activities banks can engage in is relatively restricted in Vietnam. 
Banks are, for example prohibited from engaging in securities, insurance and real 
estate markets – activities, which are permitted or only somewhat restricted in 
most other developing countries.  
• Bank accounting standards in Vietnam are below the average level of developing 
countries.  
• Finally, it was found that Vietnam has very restrictive requirements regarding the 
amount of capital that a bank must have compared to other countries in the region.  
These are all areas where the State Bank of Vietnam (the SBV) holds a central position. 
A central position, which in part rests upon the significance and powers bestowed upon a 
central bank, and in part on the continued existence of structures and procedures that 
have remained in place from the epoch prior to the Doi-Moi financial sector reforms in 
1988. The historic legacy exists and persists because the process of dual separation from 
the former mono-bank regime to an autonomous, independent central bank is far from 
completed in Vietnam. The dual process of separation, where the central bank, on the one 
side, has to be separated from actual banking operations, on the other, and also has to be 
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able to operate as an autonomous entity on par with the executive, legislative and 
judiciary branches of government is the subject of Chapter 5.  
Again a historic overview establishes how the mono-bank legacy continues to exert 
considerable influence on both SBV structure and organisation and the degrees of 
freedom available to pursue SBV objectives. The creation of a two-tiered banking system 
in combination with the legal base provided by the 1998 Law on the State Bank 
represents considerable progress in the separation of the SBV from the actual financial 
sector. Nevertheless, the persistence and importance of the planning legacy is maintained 
by the fact that the second process of separation, i.e. the transformation of SBV in 
undertaking the above-mentioned separation from the political system of central planning 
and coordination, is only just beginning to occur.  
This is further documented in the included assessment of SBV independence according to 
three non-substitutable components of independence, namely: legal, political and 
operational independence. Here it is concluded that the SBV at present cannot effectively 
develop and execute national monetary policies. It is still operationally and politically 
dependent upon support from other government agencies. Hence, although the Law on 
the State Bank represented a step backwards in terms of restricting stipulated 
independence compared to the situation prior to the passing of the law it appears more 
likely that lack of especially political but also operational independence are the more 
binding constraints. 
As a consequence, it is recommended that the pursuit of increased central bank 
independence in Vietnam should focus more on the indirect route, which entails a gradual 
build-up and strengthening of a non-governmental lobby for an independent central bank. 
The preliminary plans for the equitisation of the large state-owned banks represent an 
important step in this direction, as does the continued presence of foreign banks in 
Vietnam. In this aspect, the current low level of inflation represents an opportunity in 
terms of creating an environment conducive to increased central bank independence. The 
reverse causality argument implies that a central bank uses low inflation as a political 
lever. Yet, it is also an obstacle, due to the potential lack of a common cause to unite 
private sector interest in a lobby for a more independent central bank. Nevertheless, given 
the prevailing political and economical environment in Vietnam, the indirect approach is 
likely to be a productive and effective approach in the short- to medium-term. In addition, 
it is recommended that the Vietnamese government considers complementing the indirect 
approach with more direct measures directed at limiting local authority interfering in 
credit institution activities – not the least to improve the overall transparency and 
predictability of the political interference, which takes place.  
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In terms of the SBV role as facilitator and organiser of financial markets, Chapter 5 
briefly considers the current status on the market for Treasury bills, the inter-bank market 
for domestic currency, and the domestic market for foreign currency, respectively. 
In this context, a number of restrictions hampering the further development and growth of 
the secondary market for Treasury Bills were identified. These included the fact that only 
T-bills and SBV bills are traded in the market and the fact that the law on the State Bank 
only allows trade in Treasury bills with a maturity of less than a year. It is moreover 
stressed that it is very important that the Vietnamese government carefully considers and 
balances potential gains and risks related to the possible issue of international bonds. 
Unless such a decision is thought into a detailed and sequenced plan of financial reforms, 
the increased exposure to the erratic and powerful international financial markets may 
erase the potential short-term advantages obtained by issuing international bonds.  
Another issued in focus in Chapter 5 is whether or not the SBV would gain from the 
creation of a separate institution responsible for financial sector supervision. The 
following potential benefits from such a separation were identified: 
• The SBV directors and staff will be able to focus efforts and attention on 
managing money, credit and foreign exchange reserve.  
• The separation of the supervisory division from the SBV will serve to increase the 
distance between the SBV and its former operative functions (the current 
SOCBs), which will minimize the risk of preferential treatment and/or outsiders 
attempts to bias SBV policies and rulings.  
• The narrower set of objectives is likely to make the quest for increased SBV 
independence easier and more feasible. Less conflict of interest will occur and 
efforts can be more concentrated.  
• The potential conflicts of interest between the overall monetary policies and the 
supervision of the banking sector will be made more transparent and will have to 
be settled through discussions and negotiations between the two institutions (i.e. 
the SBV and a new independent bank supervision institution). This could for 
example be a situation where the bank supervision institution in order to better 
deal with overdue debt in the banking sector would prefer a more expansionary 
monetary policy. 
The above-mentioned potential gains should, however, be weighed against the 
operational, political and legal obstacles facing the creation of a new and independent 
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supervisory institution. Given that the process of establishing autonomous and 
independent supervision within the SBV has been underway for some time, the question 
of whether and when this process is going to end should at least be considered. 
Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the problem of non-performing loans (NPL) in the banking 
sector, more specifically the role and use of a new type of institutions in the Vietnamese 
financial sector, namely Asset Management Companies (AMCs). Here the following 
problems related to addressing the NPL problem using the chosen decentralised AMC 
set-up were identified: 
• The existing deficiencies in key national legal and judicial frameworks 
concerning collateral, land ownership, transfer of loans and creditor rights, land 
usage rights.  
• The need to coordinate NPL assessment and restructuring with ongoing SOEs 
reforms. This includes tackling potentially powerful and politically connected 
debtors who might oppose to the process and/or seek to take advantage of the 
situation and the relatively ineffective legal recourse.  
• The potential benefits from establishing linkages to the ongoing efforts to reform 
and restructure SOCBs. In this context, a central AMC would accord the 
government with an opportunity to accelerate and guide bank restructuring 
through, for example, the conditions it attached to the purchase of NPLs. 
• The scarcity of managerial and analytical talent in the sector. A single entity will 
be in a better position to reap economies of scale and make the best use of the 
human capital available  
• The thin or non-existing secondary markets for financial assets make it difficult 
for separate AMCs to obtain uniform and transparent valuations and conditions of 
sale. Information is not easily transferred across autonomous decentralised units. 
A centralised AMC with a more direct government involvement will be in a better 
position to legitimise the bundling of NPLs and/or to offer discounts if lack of 
interested buyers turns out to be a problem in Vietnam. 
Given the limited and fragmented information about the nature and extent of the NPL in 
the Vietnamese banking system and the sparse and fragmented information about the 
specific conditions under which the AMCs will operate, any predictions of future AMC 
performance and success rates are very difficult. The following three key areas are, 
however, singled out in Chapter 5 as areas where increasing government and SBV 
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attention would be beneficial: the autonomy and legal power of the decentralised AMCs, 
the initial assessment and understanding of the NPL problem, and the recruitment and 
training of skilled personnel.  
Chapter 6 provides an overview of the different economic entities and institutions that are 
currently active in the Vietnamese financial sector. This includes specific problems 
encountered by the individual types of institutions and their interrelations in the financial 
market. In addition, Chapter 6 looks at the question of allocation of credit between the 
government controlled and private enterprises. In this process a very simple typology of 
intermediate outcomes for the transformation of the SOCBs form state-owned 
commercial banks into autonomous institutions guided by market principles and forces is 
introduced. According to this typology, the Vietnamese approach can be characterised as 
allowing State Owned Banks (SOBs) to pursue an overall objective of profit 
maximisation vis-à-vis their non-government customers, while at the same time the 
government reserves the right to stipulate the terms and conditions under which the SOEs 
receive credit. This in effect amounts to the government transforming bank profits made 
on private customers into subsidies to the SOEs. As a consequence, any direct subsidies 
given to SOEs over the state budget can be reduced by the indirect subsidies channelled 
through the SOBs, and the extent and nature of subsidies given to the SOBs are less 
transparent to both outsiders and to the government itself. The evaluation of this approach 
is that it is neither sustainable nor in accordance with the process of equitisation and 
privatisation of the SOBs. 
Finally, Chapter 6 also takes a closer look at financial sector performance vis-à-vis the 
most important sector in Vietnam in terms of both employment and total output value, 
namely the agricultural sector. Here special attention is accorded to the Vietnamese Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development as well as to an evaluation of the degree of 
competition between the financial institutions serving the agricultural sector. The analysis 
of financial sector services to the agricultural sector finds that the government in effect 
has laid down an explicit division of labour between the different financial institutions 
that provide financial services to the rural population. In addition, the local communes, 
peoples committees and mass organisations play a crucial role in the identification, 
screening and follow-up on clients for each type of institution. The result is that the 
initiative to form joint-liability groups and/or to contact to potential lenders comes from 
the institutions themselves. This reflects a top-down approach, which most likely 
originates in a desire to divide the market between the institutions in order to extend their 
outreach. 
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The competition and segmentation on the rural financial markets are furthermore 
restricted by the widespread practice of offering subsidized interest rates. While this 
approach is chosen to improve development opportunities for the rural population, the net 
effects are highly likely to be negative and detrimental to the overall purpose of 
improving the livelihood of rural populations. In addition, to severely restricting the 
mobilisation of savings, the practice of subsidizing interest rates is likely to damage 
customers perception of credit, lower the overall quality of financial services, and reduce 
the quality of investment projects financed through the financial sector. All of this runs 
counter to the government desire to develop and create growth opportunities for the 
agricultural sector. 
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3  Financial Sector Developments since Doi Moi  
The objective of this section is to perform “a historical analysis of financial sector 
developments since the beginning of the Doi Moi”. This might cause some readers to 
instinctively hesitate. One can identify at least two types of negative expectations that a 
critical reader might harbour when confronted with a historical analysis of the financial 
sector. This stems from the commonly held notion of the financial sector as a sector of 
rapid changes, volatile pricing and frequent structural breaks – a sector for which a 
historical analysis would appear as almost equivalent to a contradiction in terms and most 
certainly of limited value for any analysis of current issues and problems. The second is a 
more general resentment towards the historical analysis as all-illuminating hindsight is 
granted to all who are patient or arrive late. In other words, historical analysis may be 
perceived as a non-constructive listing of past failures and miscalculations – an exercise, 
which can be executed for almost all countries and/or sectors. 
The objective of this section is to prove both types of expectations to the historical 
analysis wrong. Demonstrating why and how historical events and structures continue to 
exert large and significant influences over the current problems and issues in the 
Vietnamese financial sector will hopefully do this. In the course of the analysis, 
important historical channels of influence will be shown to include both formal and 
informal institutional structures. The former is in the shape of institutions and assigned 
tasks, which prevail from previous economic policy regimes, while the latter takes the 
form of the general reputation of and trust in the financial sector. 
For this reason, this historical overview of financial sector developments is neither 
complete nor chronological. Instead, it puts focus on events and structures, which are 
perceived to have significant and lasting influence, rather than including all developments 
within the sector in the correct chronological order. Furthermore, as the Vietnamese 
financial sector throughout the period considered has been dominated by the banking 
sector, focus will be on this part of the sector. This is not equivalent to saying that other 
parts of the sector are not important. They are. But regardless of the developments and 
direction of the near future, banks will continue to play a crucial and dominating role in 
the Vietnamese financial sector, hence justifying the explicit focus on one type of 
financial institution. 
In line with analyses of the financial sector in other East Asian countries, the 
development of the banking sector in Vietnam can be divided into two distinct phases:  
1. The first phase was initiated by the banking reforms undertaken from 1988 to 
1991. These reforms resulted in the creation of a two-tiered banking system 
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through the separation of the large state owned commercial banks (SOCBs) from 
the state bank of Vietnam (SBV). In addition, the entry of joint stock banks 
(JSBs) and foreign bank branches (albeit under restrictions) were allowed. This 
first phase ended in 1997 with the East Asian Financial Crisis (EAFC). 
2. The second phase extends from the post-crisis period until today. The second 
phase began with the adoption of the Banking Law in 1998, which strengthened 
the autonomy of the SBV and abolished the direct political control of interest 
rates. Yet, this phase can be characterized by reluctance towards continuing the 
deregulation and reform of the sector. Towards the end of the period the pace of 
reforms has, however, picked up, culminating with the recent (2001) 
announcement of the forthcoming restructuring and recapitalisation of the four 
large SOCBs. 
As can be seen from even this brief description, the current agenda and approach to 
financial sector reform is shaped by previous developments and crises in this sector. A 
more detailed description of historical developments will thus be helpful in the efforts to 
obtain a better understanding of current issues and problems.  
 
3.1 Initiating Transition, 1986-97 
The first wave of banking reforms was an integral component of the first substantial 
economic reforms implemented by the government in the period 1988-1992. These 
reforms, labelled ‘Doi Moi’, initiated the transition from a centrally planned to a more 
market-oriented economy. There had been earlier attempts to loosen government control 
– most notably the de-collectivisation process in the agricultural sector was initiated 
already in 1981. However, the Doi Moi reforms launched in 1986 were the first 
systematic attempt to loosen absolute state control over the economy.  
Previous to the Doi Moi reforms the state had a monopoly on all financial transactions as 
exercised through the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), which acted both as a central bank 
and as a commercial bank. In addition to the SBV, the government owned and controlled 
Vietcombank, a foreign trade bank, and the Bank for Investment and Development 
(BFID). They were specialized banks and among their primary obligations, they had 
responsibility for the allocation of funds to state owned enterprises. The financial system 
was reduced to being an instrument for executing government policies, continuously 
accommodating the needs of the state budget and the SOEs. A regime of directed and 
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subsidized credit resulted in negative real interest rates and interest rates on deposits were 
higher than interest rates on loans (interest rate inversion).  
The financial sector was, however, not the only sector subject to massive government 
control, on the contrary. So the Vietnamese government had to determine both the speed 
and sequence of the many reforms necessary to transform the economy towards a higher 
degree of market-orientation. The economic literature on economic liberalization and the 
sequencing of reforms in developing countries is vast and non-unified. This makes it 
difficult to derive clear, undisputable policy implications. However, one policy 
recommendation, which emerges quite generally and despite the aforementioned 
difficulties, is that the liberalization of the domestic real sector should precede the 
liberalization of the domestic financial sector (Johnston 1994). If relative prices in a non-
liberalized real sector are distorted (or perhaps missing), a financial sector guided by 
market principles will find it difficult (if not impossible) to evaluate the profitability of 
different client sectors and/or firms for whom they wish to provide credit, see Gibson and 
Tsakalotos (1994).  
The Vietnamese government did, however, not heed to this advice, choosing the financial 
sector as one of the first sectors to be liberalized as part of the comprehensive efforts to 
reform the economy. While it is difficult to trace and/or estimate the precise implications 
of this divergence from the recommended sequencing of reforms, the Vietnamese 
financial sector is still struggling with the lack of transparency and the lack of market 
incentives that continue to characterize the only partly liberalized State Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) sectors. One can therefore point to the initial choice of reform sequencing as one 
of the structural decisions of the past, which continue to exert considerable influence 
even today.  
The establishment of a two-tiered banking system through the transformation of the 
former mono-bank into the State Bank of Vietnam and two new specialized SOCBs in 
1988 marks the beginning of the structural transformation of the Vietnamese banking 
system.1 The new SOCBs that were established included the Vietnamese Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) and the Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of Vietnam (ICVB).  
Another general finding that emerges from other studies of economic liberalization in 
developing countries is that any transformation of a state-controlled mono-bank system 
into a diversified market-based financial system is a lengthy and laborious process. 
                                                 
1 The stipulated sectoral specialization of the four SOCBs was lifted in 1990. 
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Vietnam is no exception. Despite the creation and entry of a large number of new banks 
the dominance of the government-controlled banks was not reduced significantly over the 
first period. This is perhaps best illustrated by the fact that the SOCBs directly under 
government control still extended 78.4 percent of total non-government credit in 1997.  
Moreover, despite the fact that the creation of the VBARD held the seeds for an implicit 
recognition of the growing importance of private initiative within this sector, the state 
owned commercial banks in effect continued to serve only SOEs (Le Roy and Robert 
1999). The public banks thus essentially failed to fill the growing demand for credit from 
especially the newly liberalized agricultural sector, which resulted in rapid growth of 
credit cooperatives in especially the rural areas. The resurgence and even faster demise of 
the credit cooperative system in the first phase of the Doi Moi reforms is another example 
of a structural change that has had lasting and very important implications for the 
Vietnamese financial system. It is therefore useful to elaborate on conditions and 
developments in this area.  
By the time the number of Credit Cooperatives (CCs) began to grow rapidly in the mid-
1980s they were well known and established financial institutions in Vietnam. The first 
credit cooperatives were established in North Vietnam in 1956 and they numbered 5,500 
already in the early 1960s. By 1983 the first CCs were established in South Vietnam, and 
their number continued to grow rapidly during the mid-1980s. By the end of the decade 
their number stood at 7,180.  
The credit cooperatives of this epoch were operating in isolation in small communities 
beyond the reach of the former mono-bank. Often the sole source of funding in the local 
areas, the credit cooperatives attracted the majority of the local savings by offering very 
attractive rates (sometimes up to four times the rates on offer from other financial 
institutions).2 Unfortunately, staff in charge was often poorly trained, and a number of 
cases of fraudulent behaviour had been reported. Moreover, the tradition of operating in 
isolated communities was continued in the initial round of financial sector reforms, as no 
automatic refinancing by the SBV was ensured prior to the rapid growth of the CC 
system. Some refinancing by the SBV was available, but it was neither automatic nor 
predictable. 
Early during 1990 the first credit cooperatives began to encounter problems. The fact that 
the initial round of reforms contained a significant element of anti-inflationary policies 
(including sharp increases in the interest rate, a devaluation of the exchange rate, and 
                                                 
2 Le Roy and Robert (1999) citing from Fallavier (1998) 
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limits to credit expansion) made the overall conditions for the cooperatives more 
difficult. In addition, the government also implemented a number of measures intended to 
reduce the overall fiscal deficit through the elimination of budget subsidies, the reduction 
of credit to state enterprises, as well as streamlining the bureaucracy. The enforcement of 
these reforms contributed further to the collapse of the credit cooperatives, as refinancing 
by the SBV became less dependable and a number of agricultural cooperatives had to 
close as government subsidies dried up. With arrears mounting depositors panicked and 
rushed to withdraw their money, triggering a run on credit cooperatives throughout the 
country.  
The overall effect on the credit cooperative system was disastrous. The lack of 
refinancing facilities, back-up funds and deposit insurance implied that the majority (over 
7,000) of the isolated credit cooperatives went bankrupt resulting in massive and 
devastating losses of savings of especially agricultural households.  
By the end of 1990 only 160 credit cooperatives were operational, the rest had closed due 
to mounting arrears. In addition to the agricultural households that had lost their savings, 
the collapse of the credit cooperatives in particular affected newly established Small and 
Medium-scale Enterprises (SMEs) as one of their main sources of credit disappeared. The 
major long-term effect, however, appears to have been a psychological effect. The 
collapse of the credit cooperatives severely undermined the general faith and confidence 
in the formal financial system. This loss of confidence in combination with the negative 
real interest rate in the early 1990s caused many to withdraw their deposits from the 
formal sector to buy gold and dollars (see below for more information about the role and 
significance of dollarization in the Vietnamese economy). 
The government reacted to the crisis in the credit cooperative system by strengthening the 
monitoring role of the SBV and by granting more autonomy to the SOCBs to create a 
more competitive environment. These measures were primarily designed to prevent the 
spread or repeat of the crisis, while little was done to amend the damages caused directly 
by the CC collapses.  
Another area where the government reacted directly in response to the credit cooperative 
crisis was in the attempt to fill the financing gap caused by the virtual disappearance of 
the credit cooperative system. Hence, the newly formed VBARD was strengthened and 
by decree no. 202 of 6 August 1991 given the task of lending directly to peasant families. 
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The VBARD3 could not, however, fill the void from the collapsed rural credit 
cooperatives, leading the government to entrust the SBV with the creation and 
organization of an entirely new (replacement) network of local credit windows. As the 
primary objective was to re-establish confidence in the financial sector the term 
‘cooperative’ was discarded, opting instead for the term “People’s Credit Funds” (PCFs). 
After a study of the options available in several countries, the government of Vietnam 
selected to adopt the Canadian Desjardins model4 to a Vietnamese context.  
The result was a hierarchical organization in three management levels. Local Credit 
Funds (LCF), which were meant to effectively supplant the former credit cooperatives 
would be handled and directed by a Regional Credit Fund (RCF), which in turn would be 
supervised by a Central Credit Fund (CCF) handling the supply and balancing of liquidity 
among the regional funds. If the distance from a LCF to a RCF were too long – the LCF 
would be managed directly by the SBV. The future vision was, however, that each LCF 
should be associated with a RCF. The rationale underlying the choice of a three-layer 
organization was to achieve the combination of close local contacts and connections 
while minimizing the risks associated with seasonality and regional shocks, which can 
become an urgent problem especially when the sources of income of members are 
homogeneous. 
The intention underlying the creation of the PCF system was that it should be developed 
both from above (the SBV) and below (the founding members who are identified with the 
help of the local people’s committee). Most initiatives to start up new LCFs have, 
however, come from the SBV, which has also provided intensive support in control, 
supervision and training of staff, in particular during the implementation stage.5  
While addressing and seeking to constrain the crisis in the CC system throughout 1990, 
the government also found time to pass new legislation intended to further the 
diversification of the financial sector. The banking decrees passed in May 1990 thus 
allowed further (albeit limited) foreign bank participation and the progressive 
establishment of 54 joint stock banks (JSBs). Many of the latter did, however, supplant 
already existing credit cooperatives.  
                                                 
3 To signal its new role in the economy the VBARD was renamed the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture 
(VBA) in November 1991.  
4 For more information see: http://www.did.qc.ca/Ang/default.html 
5 See Section 6.3 for additional information and an analysis of current problems facing the PCF system. 
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Overall, the events in the early 1990s did little to curb government dominance over the 
financial sector. The PCF system was not an independent, non-governmental alternative 
and the conditions under which foreign banks were allowed to enter the Vietnamese 
market were so restrictive that the foreign banks appear to have ended up serving only 
foreign firms operating in Vietnam.  
The persistent dominance of government controlled financial institutions implied the 
continuation of the intimate relationship between the SOCBs and the state owned 
enterprises (the SOE sector). One manifestation of the close nexus between the SOCBs 
and the SOE sector was the allocation of a large share of total credit that went to state 
owned enterprises (SOEs).6 The intimate relationship between the SOCBs and the SOE 
sector is believed to have adversely affected the strength of the banking sector in the 
following ways:  
• The SOE sector was characterized by low efficiency and resulting difficulties in 
servicing their debts, which caused a deterioration of especially SOCB balance 
sheets. According to official statistics from the SBV the SOCBs held 75 percent 
of total overdue loans in 1997. A total 33 percent of total overdue loans were 
owed by SOEs (principally to SOCBs). It is, however, likely that official figures 
underestimate the magnitude of the problem given that ever-greening (rolling over 
overdue loans into new loans) of especially SOE loans was both allowed and 
widely practiced. In addition, loan classification in Vietnam did not follow 
international practices and definitions during this period. Instead of classifying the 
entire loan as non-performing in the case of defaulting payments, the Vietnamese 
approach up until recently appears to have been to classify the only actual arrears 
as non-performing while maintaining the remainder of the principal as active and 
performing. Even without any ever-greening it is clear that such accounting 
practice will result in estimates of the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
that are much lower than standard international practice. The problem of the non-
performing loans in the SOCBs and the recent measures to resolve these are 
discussed in Section 5.5. 
• Directly related to the above-mentioned recent measures addressing the non-
performing loans is that the high concentration of SOCBs loans given to SOEs. 
They were in addition concentrated within certain sectors implying that risk 
exposure for these banks was (and remains) very high. Allowing SOCBs to 
                                                 
6 In 1997 the SOEs received 40.2 percent of SOCB credit and 47.2 of total non-governmental credit 
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provide unsecured loans and having non-standard and non-transparent 
provisioning rules have further aggravated the problem. This in turn results in 
bank viability and financial sector stability being crucially dependent upon how 
the non-performing loan problem is resolved. 
• The extensive direct government control of credit allocation and control implied 
that staff skills and knowledge of creditor screening and supervision became 
superfluous. As a consequence, specialized staff skills and knowledge about for 
instance loan assessment and provisioning was not generated and/or maintained. 
The above-mentioned problems in the banking sector became visible already during the 
first period (1986-1997). However, the close relationship between the Vietnamese 
banking and SOE sectors in combination with the government emphasis on social 
stability implied that a reform of the SOE sector had to lead or at least be simultaneous 
with any attempt to tackle the banking problems. A situation where banks, following a 
banking sector reform, would refuse to extend credit to non-reformed SOEs was not 
politically acceptable. It would most likely result in financial problems and massive 
layouts in the SOE sector, which in turn could jeopardize the social and political stability 
of the country. The significance attached to maintaining social stability and the 
implications for the limited latitude for financial sector reforms was to become even more 
evident in the period following the East Asian Financial Crisis in 1997. 
Despite the fact that the above-mentioned problems became visible during the first phase 
(1986-1997) the economy overall reacted positively to the Doi Moi reforms. Annual GNP 
growth almost doubled from a level around 5 percent in 1990 to 9-10 percent in the peak 
years of 1994-1996 (see Figure 3.1). 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
A
nn
ua
l %
 
 
Figure 3.1: Gross national product (GNP) (annual growth in percent)  
Source: WDI (2001) 
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Towards the end of the first period (1988-1997) economic growth and the reform process 
began to stall. The potential reasons for this slowdown in the GNP growth rate are 
manifold. They range from problems of moral hazard and lack of incentives in the state 
owned enterprises to endemic corruption and an inflexible bureaucracy leading to an 
inefficient state. Moreover, in 1997 the country was hit by the worst tropical storm in 
fifty years and widespread peasant unrest erupted in the northern province of Thai Binh – 
factors, which undoubtedly contributed a loss of confidence. The result was a visible 
deceleration of the economy and the first signs of vulnerability, already prior to severe 
regional financial crisis, which was waiting in the wings.  
The acceleration of the GNP growth rate was, however, not the sole positive development 
during the first period. Inflation, here measured by the deflator of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), fell markedly from triple digits as experienced in the 1980s to single digit 
rates towards the end of the first period.  
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Figure 3.2: Inflation (annual GDP deflator)  
Source: WDI (2001) 
The fall in inflation was followed by a parallel fall in interest rates resulting in positive 
real interest rates and the end of interest rate inversion (deposit rates being higher than 
lending rates). On the negative side, the crisis in the (private) credit cooperatives coupled 
with a history of government control and lack of transparency provides possible 
explanations for the comparatively low mobilization of savings through the formal 
financial sector in Vietnam as depicted in Figure 3.3. 
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Figure 3.3: Gross domestic savings (GDS) (percent of GDP)  
Source: WDI 2001 
As can be seen from Figure 3.3, the ratio of gross domestic savings to GDP in Vietnam 
was below 20 percent throughout the first period, which compares poorly to neighbouring 
countries like the Peoples Republic of China (gross domestic savings around 42-43 
percent of GDP) and Thailand (gross domestic savings between 31-35 percent of GDP).  
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Figure 3.4: Financial depth (M2 and M3 as share of GDP in percent)  
Source: WDI (2001) 
Figure 3.4 depicts another very interesting aspect of the Vietnamese financial sector, 
which has remained virtually unchanged throughout the period: the almost constant and 
relatively small difference between M2 (defined as cash holdings plus on-demand 
deposits) and M3 (defined as all liquid liabilities. This indicates that financial instruments 
and financial intermediation plays a minor role in comparison to cash when it comes to 
handling transactions. Towards the end of the period depicted in Figure 3.4 one can, 
 30
however, detect what could be the beginning of a rapid growth in M3, which could 
indicate a higher reliance on and use of the formal financial sector. 
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Figure 3.5: Credit to the private sector (percent of GDP)  
Source: WDI (2001) 
This can be seen from Figure 3.5, indicating that the credit to the private sector increased 
rapidly in 1999.7 Returning to the lack of financial depth reflected in Figure 3.4, one can 
speculate as to the possible explanations. In this context, an obvious candidate is the 
above-mentioned limited trust in the formal sector, which was triggered/reinforced by the 
defaults in the credit cooperative system. Another aspect of the Vietnamese financial 
sector, where the supposedly limited trust in the formal sector is also proposed as a 
possible explanation, is the degree of dollarization.  
In general one can identify two, not necessarily conflicting explanations as to why 
Vietnamese residents choose to hold United States (US) dollars as a supplement to or 
instead of Vietnam Dong (VND):  
• Dollars are used as a medium of exchange. Here the driving factor is the 
opportunity cost of holding domestic currency instead of dollars, which may rise 
significantly during periods of macroeconomic instability and high inflation 
leading residents to demand more dollars. 
• Dollars are used to store value. Here a key factor is residents’ desire to minimize 
their portfolio risk and variance. This implies that prudent savers and investors 
increase dollars holdings if their expected inflation rate diverges from the 
expected real exchange rate movements.  
                                                 
7 The allocation of credit between state and non-state enterprises is analysed in Chapter 6. 
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The problems associated with a high degree of dollarization are twofold. First, the 
existence of a parallel currency system will make it more difficult for the government to 
conduct monetary policy as the shifts in demand and supply of dollars is difficult to 
predict let alone control. Second, the use of dollars will undermine the revenue the 
government derives from seignorage, corresponding to the amount of real resources 
appropriated by the government by means of printing money, and from the implicit 
inflation tax imposed on holders of domestic currency by inflation.8 For these reasons 
governments have frequently sought to limit or prohibit the use and holding of dollars, 
which in turn has made the phenomenon very difficult to track and measure. Vietnam is 
no exception, and no estimate of the precise amount of dollars circulating in the 
Vietnamese economy exists. Instead, the ratio of legitimate foreign currency deposits to 
total deposits is often used as a proxy for the degree of dollarization. The underlying 
assumption behind this choice of proxy variable is that although the ratio of foreign 
currency deposits probably does not reflect the level of dollarization it might give an 
indication of the trend and movements in the degree of dollarization. 
According to Leung and Huy Duc (2000) there were no significant holdings of dollars in 
the country in the decade prior to 1985.9 This, however, started to change as the barter 
trade with the Soviet Union began to decrease and domestic inflation accelerated from 
1986 (see Figure 3.2), leading to increased demand for US dollars. Unteroberdoerster 
(2002) supports this, finding that the ‘medium of exchange motive’ is the most likely 
explanation for the rapid rise in foreign currency deposits in the early 1990s. As for the 
increase in the FDCs from 1996 Unteroberdoerster, however, points to the ‘store of value 
motive’ as the most likely explanation given the fact that the inflation was under control 
in this period (see Figure 3.2) and that the EAFC and lower economic growth made 
agents uncertain of the government will and capacity to defend the exchange rate. 
Finally, Unteroberdoerster suggests that a more recent increase in dollarization (not 
depicted here) appears to have been caused by a combination of asset substitution and 
increased integration with the global economy. 
                                                 
8 Historically, the limited success in collecting income taxes in combination with the relatively recent 
introduction of VAT (in 1999) has implied that seignorage has been a very important source of government 
revenue in Vietnam. This further acerbates the importance of reducing the level of dollarization in the 
economy.  
9 The only exception is the South during the American War. 
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Figure 3.6: Foreign currency deposits (percent of M2)  
Source: IMF (2002) 
More specifically, Unteroberdoerster (2002) points to the following potentially 
explanatory factors: 
• Renewed confidence in the financial sector and the lack of alternative interest-
bearing financial instruments.  
• Increasing expectations of devaluation – residents are going for safety.  
• Relatively strong export performance in recent years. 
• The interest rate differential, which earlier favoured VND deposits, has 
disappeared.  
The recent increase is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that the SBV recently 
tightened legislation in order to make it less attractive for banks to offer foreign currency 
deposits. As can be seen from Figure 3.6, the increase in dollarization and the overall 
decline in economic activity (see Figure 3.1), began prior to the EAFC. Hence the 
Vietnamese economy was already in crisis by the time the regional crisis broke out.  
 
3.2 The East Asian Financial Crisis and its Aftermath, 1997-2002 
The absence of a liberalized capital account in combination with an inconvertible 
currency spared the Vietnamese banking system from the detrimental impact of volatile 
capital flows and institutional distress. In contrast to countries like Indonesia, Korea and 
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Malaysia, the Vietnamese banking sector was to a large extent shielded from the direct 
effects of the East Asian Financial Crisis.  
One of the observed direct effects of the crisis was that enterprises, expecting a 
devaluation of the VND, chose to hold foreign currency rather than sell it to the banks. 
This led to an excessive demand for foreign currency on the inter-bank market, which left 
the SBV with the burden of supplying foreign currency until a decree was passed 
requiring firms to sell 80 percent of their foreign exchange to banks (this was later 
reduced to 50 percent). The SBV furthermore decided upon a 10 percent devaluation of 
the official exchange rate to the US dollar in August 1998, thereby reducing the 
perceived pressure for VND devaluation and the demand for foreign currency. 
The principal indirect effect of the EAFC on the financial sector was a deterioration of 
bank assets as bank customers and debtors experienced falling export earnings and/or a 
reduction in foreign direct investments. As can be seen from Figure 3.7, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) had, however, already begun to fall in the years leading up to the crisis 
– possibly reflecting the aforementioned already visible structural problems in the 
Vietnamese economy.  
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Figure 3.7: Foreign direct investment (percent of GDP)  
Source: WDI (2001) 
In addition, Vietnamese enterprises and banks had borrowed heavily in foreign currency 
to take advantage of lower interest rates in a steady exchange rate environment. This 
implied that the devaluation of the VND in August 1998 worsened the situation of both 
banks and bank customers.  
The initial government response to a looming crisis was one of denial. Press coverage on 
the banking system was restricted following the first signs of problems in early 1997 (i.e. 
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already prior to the East Asian Financial Crisis). By classifying information relating to 
the banking sector as state secrets, the government could furthermore penalize anyone 
who reported on financial sector problems with up to fifteen years in prison.  
With the onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis and the resulting popular uprisings and 
unrest in a number of members of the Association of South East Asian Countries 
(ASEAN) most notably Indonesia in January 1998, the Vietnamese government shifted 
from a comprehensive to a gradualist approach to reforms. Instead, priority was accorded 
to maintaining social and political stability. This implied that the policy response to the 
crisis included using the banking sector to stabilize and support the crisis-stricken SOEs 
rather than addressing the inherent and severe problems in the banking sector. The 
favourable treatment of the SOEs through the SOCBs during 1998 included: 
• Abolishing the requirement for SOEs to put up collateral when borrowing from 
SOCBs 
• Permitting lending to loss making SOEs who submit business plans  
• Writing off bad loans 
• Lower interest rates to SOEs 
• Allowing the rescheduling loans to troubled SOEs from 1-3 year terms to 1-5 year 
terms 
The combination of the economic crisis and the SOE support measures put a heavy 
financial burden on especially the SOCBs, which led to increasing problems during 1998 
- 1999. The government response to the possibility of a crisis in the SOCBs did, however, 
resemble that introducing support the SOEs a year earlier. Thus, the government chose to 
introduce compensating measures, which to a large extent addressed the symptoms and 
not the underlying causes of the crisis. These measures included:  
• Lowering the income tax rate for the banking system from 45 to 32 percent 
(January 1999) 
• Lowering the reserve requirement ratio from 8 to 5 percent (March 1999) 
• Direct allocation of funds (September 1999) 
Since data are not available on bank financial performance and the size of their 
nonperforming loans based on international loan classification and risk management 
standards, it is difficult to gauge the severity of the problems and the extent to which the 
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above-mentioned measures worked. This is a situation, which is further complicated by 
the very limited overall transparency in the financial sector and the existence of special 
rules. For example, NPLs resulting from directed lending and some credit programmes 
for the poor are not classified as NPLs (KFW 2002). The problems associated with the 
high ratio of NPLs in the banking sector and the measures proposed to resolve these 
problems are the subject of Section 5.5.  
International observers have noted how the crisis and ensuing widespread social unrest in 
South East Asia during 1997-98 raised doubts over the continued reform process in the 
minds of Vietnamese party leaders. Fear of loosing control made the Vietnamese 
approach towards further reforms piecemeal and cautious. Albeit the need for further 
comprehensive reforms was stressed in official communiqués from a number of Central 
Committee plenums, it appears to have been more rhetoric than reality. Consequently, 
Vietnam did not follow the repeated advice of international agencies (led by the World 
Bank and IMF) in the years following the EAFC to implement a second round of 
comprehensive reforms – a ‘Doi Moi 2’. 
The Ninth Party Congress held in March 2001 marks a turning point with respect to 
obtaining a commitment towards comprehensive and far-reaching reforms. In preparation 
for the Ninth Party Congress the government had undertaken a number of strategic 
planning exercises including the formulation of a Development Strategy for the period 
2001-2010 as well as ten-year strategies and five-year plans for key sectors prepared by 
the responsible line ministries.  
Following the Party Congress the government further committed itself to reforms by 
requesting and obtaining a three-year assistance arrangement with the IMF and the World 
Bank. This first agreement between Vietnam and the Bretton Woods institutions 
increased the pressure for early and sustained reforms of both the SOCB and the SOE 
sectors. 
Some have explained the resurgence of an official commitment to comprehensive 
reforms by the failure to obtain the pre-crisis high economic growth rates in the three 
years following the EAFC (see Figure 3.1). In 2000 the government undertook a 
substantial loosening of the credit policy in an effort to boost domestic investments. The 
majority of the rapid growth in credit was in VND and stemmed from the SOCBs.10 The 
expansion of domestic credit, however, failed to produce immediate results, and the 
                                                 
10 This most likely resulted in a decrease in asset quality, as SOCB lending was not subject to sufficient 
market discipline. 
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three-year slow-down in economic growth following the EAFC apparently made it 
possible to convince conservative reformers in the government that continued reforms 
coupled with regional and global integration was the only way to regain the performance 
legitimacy that high growth rates had bestowed upon the government prior to the crisis. 
The pace of structural reforms in the banking sector had, however, already begun to 
slowly pick up in 2000. The first priority was to restructure and strengthen the JSBs. The 
SBV completed the financial assessment of 48 JSB by the end of 2000, and on the basis 
of these the SBV completed and approved restructuring plans for all 48 JSBs. The result 
was that 13 of the 48 JSBs were placed under special supervision/control by the SBV that 
two licenses were revoked and that one bank merged. The licenses of another set of JSBs 
were revoked later in 2001, and a number of other JSB will follow suit unless 
improvements are recorded in the central prudential ratios. In December 2001 the number 
of JSBs had been reduced with almost 40 percent compared to 2000, and the expectation 
is that the current number of JSBs will be halved over the next two years (IMF 2001).  
The renewed propulsion in the reform process was, however, not restricted to the JSBs. 
In March 2001 the government approved an overall SOCB reform framework. The 
objective of this framework is to enforce better lending discipline and the government has 
announced that policy induced lending will be phased out ‘except under limited and 
explicitly identified circumstances with government guarantees’.11 The phasing out of 
policy lending is furthermore made conditional on the establishment of a policy bank, 
which is envisioned to issue all new policy loans.  
Moreover, each of the four large SOCBs will, conditional on satisfactory performance 
and progress, undergo a phased recapitalisation over the next three years. In this context, 
satisfactory performance entails undergoing reforms and restructuring in a number of 
areas. Measures are aimed at increasing the transparency of SOCB operations and include 
independent audits based on international accounting standards of each bank and 
ensuring that loan classification and loan-loss provisioning are more in line with 
international standards. The full adoption of loan provisioning according to international 
accounting standards will moreover be introduced gradually over the next three years.12  
                                                 
11 See, Socialist Republic of Vietnam (2001a). It remains to be seen how the government defines ‘limited’ 
circumstances. 
12 The structural reforms and the regulation of the financial sector is the subject of Chapter 4, which also 
contains a comparison with regulatory practice in other ASEAN countries. 
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The total costs of the banking reform and recapitalisation are still uncertain, but a 
preliminary estimate (IMF 2001) puts the total capital costs of the banks debt recovery 
process at VND 24 trillion – amounting to approximately 5 percent of GDP. The 
government has announced that the cost of banking reform and recapitalisation will be 
treated as an extraordinary outlay and financed through internal bank resources, including 
loan recoveries and strengthened profitability, nonnegotiable government bonds, bank 
bonds, external support and government budgetary resources. 
The recent approval and adoption of specific plans for Incombank (ICB), Vietnam Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) and the Bank for Investment and 
Development (BID) in November 2001 have further served to bring reform efforts back 
on track.  
In addition to the efforts to restructure and recapitalise the SOCBs, the earlier mentioned 
SOE/SOCB interdependence is directly and indirectly addressed in a number of related 
financial sector initiatives and policies, including:  
• The decision to restrict debt relief in the context of SOCB restructuring to SOEs 
undergoing government approved reform measures. Loan-reduction and/or write-
off can only be applied for SOEs that are subject to liquidation, divestiture, or 
equitisation under the SOE reform programme. 
• A ceiling on bank system credit accorded to individual SOEs, including a special 
monitoring of bank credit and budget support for 200 SOEs with large debts.  
• The medium-term SOE reform plan adopted in March 2001 stipulating annual 
targets for equitisation, divestiture, and closure over the next three years. The plan 
includes steps to strengthen SOE financial discipline and introduce safety nets for 
redundant labour. 
• The opening of the official Vietnamese stock exchange in June 2000. Although 
the initial number of listed companies was only five, the symbolic importance of 
this event was significant. It presented firms and SOEs with a potential future 
alternative source of financing. 
The government moreover aims to coordinate overall credit policy with the pace of SOE 
and SOCB reforms, in particular to impose greater financial discipline on the highly 
indebted SOEs. The overall framework for doing so is improved as the government on 
the basis of the recent Public Expenditure Review has developed and implemented a 
programme intended to improve the transparency, tracking and accountability of public 
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spending. In parallel with the efforts to put bank operations on a commercial basis whilst 
reducing SOCB/SOE interdependence, the overall financial sector framework will 
undergo a number of structural reforms towards greater reliance on indirect instruments. 
This includes: 
• A more flexible interest rate. In August 2000 a new base rate mechanism was 
introduced. This entailed widening the allowable range in which banks set lending 
rates coupled with a further relaxation of controls. In November 2001 the interest 
rate ceilings on foreign currency loans were abolished, bestowing Vietnamese 
lenders the opportunity to negotiate for foreign currency loans in both overseas 
and Vietnamese based banks. The banks based in Vietnam can, however, not 
necessarily set interest rates on foreign currency loans at their own discretion, as 
they are required to take international market rates and the domestic supply and 
demand in account. Lending in VND is still subject to an upper limit on interest 
rates, which is defined as the base rate plus 0.3 percent for short term loans and 
plus 0.5 percent for medium to long term loans. 
• A more flexible exchange rate. Over the period 1990 –2001 the government 
gradually eased the control of the exchange rate. Initially, the government had 
sought to adjust to the changing external environment through adjustments in the 
official rate and/or the width of the trading band. In February 1999 the SBV, 
however, announced that the official rate was abolished, and that the government 
would in the future influence the exchange rate through the inter bank markets 
only. The foreign balancing requirement for foreign invested companies was 
lifted in November 2000, and in December 2001 the requirement that companies 
have to deposit 50 percent of their foreign currency earnings with the banking 
sector was eased to 40 percent.13  
Alongside the structural reforms and the gradual liberalization of the banking sector, 
considerable efforts have been undertaken to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory 
capacity in Vietnam. The State Bank of Vietnam holds a central position in these efforts.  
Summing up the second phase (1997 – the present) can be characterized as a gradual 
return to the more comprehensive and fundamental reforms of the financial sector that 
were discarded following the East Asian Financial Crisis in the 1997 – 1998. It is, 
however, important to note that most of the more fundamental reforms are still at an 
initial stage, implying that the official commitment and resolve towards reforms has yet 
                                                 
13 The plan is to gradually phase out this rule over the next three years. 
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to be seriously tested. In this context a very important litmus test of the political will to 
sustain the efforts to introduce a more market-based financial sector will be the above-
mentioned efforts to restructure and recapitalise the SOCBs and their NPLs in particular.  
 
3.3 Concluding Remarks 
The identification of two distinct phases in the transition from a government controlled 
financial sector towards a more market-based system does not exclude the possibility that 
structural events originating in the first phase continue to exert considerable influence – 
even today. In this context, two events from the first phase stand out: 
• The virtual collapse and ensuing disappearance of the credit cooperative system 
during the last half of 1990 may have had detrimental effects upon the general 
level of trust in the formal financial system – even today. 
• The decision to liberalize the financial sector as one of the first sectors prior to 
both any attempts at liberalizing the SOE sector and a decision to limit/stop 
directed lending is likely to have contributed greatly to the magnitude of the NPL 
problems, which are at the heart of the matter of the problems facing the financial 
sector today. 
Alongside with the above-mentioned effects of the East Asian Financial Crisis on the 
overall government approach to further reforms and liberalization, it should be clear that 
the historical analysis performed here can contribute significantly to the current 
understanding of the issues and problems in the sector.  
Finally, the following timeline summarises important events in and relevant to the 
Vietnamese financial sector: 
 
1990 • A large number of credit cooperatives go bankrupt causing the 
virtual collapse of the credit cooperative system. 
• The SBV and the two-tier banking system are established. 
• The Rules governing new entries into the banking system are 
liberalized. 
• The Rules on the stipulated sector specialization of the four major 
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SOCBs are removed. 
 
1991 • The practice of increasing money supply to finance budget deficits is 
officially abolished. 
 
1992 • Tight fiscal and monetary measures cause the rate of inflation to 
decrease and real interest rates to turn positive. 
 
1993 • The domestic inter-bank market is established. 
• All forms of subsidized credit to SOEs are officially terminated. 
 
1994 • The inter-bank market for foreign currency is established. 
• The Bankruptcy Law governing all enterprises is passed and 
economic courts to hear such cases are established. 
• Vietnam joins the ASEAN.  
 
1995 • Civil code passed by the National Assembly requires the SBV to 
clarify rules governing borrowing and lending to commercial banks. 
 
1996 • The property market in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City collapses. 
• SBV issues a loan classification system stipulating the grouping of 
loans into four categories. 
 
1997 • 6 percent devaluation to the US dollar (February). 
• East Asian Financial Crisis results in macroeconomic turmoil and 
crisis throughout the region, leading to considerable devaluation of 
currencies in and reductions the growth rates of neighbouring 
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countries.  
• 10 percent devaluation to the US dollar (August). 
 
1998 • The Law on the State Bank comes into effect, stipulating the degree 
of SBV independence.  
• The National Congress ceases to officially influence interest rate 
levels. 
• Commercial banks are required to make provision for loan losses. 
• State Bank recapitalisation improves the capital adequacy of the 
SOCBs. 
• A number of JSBs come under special control/supervision. Some 
have their licenses revoked, while others are forced to merge with 
other JSBs. 
 
1999 • Independent diagnostic audit of the SBV, the SOCBs and the JSBs 
were completed. 
• On the basis of these audits, the government decided to restructure 
the JSBs first. JSBs were classified into four types and restructuring 
strategies for each type were developed. 
• Bank Restructuring Committee is established. 
• Postal savings system is established. 
 
2000 • National stock exchange opens in Ho Chi Minh City. 
• Exchange rate policy and regime is eased.  
• Land use rights and other fixed assets are permitted to be used as 
loan collateral 
• Using the inter-bank market the SBV initiates more market-based 
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control of end-customer interest rates in the banking sector.  
• Vietnam - United States bilateral trade agreement is signed. 
• Interest rate controls on foreign currency deposits are liberalised. 
• Foreign balancing requirement for foreign-invested enterprises is 
lifted.  
• The Law on Insurance Business is passed.  
 
2001 • Medium-term SOE reform plan adopted (March). Banking and SOE 
reform is given priority. Total estimated costs of banking and SOE 
reform (2001-2003) between 7-12 percent of GDP (depending on 
accounting standards used). 
• IMF initiates the recapitalisation of the four large SOCBs.  
• Decision 284 officially brings loan classification and loan-loss 
provisioning in line with international standards.  
 
2002 • A decentralised system of asset management companies is 
established to face the problem of non-performing loans in the 
SOCBs. 
• Phased recapitalisation of the SOCBs is initiated on the basis on 
comprehensive reviews based on international accounting standards. 
The process is, however, off to a slow start. 
• Banks are allowed to set interest rates for loans through individual 
assessment of and negotiations with individual customers. 
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4 Bank Supervision and Regulation 
The question of whether financial development leads or follows economic growth has 
been addressed in a number of both empirical and theoretical analyses. A significant body 
of the literature has suggested that financial development can contribute significantly to 
economic growth. Nevertheless, the question remains as to how exactly this takes place 
and what governments can do to support and strengthen the growth enhancing functions 
of the financial sector. 
Although the predominantly negative experiences from the use of directed credit and 
controlled interest rate levels during the 1970s and 1980s to some degree continues to 
discredit direct government controlled credit allocation, it is increasingly recognized that 
government failure does not imply market success. This is especially the case in the 
financial sector, where moral hazard and adverse selection problems are both abundant 
and a particular concern given the fact that most transactions are forward-looking and 
based on mutual trust in the other party’s ability to honour the specified contracts. Hence, 
government intervention in and regulation of the financial sector is justifiable, but in what 
form and to what degree? Should the government aim at achieving a certain level of 
financial depth or the implementation of a certain structure, or should the government 
focus more on the establishing an optimal framework guiding the financial sector while 
letting market participants choose the direction and speed of change?  
Recent research, using country-, industry-, and firm-level investigations of the financial 
structure for economic development, has shown that distinguishing countries by financial 
structure does not help explain cross-country differences in long-run GDP growth, 
industrial performance, new firm formation, firm use of external funds, or firm growth 
(World Bank 2002, and Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt, Levine and Maksimov 2000). Taken at 
face value, this implies that policymakers should concentrate on strengthening the legal 
and regulatory framework rather than attempt to build a particular financial structure. It 
could moreover imply that a government’s success in designing and implementing an 
effective legal and regulatory environment to support the natural evolution of a given 
financial structure has a positive and important effect upon the country’s ability to 
compete with other countries.  
If one accepts the above-mentioned perspective as a working-hypothesis it becomes very 
interesting to compare Vietnam’s effort and performance in the area of financial sector 
regulation with that of other ASEAN economies. In this context, the objective of a 
regional comparison is to assist in the analysis of whether and from whom Vietnam 
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could learn how to create a regulatory and legal framework that is more conducive to 
financial sector development and economic growth. 
The analysis will be performed in seven separate subsections. Following a brief 
introduction to the history of financial sector regulation in Vietnam in Section 4.1, we 
turn to analysing the degree to which the regulatory framework in Vietnam is affected by 
historical determinants in Section 4.2. Subsequently, in Section 4.3 the analysis moves on 
to consider how competitive the Vietnamese financial sector is compared to other 
countries in the region and to developing countries in general. In this context, 
privatisation and entry requirements are considered as key examples of policies that can 
be used to generate a more intensive competition between financial sector institutions. 
Section 4.4 analyses the regulatory framework, which is compared to that of other 
countries in the region and to developing countries in general, while Section 4.5 
compares Vietnamese accounting and auditing standards with those of the other countries 
in the region. The issues of safety nets, capital adequacy and deposit insurances are 
considered in Section 4.6, which precedes the interim summing-up and conclusion in the 
final Section 4.7 of this chapter. 
 
4.1 Retrospective 
Bank regulation and supervision has existed in some form or other in Vietnam since the 
creation of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) in 1951 (see Chapter 5), where the Office of 
State Inspection audited the activities of the SBV. The creation of a two tier banking 
system in 1989 and the continuing transition to a market economy imposed new 
challenges that required changes in the objectives, structure, and implementation of the 
prudential supervisory framework. One of the most important and difficult changes is the 
effort to create a more level playing field between government and privately controlled 
financial institutions. 
Like many other developing countries Vietnam has a concentrated banking sector with a 
high level of state ownership. Following the Asian Development Bank (ADB 1999), the 
major State Owned Commercial Banks (SOCBs) hold approximately 75 percent of total 
assets of the banking sector. In addition, the SOCBs are large shareholders in the Joint 
Stock Banks (JSBs), and as markets for SOCBs and JSBs are completely separate in 
terms of both depositors and borrowers the share of assets under complete or partial 
government control could be much higher. The SOCB dominance is further reflected in 
the fact that the major SOCBs undertook approximately 80 percent of the commercial 
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bank operations during the 1990s although this share was declining somewhat during the 
period (see Chapter 6).  
Given their dominant and central position in the financial system, the SBV continually 
exerts considerable efforts to strengthen the legal and regulatory framework for the 
SOCB. Recently, new regulations where adopted to strengthen the prudential framework. 
This most likely reflects that the SBV and the government have realized the importance 
of the implementation of an effective prudential bank supervision programme. The 
changes are far-reaching and affect the financial sector in a multitude of ways – all 
pointing towards a gradually larger reliance on guided market powers. The recent reforms 
include:  
• Strengthening the legal and regulatory framework for entry and exit into the 
sector. Here the plans for the near future include a standard review of minimum 
capital requirements, the introduction of qualitative evaluations of new entrants, 
and the creation of accountability standards for Bank Board of Directors and 
senior management.  
• Addressing potential conflicts of interest and moral hazard problems. Vietnam 
has, in order to reduce the risk of encountering problems of this nature, adopted 
regulation that limits financial institutions from lending to shareholders, directors 
and enterprises in which the bank has ownership interests. In addition, Vietnam 
has agreed to establish and implement a risk based bank supervision system and is 
currently working on the development and establishment of a CAMEL14 bank 
rating system, which is required if a risk-based banking supervision is to result in 
improved bank supervisory practices.  
• Protection of depositors. A deposit-insurance scheme covering all depositors has 
been established.  
• Enhancing the overall transparency of the sector. As a part of the agreement with 
the IMF and the WB the Vietnamese government has pledged to change the 
current loan classification and the loan loss provisioning standards to bring them 
in line with international standards. As a part of this process independent IAS 
audits of the large SOCBs was recently completed – although the results have not 
been made publicly available. Finally, the government has indicated that bank 
                                                 
14 CAMEL is an internationally recognized framework for assessing the Capital adequacy, Asset quality, 
Management, Earnings and Liquidity of banks. Recently, an ‘S’ for Supervision was added, making the 
acronym CAMELS. 
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compliance to the revised loan classification and loan loss provisioning will be 
verified through recurrent audits. In addition, the government is considering 
whether or not it should develop an implementation plan for the use of IAS in the 
banking sector and in banking supervisory functions. 
Some of these recent reforms should be viewed in connection with the efforts to 
restructure the four large SOCBs. This restructuring is among the current big issues in the 
efforts to develop a transparent and accountable financial sector, and in some areas they 
have already begun. The government has, for example, already developed and agreed 
upon a detailed restructuring plan for the Vietcombank. This consists among other things 
also of a timetable for the implementation of performance conditions closely linked to its 
phased re-capitalization over three years. During the next couple of years a detailed 
restructuring plan for the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(VBARD), Incombank and the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam 
(BIDV) will be developed on the basis of the recently completed IAS audits mentioned 
above. In this context the issue of the non-performing loans held by the SOCBs play a 
crucial role. Due to its central importance for the overall stability and profitability of the 
financial sector the issue of NPL is analysed in depth in Section 5.5.  
Overall, the reform strategy for the banking sector in Vietnam aims at restoring 
soundness to the system and to improve the efficiency of financial intermediation. As 
described throughout this report, the Vietnamese government has adopted a wide range of 
reforms designed to increase competition, move toward a market-oriented allocation and 
mobilization of resources while maintaining system stability. Although the above-
mentioned reforms in many ways represent steps in the right direction, this process of 
gradually liberalizing the financial sector is not without risks for both the financial sector 
and for the economy as a whole. The cost of re-capitalization of the SOCBs might, for 
example, give rise to concern if the pace of SOE and banking reform slows down. 
Many of the above-mentioned reforms are inspired by the experiences of other countries 
and/or internationally recognised best practice. In this context it is, however, important to 
recognise and take into account that Vietnam’s initial conditions (see below) for a sound 
financial development might be quite different from the countries with which Vietnam 
normally compares herself. Furthermore, it is important to note that the financial sector in 
a developed country differs significantly from that in emerging market economies. As a 
result, “best practice” lessons from developed countries do not always translate to 
developing countries such as Vietnam. 
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4.2 Law, Politics or Endowments 
A recent World Bank study (Beck, Demirgüz-Kunt and Levine 2001) evaluates different 
theories of why some countries develop well-functioning financial systems, and why 
some countries have laws that support financial development. Three theories/views on the 
historical determinants of financial development are assessed here:  
1. The legal view, which emphasizes legal traditions as a central prerequisite for 
sound and stable financial sector development. 
2. The political view rejects the central role of the legal tradition and stresses 
instead the central influence of politics on financial sector development.  
3. The endowment view puts emphasis on the fact that geography and climate 
induced disease proneness influence the formation of economic and political 
institutions, which again influence financial sector development.  
Turning first to the legal view, one can identify two primary channels through which 
legal tradition influences financial development: (a) legal traditions differ in terms of the 
priority they attach to private property rights and investor rights, and (b) the protection of 
these rights form the basis of financial contracting (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny 1998 and 1999). If correct, one implication of this view is that historically 
determined differences in legal tradition can help in explaining observed cross-country 
differences in financial development. According to the legal view, legal traditions are 
spread throughout the world through conquest, colonization, and imitation. Furthermore, 
once systems and institutions are in place, they are difficult to change and/or change very 
slowly, the implication being that a significant proportion of current international 
differences in financial development can be traced back to different historical origins and 
traditions dating back to the colonial era in less-developed countries.  
Table 4.1 contains a listing of the legal origin of some of the South East Asian countries, 
revealing that Vietnam and Cambodia are the only countries, which share a legal 
environment, which is influenced by both the Socialist and French legal tradition. One of 
the main results in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998, 1999) is that 
the legal systems in countries, which follow a French civil law tradition, appear to be less 
effective in supporting financial development than legal systems in countries, which 
adhere to a German, British or Scandinavian legal tradition/system. Hence, La Porta et al. 
establish that countries with a German or a British legal tradition in general have 
achieved a higher level of greater financial development than countries where the legal 
system adhere to a French legal tradition. The explanations given by the La Porta et al. is 
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that French civil law is more static than other legal traditions, which in combination with 
a more widespread distrust of judges, a distaste for jurisprudence and for open judicial 
disputations, make the French legal tradition more comfortable with rigid bright-line 
rules and legal certainty. The result is that a legal system, which follows the French 
tradition typically, is less responsive towards sectors and conditions that change 
frequently (as is typically the case in the financial sector). In short, the financial sector 
will typically not be facing a sufficiently high level of judicial discretion in countries 
where the legal system follows the French tradition, which in turn have a detrimental 
effect upon financial sector development. 
If one believes that legal origin matters to the degree proposed by (among others) La 
Porta et al., the policy implications are quite clear. While Vietnam cannot change its legal 
origin, it can – albeit with considerable effort – reform its judicial system by emphasizing 
the rights of outside investors, by making contract enforcement more efficient, and by 
creating a legal system that more effectively evolves to support changing economic 
conditions. Another point, which is worth emphasizing, is that Vietnam should be careful 
about making direct inferences and/or adopting Chinese financial development policies 
without prior modifications and adaptation according to a Vietnamese context. The 
reason is the different starting point with regard to legal origin. The policies necessary in 
order to secure sound financial development in Vietnam may be much more fundamental 
and far-reaching than those implemented in China.  
Turning next to the so-called “political view” of financial development, this theory 
predicts that political factors will dominate the legal factors in determining the level 
and/or pace of financial sector development. These theories are inspired by North (1990) 
and Olson (1993) and emphasize that the elite will pursue their own interests, which in 
turn are reflected in government policies. Furthermore the proponents of the political 
view stress that political structures inherently tend to thwart financial development. For 
example, it can be argued that a centralized and powerful government tends to be 
incompatible with financial development, because the proper functioning of financial 
institutions and markets requires imposing limitations on government discretion, which 
might again be incompatible with the ambitions of a centralized and powerful state. Only 
if the elite sees itself as being enriched by free, competitive markets, will this group exert 
pressure on the state to create laws and institutions to stimulate financial development.  
The Legislative and Executive Index of Political Competitiveness (LEIPC), which is 
depicted in Table 4.1, indicates that according to the politics view one might predict 
difficulties in developing a sound and well-functioning financial system in Vietnam, 
China and Indonesia. However, Beck, Demirgüz-Kunt and Levine (2001) show that the 
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measures of the initial and current political structure do not explain cross-country 
variation in financial development. Thus, the data are not consistent with the emphasis of 
the politics view on political structure shaping financial development, which is why the 
focus on the LEIPC for financial development in the context of Vietnam should not be 
over-emphasized. 
 
 
Table 4.1: Legal origin, political system and initial endowments 
 Legal origin Legislative and executive 
index of political 
competitiveness (LEIPC) a 
Latitude 
(mean = 0.26) 
Tropical climate
(mean = 0.60) 
Log settler 
mortality 
(mean = 4.66) 
Vietnam French/Socialist 8 0.18 Yes (1) 4.94  
Cambodia French/Socialist 12 0.14 Yes (1) n.a. 
China German/Socialist 6 0.39 No (0) n.a. 
Indonesia French  8 0.06 Yes (1) 5.14 
Korea German 14 0.41 No (0) n.a. 
Malaysia British 14 0.03 Yes (1) 2.89 
Philippines French 14 0.14 Yes (1) n.a. 
Thailand British 14 0.17 Yes (1) n.a. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998, 1999), Beck, Demirgüz-Kunt and Levine (2001), Database of Political Institutions (DPI) 
see Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer and Walsh (2000), Acemoglu et al (2001), Global Development Network Database (See 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/ 
Note: n.a. means not available. 
aThe scores according to the Legislative and Executive Index of Political Competitiveness range from 2 - 14, where a 
score of 2 indicates a non-competitive political environment and a score of 14 indicates the most competitive political 
system. The index is documented for the year 1997. 
 
Finally the “endowment view” argues that differences in geography and disease 
proneness have shaped patterns of the political, institutional, and economic development. 
Gallup, Sachs, and Millinger (1998) find that geographical position influences the types 
of diseases that exist, the organization of economic activity, and hence the formation of 
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institutions, political arrangements, and the level and pace of economic development. 
According to this line of research, areas with poor agriculture and areas that are 
geographically isolated cannot exploit economies of scale in agriculture. In addition, 
countries dominated by ‘poor’ climate have a correspondingly lower probability of 
developing the political, legal, and institutional foundations that support complex and 
specialized economic interactions, which again help to create long-run economic growth.  
The endowment view therefore predicts that countries in poor geographical and disease 
environments will have less well-developed financial institutions than countries with 
better initial endowments. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) focus on the disease 
environment, and argue that the initial disease environment was decisive in whether 
colonialists created a “settler” or an “extractive” colony, which is found to have an 
enduring influence on financial institutions today. If the colonialists encountered a hostile 
(i.e. high mortality setting) they would choose to develop institutions that were extractive 
– i.e. designed to capture an already existing surplus for the colonial power. If, on the 
other hand, the environment was not too hostile to the first settlers (i.e. a low mortality 
setting) the colonial powers would choose to create institutions that could further develop 
the country for the benefit of the colonial power. Hence, the early environment faced by 
the first settlers is likely to have had decisive influence upon the type of institutions and 
modes of operation left by the colonial powers. If one furthermore believes that formal 
and informal institutional development and change only occur very slowly and with great 
effort, the colonial heritage is likely to still have an influence on current institutions and 
practices. Thus, according to the endowment view, the initial conditions continue to exert 
a profound influence on the present day financial sector. Consequently, a better 
knowledge of these factors will assist in predicting whether or not countries in poor 
geographical and disease environments have less well-developed financial institutions.  
Looking again at Table 4.1, three indicators of initial endowments are listed. The first 
two, latitude of the capital in the respective countries and the World Bank classification 
of whether or not a country has a tropical climate, indicate that Vietnam from an 
endowment point of view is no worse off than the rest of the region. Only China and 
Korea are considered not to have a tropical climate. In addition, the latitude of their 
respective capitals is the highest among the countries considered here. Looking at the 
third indicator, settler mortality, taken from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), it 
indicates that Vietnam does not deviate much from the sample mean, with a reported 
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average annual total of 140 casualties among every 1000 soldiers.15 Hence, there is 
nothing that indicates that Vietnam should be worse off than any other country in the 
South East Asian region when it comes to institutional determinants and structure when 
evaluated from an endowments point of view.  
Beck, Demirgüz-Kunt and Levine (2001) evaluate all three theories as to their power to 
explain the level of financial development. The results appear to be most in line with the 
“legal view” as differences in legal origin continue to help explain the development of 
financial institutions today, even after controlling for the level of economic development, 
geographical endowments, religious diversity, ethnic diversity, openness to international 
trade, number of years the country has been independent since 1776, transplant effect, 
initial endowments, political environment, and the power of the central government over 
the judiciary branches of the government. With this result in mind it would appear the 
legal origin represents a key challenge in the ongoing efforts to reform and develop the 
Vietnamese financial sector. 
 
4.3 Bank Competition, Privatisation and Foreign Bank Entry  
Over the last decade or so the perception of the potential benefits arising from increased 
competition on financial markets has become more diverse and more nuanced among 
economists and financial sector specialists. On the one side, some view competition 
between financial institutions as having universally beneficial effects upon financial 
sector efficiency regardless of its level of intensity. In addition, increased competition is 
perceived to have beneficial effects on the size of the consumer surplus and on the overall 
soundness of the financial system. On the other side, one can also find economists who, 
although they recognize the potentially beneficial effects of increased competition, also 
warn of the potentially destabilizing factors, which may arise if competition becomes 
‘too’ intense. One of the potentially destabilizing effects identified by this latter group is 
the notion that very intense competition between banks can undermine the franchise 
value of individual branch offices or even entire banks, possibly leading them to engage 
in more risky investments in an attempt to gamble for resurrection. This could in the 
worst case destabilize the entire system making it vulnerable to financial crises, which 
                                                 
15 The standard measure is annualized deaths per thousand soldiers with each death replaced with a new 
soldier. 
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might lead to real losses that outstrip the initial beneficial effects of increased 
competition. 
One consequence of the above-mentioned dissenting views over the potential net effects 
of increased competition is that one cannot claim that policy makers should always and 
uncritically attempt to increase competition in the financial sector. Excessive competition 
may create an unstable banking environment, while insufficient competition may breed in 
inefficient or reduced credit access for borrowers. Thus, instead of relying on 
generalizations and a dogmatic approach, policy analysts should instead carefully 
consider both short-term and long-term effects of policies aimed at increasing financial 
sector competition. 
However, despite adopting this more critical approach to the potentially beneficial effects 
of competition, one cannot but conclude that the degree of financial sector competition 
has to be increased in Vietnam. This in turn raises the question whether or not the 
government should seek to regulate/limit entry to and competition within the sector. 
Adopting a theoretical perspective, one can identify the following potentially beneficial 
effects from restricting entry and competition within the financial sector:  
• Banks with monopolistic power have stronger incentives to incur the necessary 
costs associated with overcoming informational barriers. In addition, monopolist 
banks have a high franchise value, which will enhance prudent risk-taking 
behaviour. Hence, the government may gain from limiting the potentially 
destabilizing competition within the sector. 
• Government ownership of banks may facilitate the mobilization of savings as well 
as the allocation of those savings toward strategic projects with long-term 
beneficial effects on an economy. The former is due to the often-higher credibility 
of the government, while the latter can be attributed to the government having 
adequate information and sufficient incentives to ensure socially desirable 
investments. 
• Regulators may need to limit entry in accordance with the ability of official 
agencies to supervise banks. Monitoring banks is costly and associated with 
externalities giving room for free rider problems.  
• A high concentration of private ownership in the banking sector may lead to 
limited access to credit by many parts of the society, which could negatively 
affect economic development.  
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• As has been illustrated by the East Asian Financial Crisis bank failures can 
reverberate throughout an economy with devastating effects. By effectively 
screening bank entry, governments can promote bank stability.  
One can, on the other hand, turn to, for example, corruption theory to identify the 
following theoretical arguments against the government seeking to limit/dampen 
competition in the financial sector in developing countries: 
• Politicians and regulators may misuse entry restrictions to reward friendly 
constituents and collect bribes, i.e. regulating bank entry may enhance corruption 
and economic inefficiency. 
• Competitive banking may be less likely to produce powerful institutions that 
unduly influence policymakers in ways that adversely affect bank performance 
and stability. 
• Governments have neither sufficient incentives to ensure socially desirable 
investments nor the information to do so if they wanted.  
• Government ownership tends to politicise the resource allocation and often 
operate with soft budget constraints, which are likely to have detrimental effects 
on economic efficiency. 
Returning to the current low level of financial sector competition in Vietnam and 
adopting a legal perspective, it is possible to identify at least three reasons for the current 
low level degree of competition:  
• Although many of the privileges and sector orientation has been lifted from the 
SOCB, each SOCB still tries to maintain its specialization towards specific 
sectors or customers. The result is highly segmented financial markets 
characterised by a low degree of competition between the different types of 
formal financial institutions (see Section 6.3.2 for an analysis of this problem in 
the context of the agricultural sector).  
• Even the seemingly stronger competition among the JSBs is restricted by 
regulation to include only interest rate competition.  
• Competition between domestic and foreign banks has for a long period of time 
been blocked by restrictive legislation. Foreign banks are, for example, only 
allowed to mobilize 25 percent of their capital in VND. Just recently the legal 
framework was, however, improved as all banks (including foreign bank 
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branches) in Vietnam may now accept land-use-rights as collateral. This 
represents a vast improvement over the situation during the 1990s where 
regulation explicitly prohibited foreign banks from accepting land-use-rights as 
collateral. In addition, the latest streamlining of the banking operation procedures 
imply that foreign banks are now allowed to open branches and to establish joint 
ventures in Vietnam – also an improvement over previous practices (see Section 
6.2.2.2. for further examples of problems of this nature) 
The above-mentioned legislation indicates that the Vietnamese financial system is 
characterized by low competition, but how can one go about comparing the degree of 
competition in Vietnam with that of other ASEAN countries? One approach, which 
builds upon the conventional economic wisdom that an increase in the number of 
competitors results in an increase in the degree competition, is to compare market 
concentration indices for the respective countries. One could also compare the fraction of 
foreign ownership in the sector. This latter approach builds upon an assumption of 
foreign owned banks being less susceptible to influence by the domestic government, and 
perhaps relatively more interested in maximizing profits. 
Table 4.2 and 4.3 list some market structure indicators for Vietnam and other ASEAN 
countries. Contrary to what one may believe, it can be seen that bank concentration in 
Vietnam, measured as the fraction of deposits held by the five largest banks, is not higher 
than in, for example, Thailand. Furthermore Table 4.3 indicates that the banking sector in 
Vietnam is less concentrated than that of the average developing country. 
One aspect, which, however, stands out in both tables, is the degree of government 
ownership in the Vietnamese banking sector. The degree of government ownership of 
financial institutions in Vietnam is very high compared to both the other countries in the 
region and to the average level in developing countries. 
This should be viewed in the context of the recent evidence from cross-country analyses 
(Laporta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Schleifer 2002, and Barth, Caprio and Levine 2001a) 
indicating that a higher degree of state ownership of banks tends to be associated with 
lower bank efficiency, less saving and borrowing, lower productivity and slower growth. 
Furthermore there is no evidence that state ownership lowers the probability of banking 
crisis. Generally the negative effects of state ownership appear to be more severe in 
developing countries than in industrialized countries. 
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Table 4.2: Market structure indicators in South East Asia (percent) 
 Bank concentration (share 
of deposits held by five 
largest banks) 
Share of deposits of the 
five largest banks, which is 
held by foreign owned 
banks 
Share of the deposits of the 
five largest banks, which is 
held by government owned 
banks 
Vietnam 65 0 80 
Cambodia 67 71 16 
China 75 n.a. n.a. 
Indonesia 53 7 44 
Korea 48 0 30 
Malaysia 30 18 0 
The Philippines 46 13 12 
Thailand 75 7 31 
Source: Calculated using information in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a, 2001b), and information from 
the World Bank office in Hanoi. 
Note: n.a. means not available. 
Note: ‘0’ indicates that none of the foreign are among the five largest banks in Vietnam – see Section 
6.1.3 for an estimate of the share of total deposits held by foreign banks. 
 
 Table 4.3: Market structure indicators in a global perspective (percent) 
 Bank concentration (share 
of deposits held by five 
largest banks) 
Share of deposits of the 
five largest banks, 
which is held by 
foreign owned banks 
Share of the deposits of 
the five largest banks, 
which is held by 
government owned banks 
Vietnam 65 0 80 
Developed countries 61 25 36 
Developing countries 71 10 22 
Source: Calculated using information in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a, 2001b), and information from 
the World Bank office in Hanoi. 
 
As for the benefits and costs associated with liberalising entry into the financial sector, 
the results of Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) analysing banking sector performance in 
107 countries indicate that tighter restrictions on entry into banking tend to increase 
overhead costs. Barth et al. are, however, not able to find a link between bank 
performance and the actual level of bank concentration. Furthermore, they find that the 
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likelihood of a major banking crisis is positively associated with greater limitations on 
foreign bank participation, a result which may be worthwhile to consider before thinking 
about the policy recommendations for Vietnams future financial development. Moreover 
government ownership is found to be generally positively related to the level of non-
performing loans (NPLs) in an economy but not robustly linked with the other 
performance indicators. 
Although bank concentration is often used as a proxy for the level of competition in the 
sector, it is still difficult to generalize about the precise effects of concentration. A high 
level of concentration does not need to reduce competition, as concentrated systems can 
be competitive if they are contestable. This implies that potential-entry forces market 
participants to keep rents low in order to avoid an intensification of the competition in the 
sector. For this reason, one should complement the concentration measures cited above 
with measures of entry and exit restrictions. The underlying rationale is that tight 
restrictions on entry into the banking sector can create monopolies/duopolies that are 
associated with higher average interest rate margins and overhead expenditures. 
Additional restrictions on foreign entrants can be associated with lower sector portfolio 
quality and greater likelihood of a banking crisis.  
Table 4.4 depicts some competition regulatory variables for Vietnam and the East Asian 
region. The data for Vietnam are unfortunately incomplete. It was not possible to obtain 
information about both the number of applications and the number of rejections hereof. 
The table does, however, also hold the results of a survey of whether or not special legal 
permissions are required to obtain a license to operate a bank in the respective countries. 
Results of this survey are reported as an index ranging from 0 to 8 where higher values 
indicate a more restrictive system. Hence, higher scores imply that one would expect that 
entry into the banking sector was more restricted and/or deterred, partly because there are 
more grounds for rejecting a license request and partly because potential applicants know 
this and therefore renege from applying. Looking at Table 4.4 one can note a number of 
aspects of entry regulation in the East Asian banking sectors, including:  
1. Limitations to foreign bank entry exist throughout the region as a significant 
proportion of both foreign and domestic applications are rejected - the only 
exceptions are China and to some degree The Philippines. The fact that several 
countries report that there have been no applications could be due to potential 
applicants perceiving the sector to be unprofitable or to potential applicants 
reneging from applying because they perceive it to be futile. The former by 
implication means that all potential applicants perceive the respective banking 
sectors to be either so competitive that obtainable rents are too low to justify entry 
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or that they foresee that they will be discriminated in and/or after their 
application.  
2. Looking at the index on the entry requirements for entry into the banking sector, it 
can be noted that Vietnam has very restrictive entry conditions. One can moreover 
see that Vietnam in this respect does not differ greatly from the rest of the region 
as Thailand and Cambodia are also found to have highly restrictive entry 
requirements. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter Vietnam has levelled 
the playing field for new entrants somewhat. Looking at the above-mentioned 
index for entry into banking requirements, one can, however, conclude that there 
is still much to be done before the Vietnamese banking environment can be 
characterized as competitive or even partly competitive for that matter. 
Table 4.4: Competition regulatory variables in South East Asia 
 Entry into banking 
requirement (0-8) 
Share of entry 
applications denied 
(percent) 
Share of domestic 
applications denied 
(percent) 
Share of foreign 
applications denied 
(percent)  
Vietnam 8 n.a.a n.a. n.a. 
Cambodia 8 67 70 67 
China 6 25 25 No applications 
Indonesia 7 60 No applications 60 
Korea 7 No applications No applications No applications 
Malaysia 7 No applications No applications No applications 
The Philippines 7 34 0 43 
Thailand 8 100 100 No applications 
Source: Calculated using information in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a, 2001b), and information from 
the World Bank office in Hanoi. 
Note: n.a. means not available. 
a Despite repeated attempts, we have not been able to achieve information on the composition and fate of 
financial sector entry applications in Vietnam. 
 
Turning to Table 4.5 it can be seen that entry into banking is not generally more restricted 
in developing countries than in developed countries. However, it appears that the fraction 
of entry denials is significantly higher in developing countries than in developed 
countries. A difference, which can perhaps be explained by a higher divergence between 
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de jure and de facto regulation in developing countries, a lower average quality of 
banking sector applicants in developing countries, or a combination of both. 
Table 4.5: Competition regulatory variables in a global perspective 
 Entry into banking 
requirement (0-8) 
Share of entry 
applications denied 
(percent) 
Share of domestic 
applications denied 
(percent) 
Share of foreign 
applications denied 
(percent) 
Vietnam 8 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Developed 
countries 
7.19 3 3 2 
Developing 
countries 
7.38 31 28 29 
Source: Calculated using information in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a, 2001b), and information from 
the World Bank office in Hanoi. 
Note: n.a. means not available. 
 
As the evidence cited above indicates that banking sectors in Vietnam and other 
developing countries can be characterised by a high level of concentration and a lack of 
competition, liberalizing entry policies appears to offer potential benefits. Cross-country 
evidence (Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga 2001) shows that the presence of 
foreign banks improves sector efficiency by creating competitive pressures that stimulate 
innovations and improves financial services. The nature and degree of these efficiency 
improvements will, however, depend on the market that is entered and on the type of 
entrant.  
However, the increased entry of foreign bank could also cause the following problems to 
occur:  
• Foreign banks may facilitate flows of international capital that can be suddenly 
withdrawn from these markets. Given the magnitude and speed at which 
international portfolio investment flows can change (the East Asian Financial 
Crisis is an ever present testimony to this fact) this could easily lead to problems 
of liquidity and the possible collapse of the domestic financial system. This 
should, however, be contrasted with the available empirical evidence, which 
indicates that foreign bank presence actually reduces the probability of systematic 
crisis in the banking sector (World Bank 2002). One possible channel of influence 
in this direction is given by the fact that the arrival of reputable foreign banks is 
generally associated with an improvement in prudential regulations. This could be 
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because foreign banks bring better accounting and information disclosure 
standards, since they adhere to their home country regulations. 
• Foreign owned banks may also overwhelm the capabilities of domestic regulators. 
This is especially a problem if the home countries of the foreign banks have a low 
supervisory and regulatory capacity.  
• In addition, concerns have been raised concerning the idea that the entry of 
foreign banks may be associated with less finance for the more disadvantaged 
segments of the economy, including smaller firms. Because of information 
problems foreign banks might have a tendency to reduce SME access to finance. 
However increased competition from foreign banks may force domestic local 
banks (with private information) into new markets, where they might enjoy a 
comparative advantage. SME lending could therefore be increased due to the 
increased foreign competition.  
• Another concern is that rapid foreign entry could erode the franchise values of 
domestic banks and therefore destabilize the financial sector as the troubled banks 
either close or begin to gamble for their resurrection. 
Due to the above-mentioned potential risks associated with foreign bank entry, 
introducing foreign competitors may require an initial transition period, to allow time for 
efficiency adjustments in the domestic sector and for improvements in prudential 
regulation and supervision. In addition, existing restrictions should not be lifted so 
rapidly that the franchise values of the incumbent banks are endangered or wiped out. 
The entry process must therefore be both managed over time and transparent. One way of 
making such a timetable more binding is to put it into domestic laws and/or international 
agreements. Similarly, because bank failures almost inevitably will occur during this 
process, the government needs to establish transparent rules for bank exit.  
Given that these precautionary measures and policies are in place, the main conclusion 
would be that the net effect of liberalising the entry requirements for foreign banks in 
Vietnam would be positive. This is in part based on the conclusion that local banks 
typically will have high overhead cost and low profitability relative to entrants, and the 
assessment that the foreign banks by concentrating on large, export-based enterprises and 
through the acquisition of local banks will be able to overcome any informational 
disadvantages they may have in lending and/or the ability to raise funds locally.  
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4.4 Supervising and Regulating Banking Sector Activities 
In order to be able to compare the supervisory environment in Vietnam with that of other 
countries in the region and with developed countries in general Tables 4.4 and 4.5 list 
some official supervisory variables. These variables are thought of as capturing 
quantitatively the degree to which supervisory authorities in Vietnam are capable of 
designing and implementing interventions with the objective of promoting a well 
functioning banking industry. The variable Official Supervisory Power shows that 
judging by the statues and legislation in place, the power of the supervisory authorities is 
as good in Vietnam and other developing countries as in developed countries. The extent 
to which the powers stipulated in the legislation translates into actual powers of 
implementation is addressed in depth in Section 5.2, which contains an in depth analysis 
of this issue.  
Returning to Table 4.6 we look at the power of supervisory authorities to restructure and 
reorganize banks and declare a troubled bank insolvent. Here it is found that the 
Vietnamese authorities are on average bestowed with greater powers than that of other 
developing countries.16 However, when we turn to compare the Prompt Corrective Power 
Index (PCPI), which measures whether or not the law establishes predetermined levels of 
bank solvency deterioration that force automatic actions, such as intervention, it can be 
seen that the promptness by which the regulator can or will respond to problems in the 
financial sector is lower in Vietnam than in most other countries in the region.17 This 
indicates problems from the supervisor’s point of view to respond to changes in the 
banking environment quickly enough.  
Finally, Table 4.6 and 4.7 show that the supervisory authorities have no or low 
independence from Vietnamese officials (see Section 5.2 for details on this issue), and 
this is no different from the situation in the other countries in the South East Asian 
region. However, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) have shown in a cross-country 
analysis that there is no clear-cut relationship between supervisory independence and 
bank development or between supervisory independence and the level of financial 
efficiency or the level of NPLs. On this background, it is not certain that a more 
independent supervisory authority will be beneficial for the Vietnamese banking system. 
                                                 
16 It is analyzed whether the supervisory authorities have the power to restructure, reorganize and declare 
insolvency of a bank. The Restructuring Power Index rates between 0 and 3, and the Insolvency Power 
Index rates between 0 and 2, with higher values indicating greater power. 
17 The Prompt Corrective Power Index rates between 0 and 6, with higher values indicating more 
promptness. 
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Whether or not the creation of an independent supervisory institution is beneficial for the 
SBV attempts to obtain more independence is the subject of Section 5.4. 
 
Table 4.6: Official supervisory variables in South East Asia 
 Supervisors 
per bank 
Official 
supervisory 
power 
index18 
Prompt 
corrective 
power index
Restructuring 
power index 
Insolvency 
Power Index 
Independence 
of supervisory 
authority 
Vietnam 3 11 0 3 2 No 
Cambodia 0 13 5 3 2 No 
China 1 11 3 3 2 Yes 
Indonesia 3 12 6 2 2 Yes 
Korea 6 9 4 3 2 No 
Malaysia 5 n.a. n.a. 3 2 No 
Philippines 7 11 6 3 2 Yes 
Thailand 10 10 0 3 2 Yes 
Source: Calculated using information in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a, 2001b), and information from 
the World Bank office in Hanoi. 
 
Table 4.7: Official supervisory variables in a global perspective 
 Supervisors 
per bank 
Official 
supervisory 
power 
Prompt 
corrective 
power 
Restructuring 
power 
Declaring 
insolvency 
power 
Independence 
of supervisory 
authority 
Vietnam 3.0 11 0 3 2 No 
Developed 
countries 
0.94 11.08 1.19 2.50 1.27 n.a. 
Developing 
countries 
3.13 11.11 2.27 2.60 1.62 n.a. 
Source: Calculated using information in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a, 2001b), and information from 
the World Bank office in Hanoi. 
 
                                                 
18 It is analyzed whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent 
and correct problems. The index rates between 0 and 14, with higher values indicating greater power 
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It would thus appear that while Vietnamese legislation is equal to or outperforms that of 
other countries of the region the autonomy and power to rapidly implement these laws is 
lacking in Vietnam compared to the other countries in the region. Given that a swift 
regulatory response is a key determinant of the ability of a country to successfully avoid a 
financial instability this is a serious shortcoming of the Vietnamese regulatory 
framework, which has to be addressed. This is further analysed in Section 5.2, which 
contains an assessment of SBV independence according to three different components of 
central bank independence. 
Up until recently the distinction between the profit taking and the social duties of banking 
system was not clear in Vietnam. In addition, the uniqueness of banks as financial 
intermediaries is not well recognized, possibly due to past and to some extent present (see 
Section 6.2.2.3) practice of using financial institutions as means for implementing 
government policies in the pre-transitional period. As consequence a clear, generally 
agreed upon distinction between financial intermediation and social duties, is still not 
available. This also affects the general perception of banks and banking functions among 
especially the Vietnamese households. Here, a bank is regarded as a safe, a broker, or a 
distributor of government funds. Banking functions such as risk sharing, screening, and 
monitoring that are elsewhere regarded as intrinsic to banks have not until now been 
sufficiently acknowledged or emphasized in the Vietnamese context. 
These factors have undoubtedly contributed to households’ preference for real assets to 
financial assets, which have kept them from forming a banking habit. The very same 
factors are likely to have dampened bank motivation to initiate financial innovation, 
leaving deposit products simple. The end-result can be a vicious circle where savers do 
not use the banking sector partly because the products on offer are not perceived as 
attractive, and the banking sector refrains from developing and supplying long-term 
and/or more advanced products because demand is low.  
Another constraint on banking sector possibilities to offer more advanced products is, 
however, the legislative and regulatory framework for government attempts to regulate 
and possibly control the level and trend of activities in the banking sector. While it will 
be difficult to separate the overall demand effect mentioned above from the more direct 
legislative effect, one can compare bank activity supervision and regulation across 
countries from South East Asia. This provides an indication of whether the Vietnamese 
framework differs substantially from that of other countries in the region. 
Table 4.8 and 4.9 contain five indicators that give an indication of bank activity 
regulatory variables and measures of the degree of regulatory restrictiveness on the 
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mixing of banking and commerce. It can be seen that the banking sector in Vietnam is 
very restricted when looking at which activities banks can engage in. Banks in Vietnam 
are generally prohibited from engaging in securities, insurance and real estate markets 
(index = 4), where in most other developing countries it is permitted (index = 2) or 
somewhat restricted (index = 3). However, Vietnam does not differ much from 
neighbouring Cambodia or China. 
Table 4.8: Legal restrictions on banking activity in South East Asia 
 Securities 
activities 
Insurance 
activities 
Real Estate 
activities 
Bank owning 
non-financial 
firms 
Non-financial 
firms owning 
banks 
Vietnam 4 4 4 2 3 
Cambodia 4 4 4 2 1 
China 4 3 4 3 4 
Indonesia 2 4 4 4 1 
Korea 2 2 2 3 3 
Malaysia 2 2 3 3 3 
Philippines 1 2 2 2 3 
Thailand 2 2 2 3 3 
Source: Calculated using information in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a, 2001b), and information from 
the World Bank office in Hanoi. 
 
Table 4.9: Legal restrictions on banking activity in a global perspective 
 Securities 
activities 
Insurance 
activities 
Real estate 
activities 
Bank owning 
non-financial 
firms 
Non-financial 
firms owning 
banks 
Vietnam 4 4 4 2 3 
Developed countries 1.37 2.22 2.04 2.22 1.77 
Developing countries 2.04 2.90 3.19 2.53 2.13 
Source: Calculated using information in Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a, 2001b), and information from 
the World Bank office in Hanoi. 
 
The question of which organizational structure is most appropriate for banks to better 
ensure a well-functioning banking industry has generated considerable controversy and 
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debate among financial sector specialist. One side argues that allowing for diversification 
of bank business operations may be beneficial because it makes it possible for banks to 
capitalize on synergies that originate from these complementary activities.  
The competing, negative point view identifies several reasons for why it might be 
beneficial to restrict the degree to which banks can engage in very diverse financial 
activities such as securities, insurance, and real estate activities etc., see also Barth, 
Caprio and Levine (2001a). These include: 
1. Conflicts of interest may arise when banks engage in such diverse activities. 
Banks may, for example attempt to dump securities on or shift risk to ill-informed 
investors so as to assist associated firms with outstanding loans.  
2. To the extent that moral hazard encourages riskier behaviour by banks, they will 
have more opportunities to increase risk if allowed to engage in a broader range of 
activities.  
3. Broad financial activities and the mixing of banking and commerce may lead to 
the formation of extremely large and complex entities that are extraordinarily 
difficult to monitor. 
4. Moreover, large institutions may become so politically and economically 
powerful that it becomes very difficult (if not impossible) to discipline them. 
5. In addition, large financial conglomerates may reduce competition and hence 
potentially the efficiency of the sector. 
As the theoretical discussion remains unsettled, one inevitably turns to empirical analyses 
to see whether a clearer conclusion emerges here. First, the afore-mentioned recent cross-
country empirical analysis by Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) indicates that restricting 
banking activities is negatively associated with bank development. Second, it is found 
that restricting banks from engaging in securities activities is strongly, negatively 
associated with less bank development. Third, the diversification of income sources 
through non-traditional bank activities is found to be generally positively associated with 
bank stability, especially in economies with active non-bank financial markets.  
The fact that a recent empirical analysis indicates that fewer regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of banks have a beneficial effect on banking sector development and stability, 
gives food for thought. One potential explanation for this finding is that the exploitation 
of economies of scale is beneficial to the development and stability of the financial 
sector. Furthermore, banks could get incentives to behave prudently if fewer regulatory 
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restrictions increase the franchise value of banks. Also, one can speculate as to whether 
the enhanced stability results from the broader activities that diversify income streams 
and thereby create more stable banks. Finally, one could argue that high levels of 
government restrictions promote government power, and thereby (perhaps) create a 
bigger role for corruption, hindering bank performance and stability. While this is 
speculative, one has to admit that the results from and the discussion about the results by 
Barth et al. indicate that it may be worthwhile considering liberalizing the laws regarding 
which activities Vietnamese banks are allowed to engage in. 
 
4.5 Setting Accounting Standards 
Accounting and provisioning practices have come much in focus recently. Especially the 
classification of bank loans into relevant categories referring to their quality and loss 
provisions of different amounts based on this classification has been an important 
parameter for bank supervisors. Practically this has meant that if interest on a loan is in 
arrears by more than 90 days, accounting standards will forbid the bank from showing 
that interest as already having accrued in its income statement. 
Developing and implementing proper accounting and auditing standards is thus a must if 
the regulatory framework and prudential regulations are to be strengthened in Vietnam. 
With respect to prudential regulations, this includes introducing and consistently 
enforcing exact concepts of non-performing loans and loan-loss provisions. It must, 
however, be emphasized that compliance with the regulations has to be strictly and 
transparently supervised. During the 1990s banks were not required to submit accounts to 
independent audit. SBV acted as auditor to the local banks, while JSBs and foreign banks 
were given the choice of independent audit. Local banks were not required to disclose 
their financial statements although most provide financial summaries in their annual 
reports. Only three JSBs (VP Bank, Asia Commercial Bank, and Maritime Bank) handed 
in independent audits as required by foreign investors prior to their subsequent purchase 
of equity stakes. 
Looking at Tables 4.6a and 4.10 it can be seen that, as in most countries, an external audit 
is required of the financial statements of banks in Vietnam. Furthermore, this has to be by 
a licensed or certified auditor. This audit indicates the presence of an independent 
assessment of the accuracy of financial information released to the public. The second 
variable shows that there is no explicit deposit insurance scheme in Vietnam, which is 
common for about half of all developing countries. The last variable measures the degree 
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of how informative bank accounts are, where higher values indicate more informative 
accounting. Bank accounting standards in Vietnam as well as in Cambodia, China and 
Thailand are below average for developing countries, indicating a regional need for 
improving accounting standards. 
Table 4.10: Accounting variables in South East Asia 
 Certified audit required  
(0-1) 
No explicit deposit 
insurance design  
(0-1) 
Bank accounting 
 (0-3) 
Vietnam 1 1 2 
Cambodia 1 1 2 
China 0 1 2 
Indonesia 1 0 3 
Korea 1 0 n.a. 
Malaysia 1 1 3 
Philippines 1 1 3 
Thailand 1 0 2 
Source: See Table 2 and The Banking Legislation in Vietnam Decree No. 166/1999/ND-CP and Circular 
No. 92/2000/BTC (SBV, 2000). 
  
 
Table 4.11: Accounting variables in a global perspective 
 Certified audit required  
(0-1) 
No explicit deposit 
insurance design  
(0-1) 
Bank accounting 
 (0-3) 
Vietnam 1 1 2 
Developed countries 0.96 0.08 2.54 
Developing countries 0.92 0.51 2.66 
Source: See Table 3 and The Banking Legislation in Vietnam Decree No. 166/1999/ND-CP and Circular 
No. 92/2000/BTC. (SBV, 2000). 
 
Looking more closely at the Vietnamese legislation in this area it appears that Vietnam is 
using a different and non-standard definition of when a loan is classified as non-
performing loans (NPLs). The accounting system is furthermore not transparent and 
 67
auditing not yet compulsory. Interest accrual on NPLs is allowed for up to 180 days for 
unsecured loans and 360 days for secured loans in Vietnam. Thereby the current loan 
classification system does not conform to the international standard since loans overdue 
for 90 days are not classified adequately. The classification system also does not reflect 
the credit risk based on the borrower’s repayment capacity, collateral coverage, and other 
factors. Over half of NPLs have been overdue for more than 180 days in Vietnam.19  
Recently Vietnam has agreed to take steps in order to improve the assessment of bank 
performance in general and for SOCBs in particular. Regulations will be revised where 
necessary to ensure accurate assessment and accounting. In addition, the four large 
SOCBs will undertake independent audits using international standards, and the loan 
classification system (Decision 284) has just been amended and has moved the loan 
classification and loan-loss provisioning closer to international standards. So issues 
relating to accounting standards are clearly moving in the right direction in Vietnam, but 
given the image emerging from the indicators depicted in Table 4.6 this is also needed. 
 
4.6 Safety Net, Capital Adequacy and Deposit Insurance 
Safety net policies are designed to address the potential problems of the fragility of 
financial systems, including the prevention of bank runs and bank failures. Capital 
adequacy and deposit insurance are important components of the safety net. On the 
positive side, safety nets are designed to reduce the incentives for banks to take risks and 
depositors’ incentives to withdraw their funds. But on the other hand there is an adverse 
effect of such a scheme. For example the presence of deposit insurance scheme may lead 
depositors to disregard risks of bank failure. Thereby the deposits are governed by 
highest interest rates on the basis of risky investments and loans. 
Tables 4.12 and 4.13 list a number of variables, which describe the level and nature of 
capital regulation. It can be seen that Vietnam has very restrictive requirements regarding 
the amount of capital that a bank must have compared to other countries in the region. 
The capital regulatory index for Vietnam is more in line with what is observed in 
developed countries than in developing countries.  
Against this background, the beneficial effects of the newly adopted regulation to 
strengthen the prudential framework in respect of capital adequacy ratios in Vietnam can 
                                                 
19 For a more in-depth analysis of the NPL problems in the banking sector and the measures proposed to 
address these, see Chapter 5. 
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be questioned. From a theoretical point of view, regulation on capital adequacy can have 
both positive and negative effects on financial development. Capital requirements may 
serve as an incentive against engaging in high-risk activities. Yet, negative effects may 
occur due to the difficulties of regulators and supervisors in setting capital standards that 
mimic those that would be demanded by well-informed private market participants.  
Table 4.12: Capital regulatory variables in South East Asia 
 Overall capital stringency (0-6) Initial capital stringency (0-3) Capital regulatory index (0-9) 
Vietnam 5 1 6 
Cambodia 3 1 4 
China n.a. 3 n.a. 
Indonesia 2 3 5 
Korea 5 1 6 
Malaysia 1 2 3 
Philippines 2 1 3 
Thailand 3 2 5 
Note: Higher values indicating greater stringency  
Source: See Table 2 and The Banking Legislation in Vietnam Decree No. 166/1999/ND-CP (SBV, 2000). 
 
Table 4.13: Capital regulatory variables in a global perspective 
 Overall capital stringency 
(0-6) 
Initial capital stringency 
(0-3) 
Capital regulatory index 
(0-9) 
Vietnam 5 1 6 
Developed countries 4.19 1.85 6.08 
Developing countries 3.20 1.46 4.65 
Note: Higher values indicating greater stringency  
Source: See Table 3 and The Banking Legislation in Vietnam Decree No. 166/1999/ND-CP (SBV, 2000). 
 
Looking at the empirical evidence in this area, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) find no 
robust relationship between capital regulatory restrictiveness and bank development. 
Furthermore the relationship between the stringency of official capital requirements and 
the likelihood of a crisis is not strong.  
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As described above safety nets that are designed to deal with the potential problems of 
financial systems are often subject to critique, and have in many countries been identified 
as one of the sources to financial fragility (World Bank 2002). Deposit insurance 
encourages excessive risk-taking behaviour, and in some countries where the relevant 
regulation and supervision to encounter such behaviour has not yet been fully developed, 
badly designed safety nets can undermine the incentives of the participants in the 
financial system. On the other hand deposit insurance schemes provide protection. For 
example if too many depositors attempt to withdraw their funds at once, an illiquid but 
solvent bank can fail.  
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) do not find a strong link between the generosity of the 
deposit insurance system and bank development. On the other hand they find a very 
strong link between the generosity of the deposit insurance system and bank sector 
fragility. This result is consistent with the view that deposit insurance not only 
substantially aggravates moral hazard but also produces deleterious effects on bank 
fragility. The results suggest that the reverse incentives effects from deposit insurance 
overwhelm any stabilizing effects that these safety nets may also have. Given these 
results, it is not clear that the implementation of an explicit deposit insurance design in 
the Vietnamese financial sector will have beneficial effects on bank development. In any 
case, the results emerging from the Barth et al. study indicate that local analysis of 
conditions and local adaptation to specific characteristics and conditions are prerequisites 
for any future thoughts in this direction 
 
4.7 Concluding Remarks 
Key points emerge from the comparison of the conditions for and the performance of 
financial sectors in Vietnam and other countries in the region.  
Analysing the competitive pressure in the Vietnamese financial sector, it was found that 
although Vietnam in recent years has levelled the playing field for new entrants 
somewhat, there is still much to be done before the Vietnamese banking environment can 
be characterized as competitive or even partly competitive for that matter. This implies 
that the Vietnamese government should consider policies that could make local financial 
markets more contestable.  
Given that the concentration in Vietnam coincides with substantial state ownership, one 
option that could make the financial market more contestable would be to strengthen the 
already initiated efforts to privatise the four majors SOCBs. This is, however, a lengthy 
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process, starting with the recently completed international audits and the subsequent 
attempts to address the NPL problem in the SOCBs, which must precede any attempt to 
recapitalise the major SOCBs (see Chapter 5). Only hereafter would it be realistic to 
consider any form of privatisation of the SOCBs. 
Another approach to making financial markets more contestable, which builds upon the 
indications that banking sectors in Vietnam and other developing countries tend toward 
concentration and lack of competition, is liberalizing the comparatively strict entry 
requirements. In this context it is important to emphasize that any new entry allowed 
should be gradual, so that the franchise value of local banks does not erode quickly, 
causing instability and potentially a financial crisis. In addition, Vietnam must maintain 
some limits on entry for prudential reasons. As a consequence, any liberalization of the 
entry process must be both managed over time and transparent. 
If entry requirements are loosened, evidence from other transitional economies indicates 
that an increasing number of foreign banks will apply for entry into the Vietnamese 
market. In this case the beneficial effects of foreign entry are likely to be pronounced in 
Vietnam, where local banks typically have high overhead cost as and low profitability 
relative to entrants. The technological and efficiency advantages often harnessed by 
foreign banks is thus likely to be strong enough to overcome informational disadvantages 
they may have in lending and/or the ability to raise funds locally. It is, however, very 
important that the foreign banks are given the opportunity to compete directly with the 
domestic banks. Foreign entrants should therefore not be directed into the gaps/sectors 
not served by the domestic institutions but rather compete directly and on equal terms 
with these. In short, foreign banks should be substitutes to domestic banks rather than 
complement them. In this context it is, however, also important to take the potential 
negative effects of increased foreign bank presence into account. This is so, in particular, 
for the increased risk of financial sector volatility due to the increased exposure to 
international capital flows and the potential erosion of the franchise values of domestic 
banks. 
Prior to opening the sector to new and most likely more sophisticated entrants, the 
Vietnamese government must, however, strengthen the capacity and autonomy of the 
regulatory framework. Our analysis points to the following areas: 
• The promptness by which the regulator can or will respond to problems in the 
financial sector is generally lower in Vietnam than in the other countries in the 
region. Hence, while Vietnamese legislation is equal to or outperforms that of 
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other countries of the region, the autonomy and power to rapidly implement these 
laws is lacking in Vietnam compared to the other countries in the region.  
• Moreover, the Vietnamese banking system appears to be very restricted when 
looking at the type of activities banks can engage in. Banks in Vietnam are 
generally prohibited from engaging in securities, insurance and real estate 
markets. Activities, which are permitted or only somewhat restricted in most other 
developing countries.  
• Bank accounting standards in Vietnam are below the average level of developing 
countries, indicating a regional need for improving the accounting standards. The 
fact that the same is the case in Cambodia, China and Thailand should not be used 
as an excuse for not addressing this problem – rather the contrary.  
• Finally, it was found that Vietnam has very restrictive requirements regarding the 
amount of capital that a bank must have compared to other countries in the region.  
However, given that recent cross-country research indicates that differences in legal 
origin continue to help explain the development of financial institutions today, even after 
controlling for other aspects of the overall framework in which financial sectors operate, 
it would appear that Vietnam faces a difficult task in reforming the financial system. The 
reason is that the French legal origin may imply that Vietnam has some institutional 
barriers, which have to be overcome in an effort to reform the financial sector. The 
subsequent chapters will look at current efforts to reform central parts/functions of the 
Vietnamese financial system, namely the State Bank of Vietnam (Chapter 5) and the 
major SOCBs (Chapters 5 and 6). 
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5  Building a Central Bank  
The State Bank of Vietnam (the SBV) holds a central position in both the day-to-day 
workings of the financial sector and in the plans to transform the financial sector towards 
a higher degree of market orientation. This central position in part rests upon the 
significance and powers bestowed upon a central bank, and in part on the continued 
existence of structures and procedures that have remained in place from the epoch prior 
to the Doi Moi financial sector reforms in 1988. One could claim that the importance of 
the Vietnamese central bank exceeds that of a central bank in an ‘average developing 
country’ due to the parallel existence of a ‘planning legacy’ (see Chapter 2) that 
continues to exert considerable influence on the current day financial sector. This legacy 
exists because although the creation of the large state owned banks heralded the initiation 
of a two-tiered banking system, the transformation of the SBV into a modern central bank 
responsible for price stability and financial sector stability necessitated the completion of 
a lengthy and still-ongoing process of dual separation. On the one side, the SBV had to be 
separated from actual banking operations in order to focus on supervision and control of 
financial institutions and markets and management of money and credit aggregates. On 
the other side, the SBV had to be separated from the political planning system in order to 
operate as an autonomous entity on par with the executive, legislative and judiciary 
branches of government.  
Following a brief historic overview of central bank operations in Vietnam over the period 
1951-2001, Section 5.2 will assess and discuss the process of dual separation of the SBV. 
Subsequently, Section 5.3 will look at how the SBV manages and controls selected 
financial markets in Vietnam, including a potential issue of international bonds, while 
Section 5.4 will deal specifically with the issue of overdue debts in the banking system 
and the measures proposed to deal with these.  
 
5.1 Brief History of SBV 
The history of the SBV takes it’s beginning with the Second National Party Congress 
held in 1951 in Tuyen Quang, where the SBV was established as part of the infrastructure 
put in place in the Northern provinces controlled by the Viet Minh. From 1951 to 1954, 
the main duties of the SBV encompassed financial transactions and a rudimentary set of 
central bank functions. This included the control of the issuance of bank notes as well as 
of monetary circulation, the management of the State Treasury, the management and 
 73
control of foreign exchange and money transactions, and the mobilisation of funds and 
the provision of loans for production and commodity circulation.  
As the North of Vietnam was liberated in 1954, banking activities were directed towards 
supporting construction in the North and the Liberation war in the South.20 When the 
South was liberated and the country unified in 1975, the SBV banking activities were 
redirected to restore the economy and to develop the country as a whole. A centrally 
planned system was applied to the economy as well as the banking system nation wide.  
During the period 1976-1989 Vietnam had a one-tier nation wide banking system owned 
and controlled by the state. As a consequence a monetary market did not develop and 
commercial banks did not exist in the full sense. However, the restrictions placed on SBV 
operations and the obsoleteness of this type of centrally controlled monetary policy made 
financial and monetary conditions difficult. The results were over-expenditure of the state 
budget, hyperinflation, and serious macroeconomic unbalances.  
Facing these circumstances, the Sixth Communist Congress, held in December 1986, was 
characterized by self-criticism over the party's failure to improve the economy. A new 
commitment was made to revive the economy and a decision was taken to launch a 
reform policy. This meant initiating a long-term process of successive reforms aiming at 
transforming a system previously based on administrative subsidies into one of 
independence and self-support. Hence, since the Sixth Communist Congress the guiding 
principle for the reform policy has been to encourage and facilitate the establishment of a 
multi-component economy and it was in this context that the launch of a process of 
banking system reforms was suggested. The reform process was initiated by the 
following two key decisions:  
1. On July 3, 1987, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (the Prime Minister) 
issued the Decision 218/CT to transform the main function of the state owned 
banks into commercial banks  
2. On March 26 of 1988, the chairman of the Council of Ministers signed Decree 
No.53/ND on shifting the one-tier banking system towards a business-oriented 
structure thereby separating and establishing state-owned specialised commercial 
banks from the SBV. 
The key content of Decree 53 was to transform the one-tier banking system into a two-
tier system addressing the separation of the SBV from the working financial system 
                                                 
20 Hundreds of bank staff went to the South to serve during the liberation war. 
 74
performing the actual financial transactions. This on the other hand was to be addressed 
by the state-owned specialised commercial banks. These included: The Foreign Trade 
Bank of Vietnam, The Commerce and Industry Bank of Vietnam, The Agricultural 
Development Bank of Vietnam and The Investment and Construction Bank of Vietnam. 
However, as the decree came into force, in reality, state management and business duties 
still overlapped. Examples of this included:  
• The SBV stipulating that branches of specialised commercial banks should be 
self-supporting and thereby automatically hindering general directors of the 
specialised commercial banks to manage their own system. 
•  In addition, the personnel department of the SBV decided appointments of 
specialised commercial bank branch managers and assistant managers without 
conferring with general management of specialised commercial banks. 
• Moreover, the Department of Planning and Economics of the SBV was permitted 
to decide credit quotas and reconcile capital for branches of specialised 
commercial banks without approval of the banks’ general managers. 
• Finally, the SBV stipulated that its representative offices were opened beside the 
branches of the specialised commercial banks and that all specialised commercial 
bank branches had to transfer capital to the SBV representative offices for 
payment. This resulted in specialised commercial banks loosing a large amount of 
their low interest capital. In addition, loan documents of the specialised 
commercial banks had to be further approved by the SBV, which was 
cumbersome and time demanding for the private clients. 
Hence, although Decree 53 permitted specialised commercial banks to be self-supporting 
and manage their own system, important day-to-day management decisions were under 
the authority of the SBV. On the other side, the SBV was not ready to perform the overall 
control and supervision of the financial system. The SBV had not used monetary 
management instruments to control and guide monetary markets and the organisational 
model of the banking system as cumbersome. 
The reform process, however, continued in other sectors of the Vietnamese economy. 
The year 1989 witnessed the initiation of the process of decentralisation in the 
agricultural sector, the abolishment of compensations for losses due to price controls, and 
the confirmation of the autonomy of the state owned enterprises in production and 
business. Within this context the government held the view that economic development 
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had to be based on banking system reform, and that government consequently should 
concentrate its efforts here. 
This resulted in the recommendation of a new, more market-based approach to banking 
activities that was in line with a new economic management mechanism.21 As a 
consequence, a structured plan for the banking system, which included a central bank, an 
investment bank, state commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks, and joint-
venture banks, was proposed. Finally, it was decided to establish and develop the 
monetary instruments necessary to conduct a more market-based credit and monetary 
policy. 
In May of 1990, the promulgation of two Ordinances on banking established for the first 
time objectives, duties, and operation purposes of each tier of the banking system. The 
SBV was now responsible for state management of banking systems and duties of a 
central bank, while commercial banks where responsible for the operation and control of 
their finances and the implementation of universal banking activities. Besides four 
specialised commercial banks, other commercial banks with different ownership were 
allowed and subsequently created. This included joint stock commercial banks, people’s 
credit funds, joint venture banks, branch offices and representative offices of foreign 
banks, and financial companies. Table 5.1 outlines the subsequent growth in second-tier 
banking institutions. 
Table 5.1: Commercial banks (units) 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Urban joint stock banks 4 16 25 29 29 31 31 31 28 
Rural joint stock banks  0 6 16 16 19 20 20 20 20 
Joint venture banks 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 5 
Foreign banks 0 5 8 9 18 22 24 25 26 
Source: Department of banks, State Bank of Vietnam 
 
In short, the two Ordinances on banks promulgated in 1990 formalised the separation of 
financial and business operations from that of the organisational structure of the State 
Bank by forming a system of credit institutions directing commercial credit businesses 
                                                 
21 Vietnamese development towards a market-based rather than a bank-based system is considered in 
Chapter 7. 
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and other banking services. As such the ordinances represent an important stage of 
progress in the banking industry, whereby commercial banking and the organisational 
practice of private enterprises are disengaged from that of the ministries concentrating on 
state management functions.  
On an organizational level, the issuance of the two Ordinances in 1990 was also an 
important turning point for the SBV given that the responsibilities of implementing 
financial transactions were no longer part of the SBV duties. This resulted in significant 
internal reorganizations in the SBV. Prior to 1990 the organisational structure of the SBV 
had included four specialised banks: The Bank of Agriculture, The Industrial Bank, The 
Commercial Bank, and The Foreign Commercial Bank and Saving Fund, but now staff of 
the State Bank of Vietnam were replaced and transferred in order to fit with the new 
functions, tasks and organisational structure.  
More specifically, one division was transferred to state-owned commercial banks, while 
the rest was placed in departments of the SBV concentrating on developing and executing 
national monetary policies, managing business operations of credit institutions, studying 
proposals and drafts determining regulations and the legal basis for managing monetary 
business and banking operation of credit institutions and non-banking financial 
institutions. Other departments such as the policy study department, foreign exchange 
management department, and the international relations department remained in the 
organisational structure of the SBV. 
From 1990 to 1998, the organisational structure and operations of the State Bank of 
Vietnam has developed in accordance with the Law on the State Bank and the Law on 
Credit institutions further strengthening the transformation towards a two-tier banking 
system. However, as mentioned above the creation of a fully independent central bank 
essentially entailed the completion of a process of dual separation from the actual 
financial system, on the one side, and the political system, on the other. While the 
ordinances and decisions passed in the first phase of the reforms primarily addressed the 
separation from the actual financial system, the process of separation from the political 
system was only initiated with the Law on the State Bank passed in October 1998. 
The Law on the State Bank defined the role and functions of the SBV to be a government 
branch, and it reaffirmed the placement of the SBV headquarters in Hanoi and formally 
made clear that the SBV should take over as the Central Bank of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam. As a consequence, the SBV was recognised as a legal entity with legal capital. 
The SBV activities were defined to be to stabilise the value of the currency value, secure 
the safety and stability of the banking system, and promote the development of the 
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economy. Moreover, the Law on the State Bank made it clear that SBV should perform 
the functions of state management on monetary issues and banking activities, including:  
• Participation in the formulation of the social and economic development strategy 
and plan of the State. 
• Development of national monetary policy to be examined by the Government and 
submitted to the National Assembly for deciding and organising policy 
implementation. This included a development strategy for banking and credit 
institutions in Vietnam. 
• Develop projects of law and ordinance and other monetary and banking operation 
projects. Promulgate legal documents and regulations. 
• Examine and inspect banking operations, and resolve violations in monetary 
business and banking operation.  
• Represent Vietnam among international credit institutions and banks if mandated 
by the President and the Government of Vietnam. 
• Act as Bank of Credit Institutions and Bank of Monetary Services for the 
Government. 
In addition, the 1998 Law on the State Bank authorized the SBV to perform the following 
central bank functions:  
• Print, issue, exchange, replace and destroy money. 
• Refinancing. 
• Execute monetary market and open-market function. 
• Control international monetary storage and manage foreign exchange. 
• Organise the payment system.  
The 1998 Law on the State Bank represents an important step towards separating the 
SBV from the political system and establishing the SBV as an autonomous entity on par 
with the executive, legislative and judiciary branches of government. Yet, this ‘second’ 
process of separation is likely to be as lengthy as the process, which separated the SBV 
from the actual financial system. As a still on-going process it makes sense to evaluate 
the current legal and political independence of the SBV. This will consequently be the 
topic of the subsequent Section.  
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5.2 The Independence of SBV 
Central bank independence is an old principle among economists and practitioners of 
monetary policy whose support has fluctuated considerably over time. This especially 
appears to be the case when it comes to the discussion of whether and when to push for 
an independent central bank in a developing country.  
One school of thought, starting with Rogoff (1985) has pointed out that the creation of a 
conservative and politically independent central bank is necessary to reduce the 
inflationary bias that results from the time inconsistency problem first identified and 
analysed by Kydland and Prescott (1977). The time inconsistency problem essentially 
comes about if policy makers are able to persuade the public of a certain inflationary 
target and the public behaves accordingly. In this case, a government facing an election 
will have an incentive to create an unexpected expansion of the monetary base, which in 
turn will lead to lower unemployment (the benefit anticipated by the government) and 
higher inflation (the price the government is prepared to pay to secure re-election). 
However, in the case of rational expectations, the public is aware of these incentives and 
will consequently expect and take into account that the government will deviate from the 
announced target. The inflationary expectations held and taken into account by the public 
leave the government with little choice but to validate these expectations. In the simple 
model, aggregate output in the situation where the government deviates is the same but 
the level of inflation is above what it would have been if the government had stuck to its 
rule. This is clearly a sub-optimal situation, which the government and the public have a 
common interest in avoiding. The solution pointed out by Rogoff and others, is for the 
government to renege its control of monetary policy by creating a conservative central 
bank responsible for price stability. Hence, the government effectively ties its own hands 
in order for the public to attach credibility to the commitment to low inflation.  
While empirical evidence appears to support a negative relationship between central bank 
independence and inflation in the OECD, see Eijffinger and de Haan (1996), for a review 
of these studies], the empirical evidence is less clear when it comes to developing 
countries. Using the turnover rate of central bank governors as an incomplete proxy for 
central bank independence de Haan and Kooi (2000) find that central bank independence 
is only related to inflation if the high inflation countries (i.e. where annual inflation 
exceeds 300 percent) are included in their sample of 82 developing countries.  
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The ambiguous empirical evidence, the possibility of reverse causality,22 the fact that 
legal independence seldom corresponds to political independence has given rise to a 
contesting school of thought based around the claim that central bank independence is 
overstressed and that problems in implementation have been overlooked (see for example 
Mas 1995). Leading proponents of this view such as Goodman (1991) and Posen (1994) 
argue that countries instead of going through the difficult and lengthy process of trying to 
create a legally and politically independent central bank, should rather seek to create and 
strengthen a domestic constituency for low inflation. Among the staunchest members of 
such an anti-inflation constituency would be private banks, which due to the maturity 
mismatch of assets and liabilities and the non-marketable nature of assets are particularly 
vulnerable to high inflation.  
One could term this the indirect route to obtaining central bank independence, as the 
creation of private banks in turn will lead to higher pressure for lower inflation, which in 
turn will induce both low inflation and central bank independence. This rival school of 
thought may help to explain why, despite having often spent considerable energy in 
creating autonomous central banks, one fails to find a robust negative correlation between 
central bank independence and inflation in developing countries. It is often the case in 
developing countries that the private banking sector is relatively small and subject to 
extensive regulation. Under such circumstances any influence held by the private sector 
is likely to be directed at changing the direct regulation instead of being geared at 
lowering inflation. Hence, the anti-inflation constituencies in these countries are 
relatively small and without political clout.  
The policy advice emerging from this rival school of thought is thus that governments 
should not waste energy and reputation trying to create an independent central bank, 
whose autonomy is likely to be violated by the government itself at a later stage of crisis. 
Instead, the government should opt for a process of building a base of support for lower 
inflation outside the policy environment. This can take place through deregulation and 
privatisation of the financial sector that will increase resistance to high levels of inflation 
and strengthen the advocacy for an independent central bank. In essence, the government 
following this indirect approach is still seeking to tie its own hands following the same 
rationale that lead to the recommendation to create an independent central bank following 
the direct approach suggested by Rogoff. However, the indirect approach might prove to 
                                                 
22 That is the situation where low levels of inflation although not attributable to the central bank tend to 
make the central bank more reputable, which in turn allows the central bank to seek greater autonomy 
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be more credible than the direct given that it involves institutions that are external to the 
government. 
Prior to evaluating whether a direct or an indirect approach to obtaining central bank 
independence will be the most effective in a Vietnamese context, the analysis will turn to 
evaluating the present level of independence of the SBV. 
Prior to analysing SBV independence, it is, however, necessary to establish how 
independence is measured. Hermes and Lensink (2000) introduce the following examples 
of typologies/methods used to enable the identification and discussion of different 
components of central bank independence: 
• Political vs. economic independence was introduced by Grilli et al. (1991), and 
the distinction between political and economic independence can be used to 
analyse the degree of central bank independence vis-à-vis specific and key central 
bank policy objectives. Hence, political independence refers to the degree to 
which a central bank independently can pursue a goal of price stability, while 
economic independence seeks to uncover the degree to which the central bank 
autonomously can determine the terms and conditions of credit to the central 
government. 
• Goal vs. instrument independence was introduced by Debelle and Fischer 
(1995), and goal independence measures the extent to which the central bank can 
set its own policy goals and objectives. Instrument independence, on the one 
hand, reflects the degree to which the central bank is able to freely choose and 
assign policy instruments to obtain a given goal. 
• Legal vs. actual independence was introduced by Cukierman (1992), and legal 
independence refers to the degree of independence stipulated in the laws 
governing the central bank. Actual independence is the political independence 
that results from the interpretation and/or circumvention of these laws.  
For the purpose of this analysis, the approach suggested by Cukierman appears the best 
suited. However, to take into account that actual independence as defined by Cukierman 
may be affected by factors that are both internal and external to the SBV, we will rely on 
the following three types of independence: 
1. Legal independence, referring to the degree of independence stipulated in the laws 
about the SBV (corresponds to Cukierman’s legal independence). 
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2. Political independence, referring to the fact that behaviour and rules do not always 
coincide. Although a central bank is independent by statute, plenty examples exist of 
situations where all sides nevertheless accept that government will have its way 
regardless of the rules. This type of independence therefore seeks to estimate the 
political capacity and clout of the SBV. In this context, it is important to point out that 
focus is on restrictions caused by factors that are external to the SBV. 
3. Operational independence refers to the fact that although a central bank may have 
obtained both legal and political independence the ability to design and implement its 
policies in practice is a necessary condition if the other two forms of independence 
are to result in actual changes. This type of independence is primarily assessed by 
looking at the human capital in the SBV as well as the strategies in place to attract, 
augment, and further develop the human capital available.23 Hence, this component 
focuses on lack of independence caused by factors that are internal to the SBV. 
As it is presented here, the three forms of independence are non-substitutable and 
necessary if the SBV is to function as a functionally independent central bank. The three 
forms will be considered in turn as a build up to the final comprehensive evaluation 
performed towards the end of this Section.  
 
5.2.1 Legal Independence 
In terms of legislation, the Law on the State Bank is the principal reference and the first 
legal confirmation of the independence of the SBV. Here and in the law on credit 
institutions it was stipulated and affirmed that interference in the lawful operations of the 
state bank and credit institutions is prohibited. 
While this clearly represents an important legal confirmation of the independence of the 
SBV its actual significance can only be evaluated in combination with the actual powers 
bestowed upon the SBV in the same context. Here the Law on the State Bank stipulates 
that the SBV is only responsible for the formulation of a national monetary policy and its 
submission to the government for consideration. The government subsequently submits 
                                                 
23 One could also include an assessment of the degree of financial independence of the SBV among the 
internal factors potentially curbing overall operational independence. Following Beckerman (1997) the 
financial independence of a central bank is defined as the requisite quantity and composition of central 
bank capital to make the central bank able to perform a credible and effective macroeconomic management 
of money and credit.  
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the perhaps modified national monetary policy to the National Assembly for approval. 
Hence, the SBV does not have the final word and is not the last to make decisions on 
issues concerning the national monetary policy. Thus, in comparison with some countries 
where the Central Banks are not tied to the government, like the FED in the United States 
and the Central Bank of Germany, the legal degree of independence of the SBV is 
restricted. 
As for the power to make decisions concerning future plans and to conduct monetary and 
credit policy the SBV is also subject to the direction of the government and in some cases 
interference of local authorities. The latter appears especially in the municipal and 
provincial branches of the SBV, where, although the powers and duties of these offices 
are restricted, operations are frequently interfered and/or disrupted by local authorities. 
Even in issues that are left for the SBV to decide, the SBV is still required to report to the 
government for approval. This type of interference can be seen in pieces of regulations 
that should have been promulgated as decisions of the Governor of state bank but were 
instead promulgated as decrees of the Government. In addition, the management of 
foreign exchange reserves and the usage of foreign exchange reserves have to conform to 
government requirements. 
In addition, the legal powers bestowed upon the SBV in terms supervisory activities 
related to restructuring and reorganising banks was considered and compared with that of 
other countries in the region in Section 4.4. Here it was found that the Vietnamese 
authorities were on average bestowed with greater powers than that of other developing 
countries. However, when we turn to compare the Prompt Corrective Power Index, which 
measures whether or not the law establishes predetermined levels of bank solvency 
deterioration that force automatic actions, such as intervention, it was found that the 
promptness by which the SBV can or will respond to problems in the financial sector is 
lower in Vietnam than in most other countries in the region. Furthermore, it was found 
that the supervisory authorities in the SBV have no or low independence from 
Vietnamese officials but that this was no different from the situation in the other 
countries in the South East Asian region. 
Thus, according to an assessment of the existing legislation, the level of legal 
independence of the SBV is mixed. A comparison with, for example, the OECD countries 
would indicate that the Vietnamese central bank is in many respects still a body of the 
Government, while a comparison with the other countries in the region and developing 
countries in general would indicate that the level of legal independence of the SBV in a 
number of areas is at par with or exceeds that which is observed in these countries. The 
lack of legally stipulated powers to promptly react to violations of the existing legislation 
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is, however, a serious shortcoming, which does not bode well for the subsequent 
assessment of the level of political independence. 
The Law on the State Bank was passed in 1998 in the context of the South-East Asia 
Financial Crisis, at a time where governments throughout the region where trying to 
restrict and hamper financial sector volatility and innovation. This highly sensitive time 
for financial regulation can perhaps explain why the Law on the State Bank, as argued by 
some experts, stipulates a level of SBV independence, which is below the non-stipulated 
political level of independence that was bestowed upon the SBV prior to the passing of 
the law. In this context, it is, however, important to point out that although the specific 
adverse circumstances at the time of the passing of the law might explain its 
restrictiveness, it is not likely that they continue to do so – i.e. when circumstances 
change to the better, the legislation can be changed accordingly. 
 
5.2.2 Political Independence 
The Law on the State Bank stipulates that the SBV is responsible for managing 
instruments of monetary policy such as refinancing, interest rates, and foreign exchange 
rates (Article 15 of Law on state bank, 1998). This is to take place through the use of 
indirect monetary instruments like the interest rate on the inter-bank market and 
refinancing conditions and terms. The effect and efficiency of these instruments are, 
however, low due to the following reasons:  
• The development of a market economy is still in its early stages resulting in 
shallow financial markets characterized by infrequent and low levels of trading 
and a small number of different financial commodities.  
• Although the mechanisms for managing interest rates have improved with the 
shift from a ceiling-managed mechanism to a basic rate system for VND 
lending,24 market forces have not been allowed to prevail due to government 
interference. As a consequence, the SBV has had to implement lending policies 
with preferential interest rates for some projects or provide loans under specific 
instructions, despite the fact that state loans are not allowed to be different from 
those of commercial loans. 
                                                 
24 In effect, this represents the first step towards liberalising lending in USD. 
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 As for the SBV management of the inter-bank markets, the prevailing policies of the 
SBV have not encouraged and attracted private credit institutions to enter the market. The 
most active participants in the market are still state commercial banks and big joint-stock 
commercial bank. Accordingly, adjusting interest rates throughout the market has not yet 
become the intended instrument to control the overall market for credit, thereby 
essentially restricting SBV independence. 
Following the approach introduced by Cukierman, political central bank independence 
can be approximated by the average turnover rate of the central bank governors, i.e. the 
average number of changes of central bank governors per year. Although this indicator is 
clearly not without problems25, it is an operational measure, which in addition can be 
measured and compared across countries. As a consequence, the average turnover rate 
(TOR) of central bank governors has become one of the most widely used and cited 
indicators of actual (political) central bank independence. Table 5.2 compares the TOR of 
central bank governors in Vietnam with that of other countries in the region: 
Table 5.2: Turnover of central bank governors (annual average in units) 
 1980 - 1989 1990 - 1998 
Indonesia 0.20 0.25 
Korea 0.40 0.50 
Malaysia 0.20 0.25 
Singapore 0.30 0.25 
Thailand 0.10 0.75 
Vietnama 0.33 0.50 
Sources: Sturm and de Haan (2001) and CIEM 
aThe list of Vietnamese central bank governors since 1980 is: Tran Doung (1980-1982); 
Nguyen Duygia (1982-1986); Lu Minh Chau (1986-1989); Cao Sy Kien (1989-1997); Do Que 
Luong (1997-1998); Nguyen Tan Dung (1998-2000); and Le Duc Thuy (2000-present). 
 
                                                 
25 On the one hand, a change of central bank governor might be caused by a multitude of reasons not 
related to unduly and excessive central government interference. On the other hand, a central bank 
governor may remain in office for a long time because he/she is acquiescing towards government wishes 
and priorities.  
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Accepting the TOR of central bank governors as a proxy for central bank independence, 
Table 5.2 would seem to indicate that the Vietnamese central bank compared to its 
regional counterparts enjoys a relatively high level of political independence. In addition, 
the level of SBV independence would seem to increase in both absolute and relative 
terms across the two periods considered, which corresponds well with the development 
and changes outlined in Section 5.1. It should, however, be noted that an inclusion of the 
most recent period from 1998-2002 is likely to change this relatively good standing of the 
SBV, as it has experienced no fewer than two shifts of governors over this relatively short 
period. 
Turning to the SBV role as a supervisor of the financial sector, the Law on the State Bank 
and Decree 88/1998/ND-CP of the Vietnamese Government states that the department of 
banking supervision is to be headquartered at the State Bank of Vietnam. The department 
is to advise the SBV Governor on implementing state management and functions of the 
central bank. The SBV supervision is to be directed by the guidelines of the State 
Inspector in co-ordination with the Banking Operation Centre of the SBV. However, 
unlike the directors of departments in the SBV headquarters, who are appointed by the 
SBV Governor, the Chief of Banking Supervision is appointed by the Prime Minister 
according to recommendations from the SBV Governor and General Chief of the State 
Inspector.26 As a consequence, banking supervision has higher status and enjoys a greater 
degree of independence than other departments of the state bank. For example, if the 
Chief of Banking Supervision is in disagreement with the conclusions of the SBV 
Governor regarding banking supervision, the Chief of Banking Supervision will be able 
to execute plans, although he must report related matters to the General Chief of the State 
Inspector. This is the case although the Chief of Banking Supervision is also responsible 
to the SBV Governor for assigned tasks. 
The overall assessment of the level of political independence of the SBV is that the SBV 
has not, in some cases, made decisions on issues that were within its power but has 
instead relied on guidance from or the consent of the government. This reflects that in the 
political system of Vietnam, the SBV as a non-governmental organisation still does not 
have the status or positioning needed to independently and effectively execute national 
monetary policies. One should, however, make note of the progress seen within the 
supervisory activities. This is a positive recent development, which hopefully will result 
in more accurate, timely, and autonomous supervision and control (see Chapter 4). 
                                                 
26 Note, most chiefs of banking supervision are officials from the state bank and that none of them are 
officials from the Ministry of Finance or a state owned enterprise. 
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5.2.3 Operational Independence 
Turning to an assessment of the operational independence of the SBV it is necessary to 
look more closely at personnel and training issues.  
The total number of staff at the SBV is between 6,500 and 7,000. The central office in 
Hanoi employs 800 people. Some 60, 100, 70, and 30 to 50 people are employed in the 
Department of Monetary Policy, the State Bank’s Inspection Division, the Technology 
Department and other departments, respectively. Remaining staff work in the 61 
municipal and provincial branches and the representative offices. Some of the municipal 
and provincial branches are overstaffed compared to assigned functions and duties (some 
offices have a staff of over 100 people). This is a recurring issue, which SBV has not 
been able to solve due to obstacles resulting from the personnel policy of the state. 
Movement of staff between the central state bank and municipal and provincial branches 
in management and operation of the system is generally not recommended by the SBV. 
If implemented, the following proposals might improve the operational capacity of the 
SBV in both the central and the regional and provincial offices:  
• Perform a check of the functions and duties assigned to the different units and 
branches of the SBV in order to avoid overlapping authorities and resulting 
possibilities to evade responsibilities. The Government will submit a proposal to 
the National Assembly regarding an amendment to the Law on State Bank (1998) 
that would create the legal framework for a re-organisation of the financial sector 
in order to improve management performance. 
• Reduce staff numbers in especially municipal and provincial branches. According 
to government policy and parallel with re-arranging personnel to more accurate 
positions, the SBV intends to reduce the permanent staff of the State Bank system 
by 15 percent.  
• Develop a pilot project on different models of regional branches that could 
potentially replace existing municipal and provincial branches. This should 
include options that strengthen local competence and reduce possibilities for local 
authorities to interfere. 
In order to proactively meet the training and retraining needs of the State Bank system 
and commercial bank staff, the Banking Institute has been reorganised with a 
combination of training and research activities. At present, the Banking Institute has one 
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sub-institute in Ho Chi Minh City, seven faculties and a dozen special departments in 
Hanoi. At present, the Banking Institute selects and trains about 2,000 students and 
thousands of short-term apprentices as well as some 20 graduate students annually. 
However, the curriculum taught and the qualifications of the lecturers at the Banking 
Institute are not comparable with those found in Vietnamese universities. Hence, the 
reputation and quality of graduate student skills is not as high as desirable. 
To improve the effectiveness of State Bank operations, special attention should be made 
to training and retraining staff of the banking system. At present, the State Bank has 
expressed much concern about the quality and applicability of the training given. Thus, 
although the annual number of staff trained is large, the training quality and effectiveness 
has not met the internal requirements. The curriculum and training methods need to be 
better suited to the trainees. Accordingly, one solution could be to select qualified young 
staff for specialised education as well as developing succession plans to adapt with future 
requirements. More emphasis should moreover be placed on teaching technical skills 
rather than theoretical issues. In addition, conducting periodical examinations for the 
selection of staff would seem to be a better mechanism for promotions instead of 
following the present general promotion scheme based in part on seniority. Implementing 
these changes will entail thorough renovation of the curriculum, training methods and 
instructors, and will, as a consequence, require a high-level backing and commitment 
within the SBV in order to succeed.  
In conclusion, the operational independence of the SBV is restricted by an inexpedient 
organisational structure that permits overstaffing at especially the municipal and 
provincial offices. The operational independence is further hampered by the insufficient 
quality and applicability of the training received in internal training institutions.  
 
5.2.4 General Assessment 
The overall evaluation of SBV independence is that the SBV with its current capacity 
cannot effectively develop and execute national monetary policies. SBV remains 
operationally and politically dependent upon support from other government agencies. 
One could therefore question whether the above mentioned more restrictive Law on the 
State Bank is the binding constraint. Given that the SBV in a number of cases renege 
from making decisions that are clearly within its area of jurisdiction and competence, it 
would appear more likely that lack of political independence is more binding. 
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Following the above-cited arguments of Posen (1994) and Mas (1995) one could also 
argue, that it is neither possible nor recommendable to attempt to separate the SBV from 
the government though direct legislative channels. Instead, one could adopt a more 
indirect route by gradually building and strengthening a non-governmental lobby for an 
independent central bank. The preliminary plans for the equitisation of the large state-
owned banks represent an important step in this direction, as does the continued presence 
of foreign banks in Vietnam. The current low levels of inflation experienced by Vietnam 
naturally imply that anti-inflation [as suggested by Posen (1994) and Mas (1995)] cannot 
be the common cause under which a private lobby would unite. But one could easily 
think of other common causes such as banking sector stability and transparency. This 
might well cause the private banking sector to unite and support a common demand for a 
more independent central bank.  
While this is clearly a long-term process, the short-term priority should be to identify and 
describe the status, role, and functions of the SBV, as this would improve the chances of 
strengthening its institutional capacity. If successful, this will in turn allow the SBV to 
perform according to the relative level of independence already stipulated in the existing 
legislation.  
Finally, a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of functions and duties of the 
SBV under the Law on State Bank (1998) will be carried out during 2002-2003. This will 
expose successes and failures as well as lessons experienced. It will also form the basis 
for a comprehensive plan to complete the banking reform programme in terms of both 
organisation and operation. This could include: 
• Improving the training of SBV staff.  
• Decentralising the SBV towards raising powers and responsibilities of SBV.  
• Completing the organisational structure of the SBV in order to reduce overlaps, 
streamline the organisation, and reassign responsibilities  
• Reform SBV activities towards concentrating on state management and reduce the 
government-imposed interference in the activities of credit institutions.  
Adopting such policies amounts to following the gradual, indirect route towards 
increasing central bank independence, which, given the prevailing political and economic 
environment in Vietnam, is likely to be the most productive and effective approach in the 
short- to medium-term. 
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5.3 SBV Management and Control of Selected Financial Markets 
All central banks have among their principal tasks to ensure the stability and 
development of the payment system and the banking sector. One way in which the central 
bank can hope to achieve this is by ensuring and facilitating the development of key 
markets for financial services and products, thereby giving agents and institutions the 
choice between financial products that vary in terms, conditions, and liquidity. 
Consequently, this section focuses on to what extent and how the SBV facilitates the 
following key financial markets: the market for treasury bills and the inter-bank market 
for domestic and foreign currency.  
 
5.3.1 SBV and the Market for Treasury Bills 
In Vietnam, treasury bills and bonds are issued via three channels: the SBV, municipal 
and provincial branches of the Treasury, and the stock exchange market. 
Up to now, the official data on the total value of T-bills and bond issues through 
municipal and provincial branches of the Treasury have not been published. However, 
indications are that this amount is not large. The amount of T-bills and bond issues taking 
place through the stock exchange market is also small. As a result, T-bills and bonds are 
still issued through the state bank. In the past, funds have been mobilised through the 
bidding on T-bills and bonds in order to increase credit investment resources and the 
efficiency of capital. Table 5.3 shows the development of funds mobilisation through the 
bidding of T-bills and bonds:  
Table 5.3: The market for treasury bills 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 
Total amount (billion VND) 243 967 2913 4020,7 4766 
Number of auctions (units) 4 19 37 44 46 
Average interest rate per year 
(percent) 
17.2-18 7.89-
13.8 
9-11.3 11.58-
11.4 
5.2 
Source: State Bank of Vietnam 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.3, the total value of T-bills and bonds has increased year 
after year. The amount of T-bills and bonds sold in 1996 was four times larger than in 
1995. In 1997, the total bidding amount was three times larger than in 1996, and the 
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bidding amount in 1998 was 1.5 times larger than in 1997. In 2000, T-bills reviews were 
conducted regularly once a week under Decree No.01/ND-CP dated January 13th of 2000. 
In 2001, the state bank managed 46 auctions of treasury bills and bonds. In total 90 
entities participated in the auctions of which 86, 2, 1, and 1 participant were from state 
commercial banks, joint stock commercial banks, a foreign bank and an insurance 
company respectively. The cut-off yield was a closed interest rate with a fluctuation from 
5 to 5.8 percent per year. The average cut-off yield in 2001 was 5.49 percent a year. 
Related to the auctions of Treasury Bills is the SBV conduct of open-market operations. 
Here the initial results obtained in the two-year period in which open-market operations 
have been conducted allow for cautious optimism. In the two-year period from July 2000 
up to now, there have been 73 transactions totalling 8,116 billion VND. As a 
consequence, open market operations appear to have stimulated demand and made a 
contribution towards carrying out the government and national monetary policy. 
There are, however, a number of restrictions, which hamper the further development, and 
growth of the secondary market for Treasury Bills and government bonds, which is 
necessary if open market operations are to become an effective instrument for monetary 
policy. This includes the fact that only T-bills and SBV bills are traded in the market, and 
moreover, according to the law on the State Bank, only short-term value trades (shorter 
than 1 year) are allowed in the market. This may hinder the development of a sufficiently 
deep market as potential participants may find it difficult to obtain a desired level of risk 
and asset diversification. 
The number of participants, who meet conditions to enter this market, is 22. However, in 
reality and most likely related to the above-mentioned problems only eight credit 
institutions have made transactions. Among these, it is moreover mainly the four large 
state owned commercial banks. The limited use of the market and the consequent lack of 
financial depth in concert with the afore-mentioned structural obstacles restrict open 
market operations from becoming an efficient indirect instrument for conducting 
monetary policy as well as a reasonable signal for improved market measures. The result 
may be a vicious circle were legal/administrative restriction prevent the market from 
growing and the limited size of the market implies lack of pressure for legal changes 
and/or limited attention to the problem in the responsible legislative bodies. 
The following measures could if implemented perhaps help to break this vicious circle 
and thus help create an alternative, market-based instrument of monetary policy:  
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• Amend the laws on the State Bank towards facilitating open market operations. 
This includes the regulations on entering the market and the rules governing 
which types of financial products that can be traded. 
• Increase the volume of transactions. This includes opening for acceptance of 
additional legal tender such as deposit certificates issued by a highly liquid 3rd 
party organisation as adequate value. 
• Strengthen the competence of credit institutions. This includes their portfolio 
management and forecasting skills. 
• Supplement and diversify financial instruments transacted in the open market. 
Here, the State Bank asked the Government and the National Assembly for 
permission to use long-term legal tenders in the open market. The State Bank is 
also proposing the Ministry of Finance to issue bonds with different maturities. In 
addition, the state bank will allow some kinds of bonds from state commercial 
banks to be issued and traded in the market. 
According to persistent rumours, the Ministry of Finance is preparing a draft proposal on 
issuing government bonds in international markets. Although not directly related to the 
SBV role as a creator and facilitator of markets, there is good reason to pause and 
consider possible implication of such a decision. Preliminary assessments indicate that 
the Ministry of Finance plans to issue for 500 million dollars worth of seven year Euro 
bonds, which will be accorded a rating equivalent to that of other emerging and/or 
transitional economies. Various arguments can be identified to provide an explanation for 
why the government may choose to go ahead with this decision: 
1. The fund raised would provide a welcome supplement to already existing sources 
of government funding 
2. Issuing an internationally tradable series of bonds can provide a much-needed 
anchor for fixing interest rate levels in Vietnam, making it, among other things, 
possible to produce a yield curve. This will serve to improve the framework and 
conditions for the other bonds and T-bills issued by the government and the SBV. 
3. The successful maintenance of an international series of Euro bonds would 
provide a clear signal to international investors that Vietnam was moving 
decisively and competently in the direction of increased reliance on market forces. 
A signal, which in the long run could improve the country’s chances of attracting 
foreign direct investments. 
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4. It would, however, also constitute an important signal to Vietnamese society that 
the country was similar to the ASEAN reference economies – hence contributing 
to government’s strategy of holding on to power through ‘performance 
legitimacy.’ 
5. Finally, it would improve the opportunities for large Vietnamese companies to 
attract funds from abroad, as the bond interest rate will provide a benchmark to 
which a company specific risk premium would be added. 
One can also identify potential concerns and downsides for each of the five positive 
aspects mentioned above: 
Ad. 1. There is a potential risk that the government commitment towards the 
international financial market will ‘raise eyebrows’ in the donor community. 
This is so, partly because donors find it harder to justify giving concessional 
loans and/or international development assistance to countries, which can 
attract international capital on market terms. Moreover, the servicing of loans 
to bilateral or multilateral agencies may be ‘squeezed’ by private creditors in 
the event of a crisis. 
Ad. 2. Analyses of the East Asian financial crisis indicate that an element of financial 
contagion was at play in the transformation of the crisis from an internal 
problem in Malaysia to a fully-fledged regional crisis. International investors 
who in the initial phase of the crisis perceived the East Asian economies as a 
bloc were to some degree to blame for this. By linking domestic interest rate 
fixation to the bond series, Vietnam does open a potential channel for 
importing future financial crises originating in neighbouring economies. 
Another problem, which could arise, is that the market for Vietnamese 
government bonds fails to achieve sufficient depth,27 potentially making the 
fixation of interest rates volatile and more susceptible to runs and speculative 
arbitrage. This could, of course, be avoided by abstaining from using the bond 
rate as an anchor thereby effectively maintaining the almost complete isolation 
of the domestic financial market. 
                                                 
27 Note, that preventing this from happening is a very important consideration in the process of deciding the 
size of the bond issue. However, lack of previous experience with Vietnamese bonds on the international 
market and the fact that other priorities also influence the design of the bond, does imply that one cannot 
issue a guarantee that the market will be sufficiently deep if the issue has a total nominal worth of 500 
million dollars.  
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Ad. 3. However, if a decision is made to isolate the Euro bond from the domestic 
financial market the signal value of issuing international bonds is lessened. 
Such a decision is likely to have a detrimental effect upon the credibility of the 
ongoing financial reforms, which in turn can make the bonds less attractive for 
international investors. 
Ad. 4. Related to issues touched upon above, the potential value of the domestic 
signal will evaporate if the consequences of an international bond issue are 
imported financial instability and/or loss of international reputation. It is thus a 
potentially dangerous signal to send to the domestic market as it might 
undermine the public confidence in the formal financial sector and the 
economic policies in general. 
Ad. 5. Opening up for firms borrowing abroad raises the complexity of choosing how 
to sequence future financial sector liberalisation. Maintaining a fixed exchange 
rate increases the amount of dollar denominated loans in Vietnamese firms, 
and this represents a real risk. By gradually opening for international capital 
flows without adjusting the exchange rate, makes it more difficult to make any 
changes to the exchange rate regime in the future. The reason is that any 
decision to let it float or devaluate would have to take into consideration the 
effects upon the firm balance sheets. In the event that a future liberalisation of 
the restrictions placed on trading the VND leads to increased pressure on the 
exchange rate, the government could face a situation where the consequences 
of both defending the VND and adjusting it/letting it float would be bad. 
Recent research into the East Asian Financial crisis indicates that a 
deterioration of firm balance sheets following the first wave of devaluations 
was one of the factors, which further augmented the crisis. Troubled firms 
passed their problems on to the banks – thereby reinforcing the crisis into a 
vicious circle.  
It is thus very important that the Vietnamese government carefully considers and takes 
into account the potential implications of issuing a series of international bonds. Unless 
such a decision is thought into a detailed and sequenced plan of financial reforms, which 
is subsequently adhered to, the short-term gains of issuing international bonds may be 
erased by erratic and powerful international financial markets. Whether or not the 
Vietnamese government decides to go ahead is inevitably a political decision, but it is 
important to consider and analyse all aspects of such a decision. 
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5.3.2 The Inter-bank Market for Domestic and Foreign Currency 
The inter-bank domestic currency market of Vietnam was first established in a 
rudimentary form in 1993 in an attempt to strengthen the role of the SBV in monetary 
management (World Bank 1995). The Governor of the State Bank of Vietnam established 
a firmer legal basis for the market in July 1998 following Decision No. 132/QD-NH14, 
which stipulated that the inter-bank domestic currency market (IDCM) is organized and 
regulated by the State Bank to assist credit institutions in making an effective use of their 
capital and ensuring their capacity to meet payment obligations. 
The state bank plays the “dual” role of market regulator and market member. It appoints 
its representative the “Chairman of the IDCM” to be a member of the IDCM. In order to 
be allowed to participate, a commercial bank has to meet a range of stipulated conditions. 
These include having an account in the Trade Office of the State Bank, having a 
representative at the Transaction Centre of the IDCM, and having an internal 
informational system linking the headquarters to the Transaction Centre. 
According to the Status of the IDCM, two types of lending activities are allowed in this 
market: borrowing to cover a deficit in clearing payments and borrowing to extend a 
credit (short-term lending). All transactions are carried out in the national currency, 
VND. This rule is also applied to branches of foreign banks and joint-venture banks. 
If a credit institution does not have enough funds to carry out clearing payments, it can 
borrow from the branch of the state bank where it has opened its account, but for a 
maturity of up to 10 days only. The member banks may repay their debt to the State Bank 
before the term of payment at any time, but earlier repayment to other members may be 
accepted only if these agree. 
To link and solve the demand-supply relationship for foreign exchange among credit 
institutions, Vietnam established an inter-bank foreign exchange market. This was first 
established in October 1994. Up to 1997, there were 58 participants in the market. The 
annual transaction volume of foreign exchange among credit institutions was 720 million 
USD. The transaction volume among credit institutions increased following decision 
37/1998/QD-TTg on accelerating management of foreign exchange and decision 
173/1998/QD-TTg on the obligation of sale and rights of buy for resident organizations, 
as well as adjustments in foreign exchange rate circulation. Another factor, which caused 
the inter-bank transaction volume to increase, was that the transaction volume among 
commercial banks and their clients also increased remarkably. In the first nine months of 
1998, the average transaction volume was 500 million USD per month. This figure was 
up to 900 million USD in the last three months of this year. But in the year 2000, the 
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transaction volume of the inter-bank foreign exchange market increased by only 9 percent 
compared to 1999. 
 
5.4 SBV Regulation and Supervision of the Financial Sector 
Whether or not the supervision and regulation of the financial sector is among the 
essential, core tasks of a central bank can be discussed. Some analysts like Beckerman 
(1997) argue that the tasks of managing credit, money and foreign-reserve aggregates are 
formidable enough, rationalising that central bank directors should focus on these and 
leave supervision to a specialized supervisory institution. The underlying argument is in 
part (i) a resource constraint (i.e. that supervision makes heavy demands on central bank 
directors time and attention), and in part (ii) a potential conflict of interests giving rise to 
possible moral hazard problems (i.e. that central bank directors could be tempted 
inappropriately to ease overall money and credit policies in order to ease their own 
supervision task). At the other end, analysts like Hermes and Lensink (2000) disagree and 
argue that bank supervision is inherently a central bank function as it assists in 
maintaining and safeguarding the overall stability of the system. 
This divergence of views is also reflected in actual differences in central bank practice 
across countries. Some central banks like the US Federal Reserve Bank regard 
supervision of the financial sector to be among its core tasks, while others, like, for 
example, the Danish central bank have delegated the task to an independent supervisory 
institution. Moreover, no norm or set of guidelines analogous to commercial banks Basel 
norms exist for central banks. Hence the decision of whether or not a central bank should 
perform financial sector supervision is essentially country-specific.  
 In Vietnam, the still ongoing process to create a two-tiered banking system in 
combination with the multitude of important issues and problems competing for attention, 
imply that the question of whether or not supervision is a central bank function has yet to 
attract attention and debate. We will return to consider this question in the Vietnamese 
context towards the end of this section. First it will, however, be useful to turn to a 
description of how the SBV conducts its supervision. This will be followed by the 
identification and discussion of problem areas and potential solutions related to SBV 
supervision.  
In the one one-tier banking system, banking supervision did not exist. Only after the 
ordinances on the state bank came into effect in 1990 was supervision of the banking 
organised into a system from the central to the local level. The 1998 Law on the State 
 96
Bank represented an important step vis-à-vis ensuring an unambiguous and clear legal 
foundation for banking supervision. Table 5.4 summarizes the situation before and after 
the Law on the State Bank. 
 
Table 5.4: SBV supervision before and after the law on the State Bank 
 Law on the State Bank Prior to promulgation of Law 
Legal position Banking supervision is defined as 
the professional inspection of the 
banking sector. 
Banking supervision is a unit of the 
state inspectorate at the state bank. 
Banking supervision was a unit of the 
state inspectorate at the state bank. 
 
Functions Professional supervision and 
general inspection. 
General inspection. 
Purpose To secure the safety of the system 
of credit institutions. 
To protect legitimate rights and 
interests of depositors. 
To support the implementation of 
the national monetary policy. 
Unclear purpose. 
Objects Organisations and operations of 
credit institutions. 
Organisations of operations of non-
banking financial institutions. 
Implementation of regulation on 
monetary and banking issues of 
institutions and individuals. 
 
Organisations and operations of credit 
institutions. 
Organisations and operations of 
institutions belonging directly to the State 
Bank. 
Principle Banking supervision only abides by 
the Law to insure accuracy, 
objectiveness, transparency, 
democracy, and timing. 
Banking supervision must not 
suffer interference from other 
The principles on inspection were 
stipulated in the ordinance on inspection 
in general. 
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Table 5.4: SBV supervision before and after the law on the State Bank 
 Law on the State Bank Prior to promulgation of Law 
authorities.  
Source: Tou (2001) 
 
While the Law on the State Bank represents the current legal basis for SBV supervision, 
banking supervisors are also subject to the Law on credit institutions and other 
regulations, including ordinances on inspection, ordinances on resisting corruption, the 
Law on complaint accusation, and ordinances on penalising administrative violations. 
On an organisational level, banking supervision at the SBV includes the following offices 
and divisions: state commercial bank supervision division, joint-stock commercial bank 
supervision division, branch of foreign bank supervision division, analysis and inspection 
division, division of judgement on complaint and supervision units of the SBV at 
municipal and provincial branches (supervision units). The Organisation of supervision 
belongs to municipal and provincial branches but the Chief of Banking Supervision 
directs it. Duties of supervision units are to inspect activities of branches of local credit 
institutions. The current number of staff in the banking supervision department is 200, of 
whom 100 are assigned to the central office while 100 are supervisors at the municipal 
and provincial branches. Again, the 1998 Law on the State Bank brought about 
considerable changes in the organisation of supervision – changes that are summarized in 
Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: SBV supervision before and after the law on the State Bank 
 Law on the State Bank Prior to promulgation of Law 
Authority Central banking supervision of the SBV 
and banking supervision of municipal and 
provincial branches.  
Instructions, conducts and assignments 
between central and municipal and 
provincial banking supervision are 
systematic. 
  
Central banking supervision of the SBV 
and banking supervision of municipal and 
provincial branches.  
A vertical system of banking supervision 
was not clear. 
Leadership Chief and assistant chiefs at the central 
banking supervision. 
Chief and assistant chiefs at municipal and 
provincial branches. 
Chief and assistant chiefs at the central 
banking supervision. 
Chief and assistant chiefs at municipal and 
provincial branches. 
Duties Implementing banking supervision. 
Implementing functions of a unit of state 
inspection. 
Duties were not made clear. 
Powers The SBV can decide upon, recommend 
and carry out the penalisation of 
administrative violations. 
In addition, the SBV were given the right 
to make propositions for new ordinances 
and legislation and the powers to perform 
inspections. In addition, if the SBV 
disagrees with government decisions an 
official note of the SBV will be kept in the 
official records.  
The chief of banking supervision at the 
central level and the municipal and 
provincial branches were given the power 
to suspend the implementation of illegal 
regulations, to suspend the 
The SBV could decide upon, recommend 
but not carry out the penalisation of 
administrative violations  
Other powers were not clear. 
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Table 5.5: SBV supervision before and after the law on the State Bank 
 Law on the State Bank Prior to promulgation of Law 
implementation of punishment, and to 
warn and suspend individuals who hamper 
inspection. 
 
Supervisor 
standards  
A supervisor at level 1 was required to 
have at least a three-year experience in the 
banking sector. 
 
Unclear regulation. 
Relationship 
with related 
agencies. 
Clear regulation on the relationship 
between banking supervision and the state 
inspection, the inspection of other 
agencies, and the legislative system was 
established. 
No regulation or guidelines  
Source: Tou (2001) 
 
In the past the supervision practices of the SBV has been subject to criticism. Most 
notably the World Bank (1995) characterised the on-site inspection performed by the 
SBV as ‘one that is largely bottom-up at the branch or sub-branch level, and with a focus 
on verifying the accuracy of financial statements’. Moreover, ‘the work performed during 
this period (up till about 1995) was more in the nature of an internal audit, rather than 
examination’. However, over the last three years a number of measures have been 
undertaken to strengthen banking supervision. As a consequence, supervision 
methodology and settlement has been changed:  
1. Banking supervision activities are now focusing on assessing and examining the 
indices of banking activities instead of checking the bank accounts, books and 
invoices. 
2. Distant supervision activities have been improved. 
3. Powers and responsibilities of the supervisor are now stipulated more clearly (as 
described in Table 5.5). 
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Still, Vietnamese banking supervision activities do not meet the requirements of global 
standards.28 First, the model of organisation for the Vietnamese banking supervision 
system handles both the inspection functions for the banking industry and the judgement 
and treatment of complaints. In addition to the potential conflict of interest involved with 
having an operative institution handling complaints about its own conduct, this model of 
organisation has also caused difficulties with respect to time and focus. Hence, banking 
supervisors often spend their hours handling complaints rather than inspecting specific 
banking issues. Second, there is a lack of transparency and of equal treatment between 
state commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and branches of foreign banks. 
This goes for both the inspection results and the post inspection settlements. Third, the 
banking supervision system has not yet found a means to efficiently control bad banking 
debt (see Section 5.5). Fourth, the inspection process for banking supervisors in Vietnam 
is weak and still not in tune with international standards. There is a pronounced weakness 
vis-à-vis systematic collection and analysis of data and information on inspection 
activities. Furthermore, international methods and systems like CAMEL have not been 
implemented. Table 5.6 compares Vietnamese and international supervisory models: 
Table 5.6: International and Vietnamese models of banking supervision  
 Vietnamese model International model 
Objects of supervision Organisation and operation of 
credit institutions.  
Banking operations of other 
institutions. 
Supervising institutions and 
individuals how to abide by 
regulations on monetary issues 
and banking operations (state 
management function of the State 
Bank of Vietnam). 
Commercial banks. 
Non-bank financial institutions.  
Scope Supervising not only credit 
institutions but also other credit 
facilities (as mentioned above) 
Assisting the Governor in carrying 
Supervising commercial bank and 
non-bank financial institutions. 
 
                                                 
28 According to Financial magazine, 11/2000  
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Table 5.6: International and Vietnamese models of banking supervision  
 Vietnamese model International model 
out state management functions, 
in the judgement on complaints 
and accusations, and in fighting 
corruption. 
Powers and duties Banking supervisors are only 
allowed to recommend and 
propose. They may not grant or 
abolish licenses, promulgate 
regulation, and penalise offenders. 
 
Promulgate regulation on: 
• Organisation and operations: 
model and standards etc. 
• Management, control, 
accounting, auditing etc. 
• Prudential regulation. 
• Risk management and 
settlement. 
Grant and abolish licenses. 
Expand and restricting activities. 
Classify banks. 
Penalise offenders by imposing a 
fine or through the suspension of 
operations and management. 
Source: Tou (2001)  
 
One reason why the SBV banking supervisors fail to act in line with international 
standards is the lack of power and competence to change bank accountancy standards to 
correspond more closely to international standards. In Vietnam bank accounting systems 
are determined by the overall accountancy standards stipulated by the Ministry of 
Finance. As a result, the SBV is unable to formulate a bank accounting system outside of 
the Vietnamese accounting system. The process of changing the overall accounting 
principles to correspond to international standards has been initiated and is currently 
under implementation. It is, however a process, which will take time as it involves the 
formulation of a chart of accounts, the development of an entirely new accounting 
methodology, and the training of staff. 
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Hence, if the quality and timeliness of the SBV supervision is to be improved, the 
following measures need to be considered.  
• Changing the inspection and accounting systems of the SBV to comply with 
international standards.  
• Applying current international inspection methods.  
• Applying an inspection process that is transparent and acceptable for all credit 
institutions. 
• Training inspection staff in proper banking supervision methods.  
• Amending regulations on banking supervision towards strengthening the powers, 
duties and responsibilities of the inspectors. 
• Ensuring equal treatment of all credit institutions. 
More specifically, it is possible to identify a number of measures that are likely to 
improve the supervision of the state owned commercial banks. Note, that these include 
both measures related directly to the supervisory activities and measures, which reflect 
upon the overall operating conditions and terms of these institutions. The latter are 
included to reflect the obvious truth that supervisory tasks are easier and more likely to 
succeed if performed on financially sound, efficient institutions. The measures directed 
towards the SOCB include: 
• Auditing the SOCBs in accordance with international standards as well as 
publishing audited results.  
• Reforming the SOCB lending process towards strengthening powers and 
responsibilities of lending and credit institutions.  
• Increasing the registered capital of state commercial banks in order to guard 
banking system capital and profit. 
• Addressing the problem of non-performing debts. 
• Strengthening internal bank inspection. 
• Separating non-commercial and commercial loans in order to shift non-commercial 
loans towards policy banking (see Section 5.5). 
 103
Similarly, it is possible to identify the following measures that are likely to improve the 
supervision of the joint stock commercial banks. 
• Inspect banks plans to increase their registered capital in order to insure their 
financial capacity.  
• For banks that need to be merged, steps of implementation will be supervised. 
• Banks under special control need to be inspected carefully by the Committee of the 
SBV to ensure they abide to existing laws and regulations. 
As regards branches of foreign banks, the following direct and indirect measures can be 
identified: 
• Inspection of all foreign bank activities.  
• Identify ways in which it is possible to utilise foreign bank expertise and resources 
to improve staff training in investment, risk management, and internal inspection in 
domestic banks. 
Finally, one can identify the following four measures, which are likely to improve the 
supervision of the People’s Credit Funds. 
• Circulating and classifying overdue debt. 
• Analysing causes of overdue debt and propose measures to settle it. 
• Taking strict measures if serious violations occur during liquidations or in 
situations of emergency. 
• Speeding up the establishment of a Safe Fund – a capital fund developed via 
people’s credit funds to cover losses from operations and systems risk. 
In conclusion, there are a number of both direct and indirect measures, which can 
potentially improve the quality, and timeliness of SBV supervision. A central question, 
which, however, remains to be addressed, is whether the SBV should continue to perform 
and be responsible for banking supervision in Vietnam. This is, as stated previously, 
essentially a political decision. Nevertheless one can identify the following potential 
benefits from such a separation: 
• The SBV directors and staff will be able to focus effort and attention on managing 
money, credit and foreign exchange reserve aggregates, i.e. the capacity constraint 
argument made by Beckerman (1997).  
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• The separation of the supervisory division from the SBV will serve to increase the 
distance between the SBV and its former operative functions (the current 
SOCBs), which will minimize the risk of preferential treatment and/or outsider 
attempts to bias SBV policies and rulings.  
• The narrower set of objectives is likely to make the quest for increased SBV 
independence (see Section 5.4) easier and more feasible. Less conflict of interest 
will occur and efforts can be more concentrated.  
• The potential conflicts of interest between the overall monetary policies and the 
supervision of the banking sector will be made more transparent and will have to 
be settled through discussion and negotiation between the two institutions (i.e. the 
SBV and a new independent bank supervision institution). This could for example 
be a situation where the bank supervision institution in order to better deal with 
overdue debt in the banking sector would prefer a more expansive monetary 
policy. 
On the other hand, one should not neglect the operational, political and legal obstacles 
facing the creation of a new and independent supervisory institution. They range from the 
costs incurred to political power struggles between the different state institutions. 
However, as described previously, the supervisory divisions within the SBV have already 
achieved more operational and political independence. This has taken place through a 
gradual process spanning the last three to four years, and it is only natural to consider if 
and when this process is going to stop. 
A complete evaluation of supervisory practices of the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) is 
planned for the future. The study has yet to begin, but the implementation of the 
recommendations from this evaluation is to be completed before the end of 2005. One of 
the issues that will be considered during this process is the establishment of an 
independent control and audit institution, reporting directly to the Audit Committee of the 
Board of Directors. In addition, talks have indicated that a completion of the guidelines 
for how to resolve/intervene in troubled banks will take place. The analysis presented 
here suggests that the SBV and the Vietnamese government in this process should at least 
consider the pros and cons of a complete separation of supervisory duties from the SBV.  
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5.5 NPLs and AMCs  
Addressing the problem of non-performing loans (NPLs) is a key component of the 
planned reforms of the banking sector where the SBV plays a pivotal role. The reason for 
focusing explicitly on bad debts is that lack of corporate debt restructuring constitutes 
one of the large obstacles to improving bank balance sheets and, consequently, domestic 
credit availability, particularly to non-state enterprises.  
Given the fact that the SOCBs granted the majority of the non-performing loans, many 
dating years back, to state-owned enterprises in difficulty or under the direction of the 
government to achieve social or economic objectives, the approach and policies taken to 
solve the problems faced by the SOCBs will be an important indicator of the overall 
political will to reform. In other words, does the government have the necessary resolve 
and political will to address problems that predominantly result from past policy 
shortcomings? 
The exact extent of the problem is not easy to assess. Table 5.7 contains recent estimates 
made according to Vietnamese accounting standards.  
Table 5.7: Bad debt (share of  total outstanding loan volume in percent) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Entire bank sector 9.3 12.3 13 12.5 11.4 
State commercial banks only 11.0 11.9 11.2 11.1 10.8 
Joint stock commercial banks only 4.2 13.5 13.9 13.1 12.4 
Source: Assessment of Vietnams Economy (1999) CIEM/Vietnam/Australia and annual report 
of the SBV, 2000. 
 
The IMF using diagnostic audits based on international accounting standards has, 
however, estimated that non-performing loans in SOCBs constitute up to 30 percent of 
outstanding loans over the period 1996-1999. In addition, informal assessments suggest 
that the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loan value is substantially higher 
than 30 percent.  
One of the reasons for the huge discrepancy between the official estimate and estimates 
made by outsiders could be the practice of rolling over old loans, which is believed to be 
widespread in the Vietnamese banks and in the SOCBs in particular. 
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Another potential explanation is that Vietnamese banking practices up until recently 
dictated that provisioning should be made only for the arrears and not for the total loan in 
the case of loan default. Prior to 1990, the level of making risk provisions was neither 
based on overdue debt nor was calculated according to risk levels. Instead commercial 
banks were required to use 10 percent of profits after taxes for risk provisions. This 
amount was clearly insufficient for the purpose. 
This has changed in recent years as Decision 488/2000/QD-NHNN5 dated 27/11/2000, 
requires that risk provisioning is calculated on overdue debt (bad debt). Moreover, 
commercial bank assets must be classified into four groups with four associated levels of 
risk provisioning. 
Finally, it was recently proposed to change the calculation of over due debt and adjust 
risk provisioning to be more in tune with international standards - i.e. that provisioning is 
based on the risk level at the time the loan is disbursed rather than making provisions for 
credit risk after the loan becomes overdue. This change was stipulated in Decision 
1627/2001/QD-NHNN dated 31/12/2001 concerning regulating the status on providing 
bank loans between credit institutions and their clients. This caused the ratio of bad debt 
to outstanding banking loans to increase to about 17-20 percent of total outstanding 
credit, bringing official Vietnamese estimates more in line with the IMF estimate. In 
addition, the principles in using Risk Settlement Funds were more clearly stated in the 
decision, including that risk provisioning funds could only be made to cover losses for 
which objective reasons can be identified. Moreover, all amended regulations will 
support credit risk management and the settlement of commercial banks. 
The problem of NPL could, however, go beyond the financial sector as no information is 
available about the magnitude and distribution of inter-cooperate debts between the SOEs 
and how these relate to bank debts. Experience from other former centrally planned 
economies indicates that inter-cooperate SOE debts can be of a sizeable magnitude. This 
can substantially complicate efforts to restructure SOEs and state owned banks as it raises 
difficult questions of priority and relative importance between SOE obligations to other 
SOEs versus the obligations towards the state owned banks. In addition, it means that 
tough decisions have to taken concerning the allocation of the funds available for 
recapitalisation.  
Regardless of whether or not inter-corporate debt of any magnitude exist, holding NPLs 
of the magnitude cited above (30 percent of outstanding loans) is almost certain to have 
detrimental effects upon banking sector performance. The general channels through 
which NPLs can exert negative influence upon banking performance include: 
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• The diversion of managerial time and skills from other banking activities. 
• The reduction in funds available for new loans because funds are used to roll-over 
and/or ever-green adversely classified loans. 
• The loss of depositor and inter-bank confidence reduces incentives to channel 
savings or investments to the financial sector. 
In addition to taxing banking sector resources, NPLs may also have an adverse effect on 
bank lending behaviour either by making banks averse to risk (fearing additional losses) 
or by inducing them to take on even riskier loans (to gamble for resurrection). If practiced 
by the majority of the banks, the former will result in a credit crunch, while the latter is 
likely to amplify the problem, increasing the probability of a systemic crisis coupled with 
an overall loss of investor and depositor confidence in the sector.  
While it is not possible to document whether or not the NPLs have had a detrimental 
effect upon lending behaviour in Vietnam, it has become increasingly clear over the last 
five years that the NPL problem appears to have had negative influence as those 
mentioned above on banking sector performance in Vietnam. 
The initial official response to the recognition that NPLs impeded banking sector 
performance was one of regulatory forbearance. This essentially involves hoping that 
economic growth and the ongoing efforts to improve banking sector performance would 
eventually cause bad debt problems to be resolved without significant financial 
commitments and/or direct involvement by the government. However, as the necessary 
improvements in both macroeconomic performance and bank management were slow to 
appear in the years following the East Asian Crisis, it became clear that following a 
strategy of regulatory forbearance would not solve the NPL problem. 
Hence, to clean up the SOCB balance sheets and address the NPL problem, it was 
decided to introduce a new type of institution in Vietnam, namely the Asset Management 
Company (AMC). Using AMCs has to some extent become the standard international 
response to NPL problems in financial sectors. AMCs have been established in a large 
number of countries. They include most of the neighbouring ASEAN countries following 
the financial crisis in 1997-98. 
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5.5.1 AMCs in South East Asia 
In general terms, an AMC is an institution established to acquire, manage and recover 
non-performing assets of troubled or failed financial institutions. In most cases, a 
government wishing to restore stability and efficiency in the financial sector while at the 
same time attempting to keep fiscal costs and risk of moral hazard at a minimum has set 
up AMCs. 
Following Cooke and Foley (2000), it is possible to identify three different institutional 
set-ups that can be used when introducing AMCs in a financial sector: 
• A centralised state-owned AMC. 
• Several decentralised AMCs operating as separate departments within each crisis-
stricken institution. 
• Several decentralised AMCs as separate legal entities but each one addressing the 
particular problems of one of the crisis-stricken institutions.  
While no blueprint exists regarding which of the three types of AMC set-ups to employ 
to a given set of circumstances, Cooke and Foley suggest that the first option, a 
centralised AMC is to be preferred when the NPL problem is of a systemic magnitude 
and/or when special legal powers or purpose tailored legislation are needed to override 
the judicial branch. In addition, Cooke and Foley stress that a central AMC will be the 
preferred option if the human capital and specialist skills necessary to operate an AMC 
are in limited supply in the financial sector. 
After the financial crisis in 1997-1998, the directly affected East Asian countries were 
burdened with a large volume of non-performing assets, including nonperforming or past 
due loans and real estate and other assets pledged as collateral for loans. The magnitude 
of the problem in the respective countries is evident from Table 5.8. As is the case in 
Vietnam, several of the depicted countries are thought to have employed a definition of 
NPLs, which is more lenient than recommended by international standards. 
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Table 5.8: NPLs in South East Asia in peak year of crisis, 1998 
 NPLs in peak year of 
crisis 
Estimated amount 
of government 
debt to pay for 
bank 
restructuring 
Annual interest 
cost of 
government debt 
to pay for bank 
restructuring 
 Share of 
loans in 
percent 
Share of 
GDP in 
percent 
Share of GDP in 
percent 
Share of GDP in 
percent 
Thailand 50 70 32 4.0 
Indonesia 70 53 29 3.5 
Malaysia 30 42 18 1.3 
Korea 35 35 18 2.0 
The Philippines 15 5 4 0.5 
Source: Cooke and Foley (2000) 
 
In their policy response to this problem and with the intent to restore the health of and 
confidence in the financial sector, all countries chose to create and develop AMCs in 
1997-1998. As can be seen from Table 5.9 most countries have chosen to employ a 
centralised AMC set-up. 
Table 5.9: AMC set-up in South East Asia 
 Initial model Chosen Approach 
Thailand Both central 
and 
decentralized. 
Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA) 
evaluates finance companies rehabilitation plans 
and sells their assets. 
Asset Management Company acts as bidder of 
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Table 5.9: AMC set-up in South East Asia 
 Initial model Chosen Approach 
last resort for FRA’s bad assets. 
Radhanasin Bank29 acts as bidder for FRA’s good 
assets. 
Bank Based Asset Management Companies work 
out NPLs for commercial banks (both private and 
state). 
Indonesia Decentral Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency 
supervises banks in need of restructuring and 
manages assets acquired in the bank restructuring 
process. 
Malaysia Central Special purpose vehicle for the management and 
disposition of banking system NPLs 
Korea Central Special purpose vehicle for the management and 
disposition of banking system nonperforming 
assets. 
Source: Cooke and Foley (2000) 
 
According to Rajan and Bird (2001) all of the above mentioned economies have made 
‘some headway in reducing NPLs’. In Korea and Malaysia the combined effect of the 
nascent economic recovery and the AMC effort have caused a reduction in NPL ratios for 
commercial banks to less than 10 percent. In contrast, NPLs have remained high in 
Thailand (about 30 percent), a fact that Rajan and Bird cautiously attribute to the Thai 
government’s preference for a market-based approach to financial restructuring. In 
Indonesia, the central AMC is estimated to control approximately 75 percent of total 
NPLs, but the combination of powerful, uncooperative borrowers and an inadequate 
legislative framework continue to hamper the subsequent recovery and restructuring of 
assets. 
                                                 
29 Radhanasin Bank (RAB) was initially created to manage quality assets of the failed finance companies, 
leaving the bad assets to the AMC. In January 1998, however, the government announced that RAB would 
no longer serve in this capacity but instead act as a commercial bank. 
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In their 2000 survey of AMCs in East Asia, Cooke and Foley assess individual country 
experience using AMCs and distil valuable lessons from the first years of AMC in South 
East Asia. While identifying problems and hurdles in all countries studied, Cooke and 
Foley specifically note, that the decentralised approach chosen in Thailand is not without 
problems. To be more specific, the bank based AMCs did not appear to be guiding and 
coordinating their efforts to resolve the country’s NPL problems. Still plagued by a high 
level of non-performing loans, the Thai government in February 2001 finally decided to 
establish a nationwide AMC with broad special powers to resolve the critical situation of 
the banking sector. 
Regardless of whether a centralised or decentralised approach is chosen, Cooke and 
Foley point to the following key lessons, which should also be considered in a 
Vietnamese context:  
1. Addressing the NPL problem is not equivalent to addressing the factors 
responsible for creating the problem in the first place. Failure to address the 
causes of the NPL problems is to invite a repetition. A realistic assessment of the 
cause, size and character of the problem is the key starting point for attempts to 
address the NPL problems.  
2. Prior to establishing the AMC, the government must assess the legal 
infrastructure. Among other things this implies ensuring that the legal system and 
legal powers are in place to permit an effective and swift case management and 
that bankruptcy, tax, property ownership, collateral and foreclosure laws are both 
adequate and reflected in court rulings. If the legal infrastructure appears 
inadequate measures must be taken to bestow the AMCs with the necessary 
special legal powers and/or legislation. 
3. The use of AMCs and the issue of resolving NPLs is a complex matter, and the 
government should consider establishing an independent supervisory board 
responsible for the balanced, non-partisan oversight of the efforts and results. The 
board should have both industry and government representatives. It should not be 
directly involved in the daily operations. 
Related to the above-mentioned complexity of the process of establishing and operating 
an AMC the government should make sure that policies and institutions are developed to 
promote openness and transparency in the process. Lack of transparency can result in a 
conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof, which can diminish public confidence in 
the integrity of the process.  
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5.5.2 AMCs in Vietnam 
Several aspects of the NPL problem and the financial sector in Vietnam appear to fit the 
circumstances under which one would suggest employing a centralised approach. This 
includes:  
• The deficiencies in key national legal and judicial frameworks such as those 
concerning collateral, land ownership, transfer of loans and creditor rights, and 
land usage rights.  
• The need to coordinate NPL assessment and restructuring with ongoing SOE 
reforms. This includes tackling potentially powerful and politically connected 
debtors, who might oppose the process and/or seek to take advantage of the 
situation and the relatively ineffective legal recourse.  
• The potential benefits from establishing linkages to the ongoing efforts to reform 
and restructure SOCBs. A centralised AMC will accord the government with an 
opportunity to accelerate and guide bank restructuring through the conditions it 
attaches to the purchase of NPLs. 
• The scarcity of managerial and analytical talent in the sector. A single entity will 
be in a better position to reap economies of scale and make the best use of the 
human capital available  
• The thin or non-existing secondary markets for financial assets make it difficult 
for separate AMCs to obtain uniform and transparent valuations and conditions of 
sale, as information is not easily transferred across autonomous decentralised 
units. In addition, AMC experience in other ASEAN countries have been marred 
by a lack of interested buyers. A centralised AMC with a more direct government 
involvement will be in a better position to legitimise the bundling of NPLs and/or 
to offer discounts if lack of interested buyers also turn out to be a problem in 
Vietnam. 
Following the decision to use AMCs in Vietnam, the State Bank of Vietnam initially 
reasoned along similar lines and ended up suggesting that Vietnam should establish one 
central nationwide AMC.30 A range of political, legal and technical hurdles, however, 
hampered the implementation of the first choice and forced the SBV to turn to its second 
                                                 
30 This is in line with Lan (2000), who also suggests that a centralized AMC would be more 
suitable in Vietnam. 
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option, the establishment of individual AMCs under each of the major state-owned 
commercial banks. Thus, to some extent the decision to implement a decentralised AMC 
set-up against the initial recommendation made by the SBV, one could view this as a 
consequence of limited SBV independence (see Section 5.2).  
To implement the second option, the prime minister initially published an Official Letter 
in February 2000, allowing state commercial banks to establish companies for debt 
management and exploitation of mortgaged assets on the basis of an approved plan for 
the settlement of commercial bank non-performing loans. This plan was, however, 
modified as the Prime Minister on 5 October 2001 promulgated a new decision on the 
establishment of a company for debt management and asset exploitation under 
commercial banks. The new decision, a higher ranked legislative instrument, has a wider 
application than the previous Official Letter. All types of securities are now covered by 
the regulation instead of only mortgaged assets. 
The overall plan for introducing AMCs into the Vietnamese financial system is to 
establish loan-workout units (LWU) and asset management companies (AMC) in each of 
the four major SOCBs. Each AMC will buy the collateralised non-performing loans at 
market value while the respective LWUs will seek to resolve the non-collateralised loans 
in each of the four banks.  
Although detailed plans on how the AMCs and the LWUs will operate and function are 
currently not publicly available, some details of the restructuring plan for the 
Vietcombank (VCB) completed during the fall of 2001 have been made public. The 
performance criteria for VCB at the end of the three-year reform period include a capital-
assets ratio of 6 to 8 percent, a return on assets of at least 0.5 percent, and NPLs below 4 
percent of total loans outstanding. As for the NPLs in VCB the plan was to complete the 
loan classification and recovery plans for loans to the 50 largest debtors of VCB before 
the end of 2001. Recovery plans for the remaining loans will subsequently be worked out 
before the end of 2002. The recovery rate for the LWU associated with VCB was 
tentatively scheduled to gradually increase from 10 percent in 2001, rising to 25 percent 
in 2002, and 35 percent in 2003. 
In addition, the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam (BIDV) recently 
(January 2002) announced that it has set up its own AMC. Some details of the 
organization and objectives of this company were also made public, including: 
• The AMC responsible for the BIDV has an initial chartered capital of VND 30 
billion, and will inherit from BIDV all outstanding debts, both secured and 
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unsecured, as well as the assets pledged for such debts. It is hoped that the AMC 
will secure at least VND40 billion in bad debts.31 
• The AMC will be authorized to sell assets mortgaged with BIDV at market prices 
to the public through the Auction Service Centre, or to other AMCs. 
• In addition, the AMC will be given the powers to restructure outstanding debts by 
rescheduling, cutting interest rates, and transferring debts into investment.  
On the operational side the BIDV AMC plans to complete categorization of loans given 
to discharge Government policies and commercial loans, and handle outstanding debts to 
assign lending before the end of 2002. It will also strive at tackling over 60 percent of 
overdue debts in 2002. 
As for debt restructuring in private banks, two recent government decisions indicate that 
the government would like to facilitate and speed up debt restructuring in the private 
sector: The decision in October 2001 allowed commercial banks to set up their own 
AMCs, and in a directive dated 7. January 2002, the State Bank Governor gave 
commercial banks greater autonomy in handling overdue debts.  
Given the limited and fragmented information about the nature and extent of the NPL in 
the Vietnamese banking system in combination with the fragmented information about 
the specific conditions under which the AMCs will operate make any predictions of 
future performance and success rate very difficult. One can, however, point to three key 
issues, which regardless of the unresolved/unknown issues will have central importance 
for the efforts to resolve the NPL problem in Vietnam. The three issues, which will be 
discussed in turn below, are: 
• The autonomy and legal power of the decentralised AMCs. 
• The initial assessment and understanding of the problem. 
• The recruitment and training of skilled personnel.  
 
5.5.2.1 Autonomy and legal power of decentralised AMCs 
As will be evident from the analysis conducted thus far, the SBV decision to establish 
decentralised AMCs implies that they will almost inevitably have less power than a 
                                                 
31 By the end of 2001, BIDV had total outstanding debts of VND42,500 billion. 
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nationwide AMC established through a law adopted by the National Assembly. The fact 
that the SBV itself first opted for a centralised set-up does, however, imply that criticism 
of the decision to choose a decentralised model would not be constructive at present. 
Instead, an interesting question is whether the Vietnamese approach will have a better 
success rate than in Thailand where a decentralised model was recently discarded? If not, 
the first option of a nation-wide AMC would still be available to the Vietnamese 
government as it was for the Thai government. Following Cooke and Foley (2000), the 
following potential benefits of adopting a decentralised approach can be identified. 
• Utilization of in-house knowledge of NPL at the particular bank which issued the 
now non-performing loans. 
• Maintaining important banking relationships with debtors.  
• Strengthening of loan resolution expertise in the bank. 
• Establishing new relationships with investors involved in asset workouts. 
• Obtaining operational flexibility by being a smaller unit. 
On the other hand, the following problems could arise from using a decentralised 
approach. 
• Increased exposure to losses, say if bank bad debts are concentrated on few 
debtors or in one sector. 
• Limited industry wide coordination – competing for both skilled labour and 
investor attention.  
• No economies of scale in asset valuation, management and disposition. 
• Conflicts of interest with the originating bank.  
• No central pressure for legal reform and/or special legal powers bestowed upon 
the AMCs. 
• No central channel for government influence including securing funds 
On the basis of the above mentioned strengths and weaknesses of the decentralised 
model, it is evident that the extent to which a decentralised approach will have 
detrimental effects upon resolving NPLs depends upon: (i) how much the government is 
willing to empower the AMCs vis-à-vis the judicial system, and (ii) the supporting 
policies and institutions established by the central government and the SBV.  
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As for judicial empowerment, experts generally advise to attribute special powers to the 
Asset Management Company. This includes powers relating to the transfer of loans and 
collateral and their enforcement as well as procedures relating to registration and transfer 
of title documents evidencing ownership. A difficult trade-off, however, exists between 
ensuring that the decentralised AMCs have the necessary power to operate and 
minimizing the degree of special powers granted to non-legal units. In some countries 
AMCs have been given powers that exceed what is normally advisable. In Malaysia, for 
example, the government provided its AMC with extensive authority to circumvent 
existing bankruptcy laws. In the US following the Savings and Loans Scandal the 
Resolution Trust Corporation was authorized to override state laws and set aside 
burdensome contracts. Bestowing such powers to decentralised units is likely to be very 
difficult politically, and controlling and monitoring such powers to prevent misuse is also 
likely to represent a major challenge.  
As for the above-mentioned supporting institutions that could possibly facilitate the 
operations of the decentralised AMCs, they could include an overall supervisory 
institution with the objective of ensuring homogeneous valuations. Experience form 
Thailand indicates that such institutions help ensure that homogenous NPLs are valued 
alike across SOCBs and that fire sales of low quality assets are avoided. It is at present 
not clear whether or not the Vietnamese authorities plan to establish these institutions. If 
not, it will be difficult to ensure the necessary uniformity and transparency of the NLP 
valuation, potentially resulting in deterioration of both revenue and public confidence in 
the process.32 
Another potentially beneficial supporting institution could be one that coordinated the 
efforts of the individual AMCs with each other and with the efforts to reform and 
revitalize the state owned enterprises. It is uncertain whether or not an existing institution 
could fill this role. In this case, great care would have to be taken in order to ensure that 
the information given is as objective as possible. 
Finally, operational funding for start-up and operations for the individual AMC should be 
supplied from a non-partisan source – i.e. not from the bank which NPLs the AMC is 
attempting to resolve. As is evident from the Table 5.10, AMCs in other ASEAN 
countries derive operational funding from a multitude of different sources, including asset 
recoveries, issuance of equity, bond programmes and the government. 
                                                 
32 Similar arguments hold for the decentralized LWUs, where the case for a central coordination of 
valuation and conditions of sale would appear to be even stronger due to the inherent difficulties associated 
with resolving non-collaterised loans. 
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Table 5.10: Operational funding for AMCs 
Thailand Indonesia Malaysia Korea The 
Philippines 
Government 
supplied seed 
capital. The 
AMC has the 
ability to issue 
bonds to 
purchase assets. 
Finally, the 
AMC can issue 
promissory 
notes to cover 
interest 
expenses 
Asset recovery 
and sale of 
equity will 
cover some. 
Government 
guaranteed 
bonds replace 
acquired NPLs. 
In return, the 
state receives 
equity in the 
banks. 
75 percent of 
funding will 
originate from 
the AMC Bond 
Programme. 
The remainder 
is funded by 
loans from the 
government and 
SOEs. 
90 percent of 
funding stems 
from bonds 
issued by the 
AMC. The 
remaining 10 
percent 
originate from 
the Central 
Bank. 
Funding is 
provided by the 
Department of 
Finance. 
Source: Cooke and Foley (2000) 
 
The important issue in this context is not the source of funds but the recognition that no 
central channel for securing funds exists for the decentralised AMCs. Hence, the 
government has to pay special attention to this issue. 
 
5.5.2.2 The initial assessment and understanding of the problem 
As mentioned earlier, one of the most important points emerging from the ADB study of 
AMCs in East Asia is the need for an initial realistic assessment of the size and character 
of the problem. The ADB study furthermore points to the fact that addressing the NPL 
problem does not necessarily imply addressing the factor responsible for creating the 
problem in the first place.  
The groundwork prior to establishing the AMCs will therefore constitute the real test of 
the government will and ability to undertake in depth reforms of the financial sector. Will 
the restructuring and re-capitalization of the four major SOCBs imply a change in lending 
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practices? Will bank management autonomy and accountability increase and will SOE 
favourable treatment come to an end? 
These questions should ideally be answered in an AMC strategy formulated by the 
government. Here the government should consider not only the financial dimension of 
the problem, but also cultural, political and legal environment. In this context, it is very 
important that the government clearly and publicly states the objectives and end goals set 
up for the AMCs. The objectives should support maximum coordination and clarity of 
governance and provide a yardstick for measuring AMC progress and success. 
 
5.5.2.3 The recruitment and training of skilled personnel 
Obtaining and maintaining the necessary managerial and analytical talent is an often-
overlooked dimension of institutional change. However, given the fact that the 
Vietnamese government plans to establish several highly specialized and complex 
financial institutions in a country where skilled manpower is already in short supply, the 
approach taken to overcome this problem will be of central importance for the 
possibilities of achieving government goals. 
AMC staff will require expertise in asset management, including asset appraisal, property 
management, and conducting workouts. In addition, experience in banking, legal matters, 
accounting, marketing and public relations will also be required. In the short run, the 
government can perhaps obtain such skills and expertise through outsourcing and/or joint 
ventures with foreign specialist partners, but this is clearly not a viable or optimal long 
run solution. To ensure the long-run viability of both the AMCs, the LWUs and the 
financial sector as a whole the government must therefore accord high priority to 
initiatives, which build up local analytical and managerial capacity within financial sector 
issues. This could include:  
• Specialized on-the-job and classroom training programmes for people already 
employed in the sector. 
• Supporting the build-up of analytical capacity at external research institutions, 
departments of economics at universities and analytical institutes. 
• Creation of improved incentive structures for financial sector professionals by 
raising real wages and wage decompression. 
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The above-mentioned initiatives or a combination hereof can assist the government meet 
the demand for skilled professionals in the financial sector, but the problem of an excess 
demand for skilled financial sector professionals is likely to persist to some degree even 
in the long run.  
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has provided description and analysis of some of the key areas related to the 
further development of the SBV into a fully-fledged modern central bank. It is, however, 
by far a complete review of the issues that the SBV has to deal with. Other key issues 
include: SBV performance in the development of refinancing facilities, status and 
management performance of foreign exchange reserves, level of capitalisation and 
quality of SBV assets, and procedures for and management of licensing procedures. 
These are not considered in the present report due constraints imposed by data and time 
available. 
As mentioned in Section 1, the mono-bank history continues to exert considerable 
influence on both SBV structure and organisation and the degrees of freedom available to 
pursue SBV objectives. Although the creation of a two-tiered banking system in 
combination with the legal base provided by the 1998 Law on the State Bank represents 
considerable progress in the separation of the SBV from the actual financial sector, the 
persistence and importance of the planning legacy is maintained by the fact that the 
second process of separation transformation of the SBV – that is, the transformation of 
the SBV to become an autonomous entity on par with the executive, legislative and 
judiciary branches of government – is only just beginning to occur.  
This was further documented in Section 2 containing an assessment of SBV 
independence according to three non-substitutable components of independence, namely: 
legal, political and operational independence. Here it is concluded that the SBV at present 
cannot effectively develop and execute national monetary policies, as it is still 
operationally and politically dependent upon support from other government agencies. 
Hence, although the Law on the State Bank represented a step backwards in terms of 
restricting stipulated independence compared to the situation prior to the passing of the 
law it appears more likely that lack of especially political but also operational 
independence are the more binding constraints. 
As a consequence, it is recommended that the pursuit of increased central bank 
independence in Vietnam should focus on the more indirect route suggested by among 
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others Posen (1994) and Mas (1995). This involves a gradual build-up and strengthening 
of a non-governmental lobby for an independent central bank. The preliminary plans for 
the equitisation of the large state-owned banks represent an important step in this 
direction, as does the continued presence of foreign banks in Vietnam. In this aspect, the 
current low level of inflation represents an opportunity in terms of creating an 
environment conducive to increased central bank independence. The reverse causality 
argument implies that a central bank makes use of low inflation as political leverage. Yet, 
it is also an obstacle,33 due to the potential lack of a common cause to unite private sector 
interest in a lobby for a more independent central bank. Nevertheless, given the 
prevailing political and economical environment in Vietnam, the indirect approach is 
likely to be a productive and effective approach in the short- to medium-term. In addition, 
one should consider complementing the indirect approach with more direct measures 
directed at limiting local authority interfering in credit institution activities – not the least 
to improve the overall transparency and predictability of the political interference which 
takes place.  
In terms of the SBV role as a facilitator and organiser of financial markets, Section 5.3 
briefly considered the current status on the market for Treasury bills, the inter-bank 
market for domestic currency, and the domestic market for foreign currency, respectively. 
Most importantly, a number of restrictions hampering the further development and 
growth of the secondary market for Treasury Bills were identified. These included the 
fact that only T-bills and SBV bills are traded in the market and the fact that the law on 
the State Bank only allows trade in Treasury bills with maturity of less than a year. Both 
restrict the development of a sufficiently deep secondary market for government bonds, 
which again limits the efficacy and power of open-market operations. It was moreover 
stressed that it is very important that the Vietnamese government carefully considers and 
balances potential gains and risks related to the possible issue of international bonds. 
Unless such a decision is thought into a detailed and sequenced plan of financial reforms, 
the erratic and powerful international financial markets may erase the short-term gains of 
issuing international bonds.  
The central issue focused on in Section 5.4 was whether or not the SBV would gain from 
the creation of a separate institution responsible for financial sector supervision. The 
following potential benefits from such a separation were identified: 
                                                 
33 Note, that here the prevailing low level of inflation is single-mindedly judged in terms of its relevance to 
the pursuit of increased central bank independence following the above-mentioned indirect approach.  
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• The SBV directors and staff will be able to focus efforts and attention on 
managing money, credit and foreign exchange reserve.  
• The separation of the supervisory division from the SBV will serve to increase the 
distance between the SBV and its former operative functions (the current 
SOCBs). This will minimize the risk of preferential treatment and/or outsider 
attempts to bias SBV policies and rulings.  
• The narrower set of objectives is likely to make the quest for increased SBV 
independence easier and more feasible. Less conflict of interest will occur and 
efforts can be more concentrated.  
• The potential conflicts of interest between the overall monetary policies and the 
supervision of the banking sector will be made more transparent and will have to 
be settled through discussion and negotiation between the two institutions (i.e. the 
SBV and a new independent bank supervision institution). This could; for 
example, be a situation where the bank supervision institution in order to better 
deal with overdue debt in the banking sector would prefer a more expansionary 
monetary policy. 
The above-mentioned potential gains should be weighed against the operational, political 
and legal obstacles facing the creation of a new and independent supervisory institution. 
However, as the process of establishing supervision as an independent unit within the 
SBV has been underway for some time, the question of whether and when this process is 
going to stop should be considered. 
Finally, Section 5.5 addressed the problem of non-performing loans (NPL) in the banking 
sector, more specifically the role and use of a new type of institutions in the Vietnamese 
financial sector, namely asset management companies. Here the following problems 
related to addressing the NPL problem using the chosen decentralised AMC set-up were 
identified: 
• Deficiencies in key national legal and judicial frameworks such as those 
concerning collateral, land ownership, transfer of loans and creditor rights, and 
land usage rights.  
• The need to coordinate NPL assessment and restructuring with ongoing SOE 
reforms. This includes tackling potentially powerful and politically connected 
debtors who might oppose to the process and/or seek to take advantage of the 
situation and the relatively ineffective legal recourse.  
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• The potential benefits from establishing linkages to the ongoing efforts to reform 
and restructure SOCBs. In this context, a centralised AMC would accord the 
government with an opportunity to accelerate and guide bank restructuring 
through, for example, the conditions attached to the purchase of NPLs. 
• The scarcity of managerial and analytical talent in the sector. A single entity will 
be in a better position to reap economies of scale and make the best use of the 
human capital available.  
• The thin or non-existing secondary markets for financial assets make it difficult 
for separate AMCs to obtain uniform and transparent valuations and conditions of 
sale. Information is not easily transferred across autonomous decentralised units. 
In addition, AMC experience in other ASEAN countries have been marred by a 
lack of interested buyers. A centralised AMC with a more direct government 
involvement will be in a better position to legitimise the bundling of NPLs and/or 
to offer discounts if lack of interested buyers also turn out to be a problem in 
Vietnam. 
The limited and fragmented information about the nature and extent of the NPL in the 
Vietnamese banking system in combination with the fragmented information about the 
specific conditions under which the AMCs will operate make any predictions about 
future performance and success rates very difficult. The following three key areas are, 
however, singled out as areas where increasing government and SBV attention would be 
beneficial: the autonomy and legal power of the decentralised AMCs, the initial 
assessment and understanding of the NPL problem, and the recruitment and training of 
skilled personnel.  
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6 Financial Intermediation vis-à-vis the Agricultural Sector 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the different economic entities 
and institutions that are currently active in the Vietnamese financial sector. This includes 
as well specific problems encountered by the individual types of institutions and their 
interrelations in the financial market. This overview is provided in Section 6.1, which 
focuses first on the formal and subsequently on the informal financial institutions. The 
specific question of allocation of credit between the government controlled and private 
enterprises is the subject of Section 6.2, while Section 6.3 takes a closer look at financial 
sector performance vis-à-vis the most important sector in Vietnam in terms of both 
employment and total output value, namely the agricultural sector. Here special attention 
will be accorded to the Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development as well 
as to an evaluation of the degree of competition between the financial institutions serving 
the agricultural sector. Subsequently Section 6.3 will conclude with an analysis of the 
effects of interest rate control and the associated lack of savings mobilisation in rural 
areas. Finally, Section 6.4 presents concluding remarks a summary of the policy 
implications derived from the analyses.  
 
6.1 The Financial Market 
Turning first to the formal institutions, one can, for the purpose of identification, define 
formal institutions as all financial sector entities subject to government legislation and 
control. While this definition is operational it does not exclude the possibility of formal 
institutions taking into account both the presence of and competition from informal 
institutions. Consequently, they can exert considerable influence on decisions and actions 
taken by formal institutions.  
6.1.1 Formal Financial Institutions 
From Table 6.1 listed it becomes clear that the formal financial sector has undergone 
rapid growth in recent years in terms of both total deposit volume and total credit volume. 
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Table 6.1: Deposits and credit in the formal sector (billion VND) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total deposits 7,623 13,882 16,565 18,071 24,382 33,593 41,458 56,290 74,153 
Total credits 5,710 10,051 15,093 23,180 33,400 42,277 50,744 62,201 72,596 
Source: IMF (1999)  
 
In parallel with the rapid increase in scale, the quantity of services provided by the formal 
financial institutions has also increased to include various types of financial services, 
such as investment brokerage, stock brokerage, issuing credit cards, financial consultancy 
services, asset insurance, and liability insurance. 
Listed according to relative size, the formal sector includes the following institutions, 
which will be considered in turn: state owned commercial banks (SOCBs), joint stock 
banks (JSBs), foreign banks and joint venture banks (JVBs), People’s Credit Funds 
(PCFs), and Financial Lease Companies (FLCs).  
 
6.1.1.1 State Owned Commercial Banks  
There are four large SOCBs in Vietnam: the Foreign Trade Bank of Vietnam 
(Vietcombank), the Industry and Commerce Bank of Vietnam (Incombank), the 
Vietnamese Bank for Investment and Development (VBID) and the Vietnam Bank for 
Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD). These banks are the leading banks of the 
banking system and have 230 branches in all cities and provinces in Vietnam. The 
number of third level-branches nation wide is more than 1,000. The number of staff 
working for SOCBs is 40,000, of whom the graduate and post graduate workforce 
accounts for 55 percent, while 43 percent of the workforce has high school graduation as 
their highest educational attainment. The remaining 2 percent include the unskilled 
workforce. 
As mentioned earlier, the group of SOCBs dominates the credit market. At year-end 1999 
outstanding loan volume of these four SOCBs accounted for 73 percent of total amount 
of loans in the economy. This dominance is mirrored in the mobilisation of funds where 
the SOCBs accounted for 75 percent of all resources mobilised through formal 
institutions. 
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The VBARD is the largest SOCB in terms of legal capital and has a rather wide scope of 
operations. It serves a wide range of customers and exerts considerable influence upon 
not only agriculture production but also non-agriculture activities in rural areas. 
According to a 2000 report by the VBARD, total capital of the Bank was VND 55,041 
billion and total debts VND 48,548 billion, of which medium and long-term loans 
accounted for 42 percent.34 The VBARD also has extended international relations and 
foreign businesses, and it has received finance from international financial institutions 
like ADB, World Bank, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD). VBARD has received and implemented 50 foreign development projects 
amounting to a total investment capital of over USD 1,300 million for agriculture and 
rural development. In addition, VBARD has carried out credit programmes with broader 
socio-economic perspective and objectives as stipulated by the government. This includes 
policy credit for non-commercial purposes like: providing loans to build houses on stilts 
(over water) in flooded areas of the Mekong river delta and providing loans to reduce the 
adverse impacts of floods and droughts (this is also considered in Section 6.3, which 
contains a more detailed description of the VBARD and its operations). 
According to the report of 2000 by Incombank, its total assets achieved VND 48,704 
billion while total deposit was VND 40,745 billion. Total debts summed to VND 26,224 
billion, of which medium and long-term loans accounted for 31.6 percent. Over the year 
2000, the Incombank increased the rate of medium and long-term loans from 20 percent 
at the beginning of the year to 25 percent of total loans at the end of the year. These loans 
were predominantly granted to large government programmes and priority sectors such as 
the postal services, the communication sectors, the processing industry, and the 
production of construction material. In addition, the Incombank has delegated 
investments and performed credit activities for a range of non-commercial purposes like 
lending to reduce adverse impacts of floods, the creation of training funds for poor 
students, and loans to purchase food for reserves. 
As for the Vietcombank the 2000 annual report shows that total assets by the end of 2000 
was VND 65,633 billion, of which funds in foreign currencies accounted for 74.9 
percent. The total volume of deposits at the Vietcombank was VND 43,748 billion, while 
                                                 
34 According to Article 8 of Decision 1627/2001/QD-NHNN dated 31/12/2001 short-term loans in Vietnam 
are defined as having a maturity below 12 months. As for the medium-term loans their maturity ranges 
from 12 to 60 months, while long-term loans are defined as those having a maturity above 60 months. 
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total credit lending was VND 14,421 billion, of which medium and long-term loans 
accounted for 17.61 percent35. A total of 57.8 percent of total loan volume was in VND. 
As for the Vietnamese Bank for Investment and Development, the 1999 annual report 
indicates that its total assets amounted to VND 39,176 billion, of which total loans 
accounted for VND 28,201 billion.36 Total deposit volume amounted to VND 18,379 
billion in 1999. In addition to undertaking the functions of a multi-functional commercial 
bank, VBID was responsible for assisting government directed development investments. 
In 1999, the government granted the Bank a development investment credit worth VND 
8,335 billion. This fund was especially allocated to several big economic programmes 
directed towards industrialisation and modernization, including programmes to develop 
electricity, petroleum, cement, and rubber industries, or programmes directed towards 
industries processing agricultural outputs such as sugar cane and seafood. 
Hence, as indicated above a considerable degree of government involvement in the 
allocation of credit can be detected in all four large SOCBs, which have all been required 
to undertake non-commercial and/or development oriented programmes. This will be 
looked into in more detail in Section 6.2. 
 
6.1.1.2 Joint Stock Banks 
There are a total of 47 joint stock commercial banks (JSBs) in Vietnam. Thirty-one are 
urban JSBs and the remaining 16 are rural JSBs. The majority of the JSBs were 
established rapidly in the years following the initial liberalisation of the financial sector. 
Their rapid establishment at a time where the pace and direction of the market-reforms 
were still unclear can perhaps in part explain why they have subsequently run into 
problems.  
When the magnitude and nature of the problems in the JSB sector became clear in the 
second half of the 1990s, the government undertook independent diagnostic audits of all 
the JSBs during 1998-1999. On the basis of these audits, the JSBs were subsequently 
classified into four types and a restructuring strategy for each type was developed. 
Government follow up on these strategies has so far led to the rehabilitation of viable 
banks and the merger or closure of weak banks. Three JSBs have already been closed, 
two have been merged and 13 have been put under increased surveillance. In addition, it 
                                                 
35 This was lower than the share of medium- and long-term achieved in both 1998 and 1999.  
36 Medium and long-term debts accounted for 61 percent total credit from the Vietnamese Bank for 
Investment and Development. 
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has been announced that another nine JSBs will, most likely, be closed in the immediate 
future.  
 
6.1.1.3 Foreign Banks and Joint Venture Banks 
There are 15 branches of foreign banks and four joint-venture banks (JVBs).37 In 
addition, there are 62 representative offices from 20 nations operating in Vietnam. They 
include major international banks such as Deutsche Bank (Germany), Bank of America 
and CitiBank (USA), Standard Chartered (Great Britain) Credit Lyonnaise (France), ANZ 
Bank (Australia), State Bank of Krung Thai Bank (Thailand), and National Bank of 
Kuwait (Kuwait).  
Since their establishment, the market share of foreign bank branches has increased 
sharply. In the deposit market, the market share of foreign banks has increased 9.2 times 
from 2 percent in 1994 to 18.5 percent in 1997. Following the East Asian Financial Crisis 
the market share has, however, decreased slightly to holding 14.7 percent of all deposits 
in 1999. A similar pattern can be found on the market for credit where the market share 
of foreign banks first increased approximately 14.6 times from 2 percent in 1994 to 29.2 
percent in 1998, only to be followed by a slight reduction to 25.7 percent in 1999. As will 
become clear below, the existing, however, still blocks foreign banks from becoming 
fully fledged participants on the Vietnamese financial market. Hence, despite recent 
progress the Vietnamese government has yet to establish a level playing field for 
competition between foreign and domestic banks. 
 
6.1.1.4 People’s Credit Funds 
As mentioned in Section 3.1 the system of People’s Credit Funds was established in 1993 
to replace the system of credit cooperatives that virtually disappeared following a general 
loss of depositor confidence that led to bank runs and resulting problems of repayment 
during 1990-91. More formally the Prime ministerial Decision 390/TTg dated 27/07/1993 
permitted the pilot establishment of PCF system. At the end of 1999, a total of 971 Local 
Credit Funds (LCFs) existed in communes and districts with a total of 714,000 members. 
                                                 
37 These include joint ventures between Vietnam and Malaysia, between Vietnam and Korea, between 
Vietnam and Indonesia, and between Vietnam and Thailand. 
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As stated in Section 3.1, the intention underlying the creation of the system of PCFs was 
to create a three-layer organization in order to achieve a combination of close local 
contacts and connections while minimizing the risks associated with seasonality and 
regional shocks. As a consequence, all LCFs were handled and directed by Regional 
Credit Funds (RCFs), which in turn would be supervised by the Central Credit Fund 
(CCF) handling the supply and balancing of liquidity among the regional funds.  
Current status is that 21 RCFs exist on the regional level, which in turn all are members 
of The Central PCF.38 At the end of October of 1999, after approximately six six years of 
operation, the LCFs had mobilised a total of 2,220 billion VND in deposits, of which 157 
billion VND was capital put up by founding members and the remaining amount was 
mobilized funds. The total value of outstanding loans was 1,816 billion VND of which 
4.14 percent is over-due debt. Hence, compared to commercial banks, deposit and credit 
market shares of the PCF system are relatively small amounting to only about 1-2 percent 
of total market volumes. The operational performance of the RCFs was quite good, 
meeting members demand for capital and mobilising about 400 billion VND annually. 
Section 6.3 will, however, focus on some of the problems facing the PCF system in terms 
of meeting the demand for financial services in the rural markets.  
 
6.1.1.5 Financial Lease Companies 
Financial lease companies are a relatively new institution on the Vietnamese financial 
market, performing medium and long term credit activities by leasing machines, 
equipment, transport means and others types of capital to manufacturers. In short, the 
financial lease companies buy machines according to the requirements of a leasing party 
(i.e. a manufacturer), which subsequently uses and leases according to a specified 
contract, which cannot be cancelled before time. At the termination of contract, the 
leasing party has to choose between using their option and right to buy the equipment or 
to continue to hire it according to conditions as specified in a new contract. 
From October 1995 when the government issued Decree 64/CP stipulating the statute on 
organization and operation of financial companies as well as the State Bank of Vietnam 
(SBV) promulgated circular 03/TT-NH from February 1996 to now, the SBV has granted 
                                                 
38 In the regions where no RCFs exist, any existing local PCFs are also members of the Central People’s 
Credit Fund. 
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the license to nine financial companies, including two joint stock companies, two that are 
fully financed by foreign capital, and five companies that are owned directly by the 
SOCBs. 
The FLCs have, however, only gradually become an accepted alternative by enterprises. 
This explains that the total amount of capital channelled through FLCs loans only 
accounted for 1 percent of total commercial bank credit by the end of 2000. 
 
6.1.2 Informal Financial Institutions 
As informal financial markets and institutions were repressed during the central planning 
period very little information about informal finance during this period exists. This has 
improved since 1989, where the gradual transition towards increased reliance on market 
forces has implied a parallel rise in the acknowledgement of and recognition bestowed 
upon the informal financial sector. The unregulated and at times illegal activities taking 
place in this sector, however, still imply that neither comprehensive nor fully reliable data 
exist on the magnitude and character of the informal institutions and transactions in 
Vietnam.  
The following informal credit institutions are described below: Moneylenders, tontines 
(rotating credit and savings associations), loans from relatives and friends (mutual 
lending), and trader credit. 
 
6.1.2.1 Moneylenders 
Generally, moneylenders are wealthy individuals, who on lend their funds and/or funds 
borrowed from other sources. Their clients are households who need short-term capital 
for production purposes and poor household who need money to cope with emergencies. 
The necessary procedures to obtain a loan are very simple, usually just a piece of paper 
stipulating the contract agreed upon by moneylender and the client. In some cases, no 
paper exists, so the parties rely on oral agreements, only.  
Loans can be made in both cash and kind, and the specific terms of the contract such as 
interest rate and duration depend on the relationship between lender and borrower. A 
recent survey by Sy (1999) indicates that while the average interest rate of money loans 
was 5 percent per month, some households were able to obtain loans at 1.8 to 2.5 percent 
per month, while a few had to suffer loans with interest rates as high as 6 percent per 
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month. Overall, if the loan is in cash, surveys have found that the interest rate level is 
between two to five times higher than that of formal credit. The duration of the loan is 
typically short, measured in weeks or months and only rarely exceeding a full year. The 
loans in kind are especially popular in rural areas, where a poor household is provided 
with foodstuff or seed by the lender, who in turns demands, a repayment in cash or rice. 
 
6.1.2.2 Tontines (Roscas) 
A tontine (also known as a Rotating Savings and Credit Association or Rosca) is an 
informal financial institution found in almost all regions of the world. A Rosca usually 
consists of a group of people, who are voluntarily or involuntarily excluded from the 
formal financial system. The group meets on a regular basis all bringing a pre-determined 
amount, which subsequently is put into a Rosca pool. Through recurrent meetings this 
pool is sequentially allocated once to every group member. After having received the 
pool, members have to continue to contribute to the Rosca until every member has 
received it once. 
The objective of a Rosca is often twofold: (i) to obtain economies of scale by pooling the 
collective savings of the group, and (ii) to provide external incentives to save through the 
obligation to the Rosca group. This second motive is intrinsically linked to issues of 
intra-household allocation of resources through the fact that the majority of Roscas are 
typically all-female groups. The primary advantage of joining a Rosca is that all but one 
member (the one who receives the pool in the last round) will obtain funds faster than if 
she had chosen to save on her own. The primary challenge facing Rosca participants is 
likewise twofold: (i) to ensure member compliance such that they continue to contribute 
to the Rosca after having received the pool, and (ii) to determine how to allocate the pool 
in each round. While Rosca members usually rely on a combination of informal 
sanctions/reputation effects and the limited mobility of Rosca members to deal with the 
problem of compliance, the problem of allocating the pool is essentially a choice between 
different types of Roscas. They include: (i) a random Rosca (where the pool is allocated 
through a lottery between the eligible members - i.e. those who have yet to receive the 
pool); (ii) a bidding Rosca (where the pool is allocated through sequential auctions in 
which each eligible member states the maximum reduction in the contribution of the 
other eligible members contribution she is prepared to accept); and (iii) a discrete Rosca 
(where the pool is allocated according to a discretionary criteria that may change from 
round to round – usually the person who organised/founded the Rosca is the one who 
takes the decision). 
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Anecdotal evidence points to the presence of at least two types of Roscas in Vietnam: 
commercial (bidding) Roscas and family based (random or discrete) Roscas. A 
professional Rosca organiser who has the assets and prestige necessary to make potential 
members believe in and trust the Rosca usually founds the former. The organiser 
(sometimes in cooperation with the participants) proposes the rules of Roscas such as the 
amount of capital (typically in cash) that should be contributed in each round, and the 
interval between meetings (days, weeks or months). More often than not, the organiser 
and the participants do not know each other in advance, making the participation in such 
a Rosca a bit of a gamble for all parties. No guarantees exist that the founder or 
individual participant does not run away/fail to make payments. As a consequence, the 
implicit interest rate levels that can be calculated from the winning bids in each round are 
found to be quite high – typically 50-300 percent higher than that what can be obtained in 
commercial banks.  
In the family based Rosca all participants are, as indicated by its name, acquainted with 
one another by being relatives or friends. One of them is chosen to be the organiser, but 
all members typically agree upon the rules and terms. The member, who is to receive the 
pool in a given round, is either selected by lot or by common agreement – typically based 
on an intra-group comparison of individual member’s perceived need for the pool. The 
organiser is responsible for the implementation of the Rosca and will typically collect 
member contributions in each round. These are duties and responsibilities for which she 
almost always receives the pool in the first round. This type of Rosca usually has 
contributions in the form of rice and/or money.  
Based on the aforementioned anecdotal evidence, the observed pattern where random and 
discrete Roscas appear in predominantly rural and traditional settings while bidding 
Roscas appear in more market-based, modern environments lend support to the 
hypotheses originally proposed by Clifford Geertz. According to Geertz (1962) the 
choice between different types of Roscas reflects a gradual process of modernisation 
where the eventual dominance of the market-based relationships will lead to the demise 
of the random and discrete Roscas. This is, however, in contrast with later theories put 
forward by Ardener (1965) and Besley et al. (1992) where the choice between different 
types of Roscas rather reflects special characteristics of the group and the environment in 
which they operate.39 
                                                 
39 The notion that the choice of Rosca depends not only on group characteristics but also on the 
environment in which they operate is found in Kovsted and Lyk-Jensen (2000). 
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One could speculate as to whether the recent re-orientation towards market-based 
principles in Vietnam have caused people to perceive these as being more modern and 
more advanced than traditional mechanisms. If so, this perception could bias Rosca 
participants, who are aware of all the mechanisms available, to choose the more market-
based mechanism as it is perceived to be more effective under all circumstances.40 More 
research into this area is, however, needed if one is to make more definitive statements 
concerning this issue. 
 
6.1.2.3 Loans from Friends and Relatives 
As stated previously, this form of credit is probably the most important source of credit 
for households, expressing not only differences in wealth and access to credit but also 
family links and the strength of neighbour relations. A loan is typically provided if a 
household suffers from difficulties due to e.g. disease or floods, or if a household is 
facing a major event such as a wedding or building a house. This kind of financial 
assistance is given without incurring interest payments. 
It is, however, not only households, which rely on this type of credit. A survey of 407 
enterprises in Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Hai Hung, Song Be and Ho Chi Minh City was 
conducted in 1996 by Dr. Tran Kim Hao and a research group of the Central Institute for 
Economic and Management (Hao et al. 1996). They revealed that 46.5 percent of all 
surveyed enterprises accessed loans, of which 35 percent borrowed from relatives and 
friends to establish their enterprise.  
 
6.1.2.4 Credit Sales  
Private lending is essentially deference on payments for goods delivered. Suppliers 
selling on credit are the lenders and the buyers are the borrowers. Lending procedures are 
simple. Lenders give the goods to the borrowers when they sign in the ‘debt’ book of 
lenders. The duration of a loan is typically a production and/or business period, while the 
interest level typically depends on the price of the goods delivered, ranging from 0 
percent to 5 percent per month. 
 
                                                 
40 Looking at existing economic models it, however, becomes clear that a bidding Rosca is not always the 
preferred choice if using an ex ante evaluation of the expected outcomes of a bidding versus a random 
Rosca. 
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6.1.3 Informal Credit 
The 1993 Vietnamese Living Standards Survey (VLSS) provides some indications of the 
importance of informal finance. Here it was found that 73 percent of all households used 
informal credit. It was moreover found that funds from family members, relatives, friends 
and neighbours supplied up to 40 percent of the credit to private households. Another 
third of the credit was supplied by moneylenders while only a quarter of total household 
credit originated from formal banks and other sources. The Vietnam-Sweden Mountain 
Rural Development Programme (1999) provides similar estimates as to the importance of 
informal credit – here it was found that more than 50 percent of households surveyed in 
the northern mountainous provinces included in the programme had no access to formal 
credit and consequently had to rely on informal credit. In general, lack of assets or land-
use-rights required by commercial banks as collateral and/or lack of basic knowledge of 
how the formal financial system operates are among the major constraints faced by poor 
seeking to obtain credit. This is so when they need credit for investments in productive 
capital and when they face an urgent need for funds. This may happen for example if a 
family member falls ill, in times of flooding, and when weddings or funerals are faced. In 
these situations poor households rely on the informal financial market.  
In this context it is, however, important to understand that the informal sector far from 
always represents the second-best complementary option compared to the formal sector. 
In many cases, the services and products offered by the informal sector are perceived as 
being superior to choose offered by the formal sector. This could be due to lower interest 
rates (for example credit obtained from family and friends) or due to lower transaction 
costs (through more rapid dispersion of credit and/or less paperwork) or both. Dat (1998) 
provides an example of lower transaction cost in the informal sector on the basis of a 
study of 150 rural households in the Red River Delta in 1996. Here it was found that 
while mean amount borrower transactions costs in the formal Vietnamese institutions 
compared favourably with borrower transaction costs in other Asian countries, those 
incurred by applicants for small loans were quite high in Vietnam. In particular, it was 
found that for loans under VND 1 million the higher transaction costs associated with 
formal loans in effect outweighed the higher interest rates paid for such loans in the 
informal sector. The very poor applying for small loans would thus be better off by using 
the informal financial sector.  
However, often households borrow from both the informal and the formal sector. Recent 
research on a rural credit market in Gia Lam district of Hanoi City surveyed 216 
households, of these 121 households (amounting to 56 percent) had taken up loans, and 
98 of those who did had used informal credit sources (amounting to a total of 45.3 
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percent of all surveyed household). The interest rate charged ranged from being 1.5 to 3 
times higher than on the formal market41 and in addition, the size of the informal loans 
was smaller than those received on the formal market where loans typically range from 
several hundred thousands to several millions VND. 
It would, however, be wrong to assume that the informal financial sector only provides 
services to households. A field-study in the Quang Nam Province indicates that a 
majority of the 94 shrimp ponds surveyed have used the informal sector as an important 
source of credit. Establishing shrimp ponds is a capital-intensive industry, where initial 
investments are as high as hundreds of million VND. This is especially the case when 
having intensive and semi-intensive shrimp farming on sandy areas, as is the case in the 
Quang Nam Province. The shrimp farmers can only rarely count on raising the entire 
amount needed for the initial investments plus the 8-10 million VND needed for 
purchasing inputs from the formal sector. Consequently most of the shrimp farmers 
complement formal loans with informal ones.  
Thus, informal credit is also an important source of credit for enterprises. It is especially 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) which, in addition to the funds they can 
accumulate on their own, use informal credit sources help mobilize capital in start-up and 
development phase. SMEs use the informal market due to less demanding (in terms of 
capital and assets owned) requirements to obtain a loan (relying essentially on trust), the 
more simple procedures (written or oral agreements), and the specific nature of their 
planned enterprise, which may not be sufficiently recognised by the formal financial 
institutions. 
In short, the informal sector can be both complementary or a substitute to the formal 
sector. Accordingly, the formal sector must take both the presence and the reactions of 
the informal sector into account when designing and offering financial products and 
services.  
 
6.2 Formal Sector Credit Allocation  
To some extent the question of whether and by how much the government is able to 
continue to influence the allocation of credit reflects how far the transition from a 
                                                 
41 Note that this is actually illegal according to Article 473 of the Civil Code. Here it is stipulated that the 
maximum interest rate on informal loans must not exceed 1.5 times that which can be obtained in the 
formal market. This law is, however, not enforced and it is indeed difficult to see how it can ever be given 
the very nature of the informal market.  
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centrally planned economy to more market based economy has progressed in Vietnam. In 
this context it is, however, important to realise that central planners rarely have all the 
information necessary to completely plan for and coordinate an entire economy. As 
pointed out by Appold and Phong (2001) central planning committees and ministries are 
likely to have functioned as the ‘locus of negotiation and bargaining between the state 
and its economic agents, the state owned enterprises’. In other words, when assessing 
whether or not the government continues to influence the allocation of credit to 
government controlled agents, one has to evaluate to which extent and on which terms 
the government owned bank enter the centrally coordinated negotiations and bargaining 
sessions. Given the comprehensive government control of certain sectors and industries 
such interaction still takes place in Vietnam.  
The final decisions on control of credit allocation are more likely to originate from a 
series of meetings and bargains than from a centrally placed command and control centre. 
Thus, it is unlikely that very detailed plans stipulating all terms and conditions for any 
government controlled allocation of credit can be found. This is so even in the (unlikely) 
case where all government processes and decisions are fully transparent. The fact that 
credible information is both scattered and sparse in Vietnam (see Section 4.5 on 
accounting standards and information possessing) only adds to the difficulties involved 
with getting an accurate assessment of the nature and degree of direct government control 
of the allocation of credit. Accordingly, an assessment of this nature can only be 
tentative, relying on indirect measures and the detection of indicative patterns. 
 
6.2.1 Issues Related to Government Control of Credit Allocation  
In the process of transforming a formerly centrally coordinated system to a market-based 
system, the timing of the transfer of government ownership (the equitisation process), on 
the one side, and the relationship between the SOBs and the SOEs, on the other, 
determine where and how the government (if it desires to do so) can continue a policy of 
subsidising the state-owned enterprises. Table 6.2 presents the four different outcomes in 
a simplified representation of this argument:  
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Table 6.2: Objective of SOBs and credit allocation to SOEs 
 Allocation of credit to 
SOEs is market-based  
Allocation of credit to 
SOEs is determined by 
government  
Top priority of former state-owned but 
now private banks is to maximise profits  4 3 
Profit maximisation is not the top 
priority of the SOBs  2 1 
 
Outcome 1 in Table 6.2 more or less represents the situation in Vietnam prior to the 
initiation of the Doi Moi reforms. The overall objective of the SOBs was to function as a 
supplier of credit to the SOEs – i.e. to be subservient to SOEs. Consequently, 
maximisation of SOB profit was not a priority objective if at all on the list of priorities. 
The SOEs were the focus of government economic policies and planning, and the 
government consequently controlled allocations of credit to the SOEs in accordance with 
these plans and objectives.  
At the other end, outcome 4 to some extent reflects the current situation in OECD 
countries. State-owned enterprises can, of course, still apply for credit in (the often 
formerly) state-owned banks, but given that the first priority of the SOBs is to maximise 
profits, any decision to grant credit to SOEs will be made based on a market-based 
assessment of expected profits and risks associated with their application. To obtain this 
degree of bank autonomy vis-à-vis SOEs typically requires that the SOBs are sold to 
private owners through a process of equitisation.  
Outcomes 2 and 3 represent intermediate stages in the transition from outcome 1 to 
outcome 4. In outcome 2, the SOBs are still not allowed to assign top priority to profit 
maximisation but the allocation of credit to SOBs is conducted according to market 
principles. Hence, while SOBs might be forced to extend loans to SOEs they will (in 
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principle)42 receive compensation for doing this from the government. Consequently, any 
subsidies and favourable treatment that the government might wish to extend to the SOEs 
will come from and appear on central government budgets. This (potentially) has the 
benefit of enhancing overall transparency concerning the extent and nature of 
government subsidies to the SOBs.  
Outcome 3 represents another quite different situation. Here the SOBs are allowed to 
pursue an overall objective of profit maximisation vis-à-vis their non-government 
customers while the government reserves the right to stipulate the terms and conditions 
under which the SOEs receive credit. In this outcome the government transforms bank 
profits made on private customers into subsidies to the SOEs. As a consequence, any 
direct subsidies given to SOEs over the state budget can be reduced by the indirect 
subsidies channelled through the SOBs and financed by the SOB private customers. In 
addition, the extent and nature of subsidies given to the SOBs are less transparent to both 
outsiders and to the government itself.43  
The transformation from outcome 1 to 4 is a prolonged and gradual process rather than a 
clear structural break. Moreover, the timing between the process of increasing SOB 
autonomy (the equitisation process) and the process of reforming the principles and 
procedures governing the allocation of credit to the SOEs is likely to be neither perfect 
nor coordinated. On this background, it makes sense to compare and evaluate outcomes 2 
and 3.  
First, it should be noted that Outcome 2 is clearly preferable to Outcome 3 in terms of 
overall transparency of the character and magnitude of subsidising SOEs. This is the case 
for both the central government that achieves better and more precise information, which 
can be used to improve and reform existing polices, and non-governmental, external 
agencies, which (if allowed by the government) can obtain a better assessment of the 
overall state of the economy and the financial sector in particular. Second, it is clear that 
Outcome 3 becomes increasingly non-sustainable if the process of equitisation lead to a 
gradual increase in the private ownership of banks. It is thus evident that an inherent 
tension exists between increasing the level of SOB autonomy, on the one side, and the 
government wishing to continue to influence the allocation of credit to the SOEs, on the 
                                                 
42 The SOBs will not be fully compensated to the extendt that stipulated extension of credit to SOEs might 
limit the SOBs possibilities to pursue more profitable projects in the private sector due to, for example, 
reserve requirements and/or a limited supply of credit available. 
43 Note that this might represent a serious short-term problem if this is inclined to abolish the practice of 
subsidising the SOEs. 
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other. In conclusion, Outcome 2 is the preferred intermediate stage between a centrally 
coordinated economy and a market-based system, consisting of fully autonomous 
economic entities.  
Vietnam has already launched a process of equitisation with the stated objective to fully 
privatise the SOBs (see Chapter 3). Thus, one objective of the subsequent analysis in this 
chapter is to assess the degree to which SOBs receive market-based compensation for 
allocating credit (directly to SOEs or to government programmes) according to 
government directives. This will give an indication of the nature of future tensions that 
are likely to arise in the process of transforming the Vietnamese financial sector.  
 
6.2.2 Analysing Issues Related to the SOCB Allocation of Credit 
Prior to assessing the allocation of credit to private and state-owned enterprises it will be 
useful to:  
1. Compare the development of the two sectors in recent years in order to assess 
their respective demand for credit.  
2. Evaluate whether the legislative system puts the two sectors at par with respect to 
access to credit.  
3. Assess the extent to which the government uses the SOCBs as partners and 
contributors of capital in the implementation of special (non-SOE) programmes. 
Subsequently the analysis will turn to consider actual disbursement of credit between the 
two sectors.  
 
6.2.2.1 Recent Developments in the Private and State-Owned Sectors 
The private sector in Vietnam has increased rapidly since the initiation of the Doi Moi 
reforms. By September 2001 there were 66,780 registered enterprises throughout the 
country. Some 58 percent were private enterprises, 38 percent were limited liability 
companies, 3 percent were shareholding companies, and less than 1 percent were 
partnership companies.  
With the issuance of the Enterprise Law that came into effect from January 2000, it is 
forecasted that the number of private enterprises, limited liability, and shareholding 
companies will triple their numbers by 2005. The number of business households in 
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urban areas is predicted to increase by more than 20 percent a year, while commercial 
farms and manufacturing households in rural areas are expected to increase by more than 
5 percent a year 
In contrast, the number of SOEs has decreased by over 50 percent from 12,300 
enterprises to 5,789 enterprises over the past 10 years. This rapid decline was caused by a 
combination of liquidations, bankruptcies, mergers, equitisation, and the sale of state-
owned companies to the private sector. The forecast for the coming years is that the 
number of SOEs is expected to decrease by 50 percent over the period 2000-2005 and by 
30 - 35 percent over the period 2005-2005 before levelling off just below 2,000 SOEs. 
The Vietnamese government is thus determined to maintain ownership of SOEs in 
important areas of the economic infrastructure including electricity, petroleum, postal 
services, communication, airlines, and the shipyard industry. Hence, despite the overall 
reduction in the number of SOEs since the initiation of the reforms, the mere fact that the 
governments intends to maintain ownership of these capital intensive industries imply 
that the demand for credit by state-owned enterprises is unlikely to decrease and might 
even increase over the next 5-10 years. 
 
6.2.2.2 Legal Constraints on Private Sector Access to the Banking System  
According to the policy of economic development of the Vietnamese State every sector 
private and government has, in principle, been accorded equal right to pursue their 
business activities. Although not the result of a comprehensive survey of the entire 
existing body of legislation, the following are examples of areas and issues where the 
current legislation in effect discriminates against private enterprises: 
1. Decision 423/2000/QD-NHNNI by the State Bank dated 22/09/2000 on the credit 
policy of banks towards farming activities stipulate that the head of a farm 
household can borrow up to 20 million VND without collateral. Although this has 
been gradually loosened over recent years,44 problems still occur as the farm 
develops and consequently needs to raise additional capital. In this case the 
                                                 
44 Prior to 1999 households in rural areas could only borrow up to five million VND without mortgage. 
This was increased to ten million VND in March 1999, while the current maximum of 20 million VND 
came into effect in September of 2000. Aquaculture households can, however, borrow up to 50 million 
VND without mortgage. 
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household is confronted with Decree 178/1999/ND-CP on credit guarantee. More 
specifically, Clause 2, Article 15 of this Decree requires that assets created 
through previous extensions of credit have to be valued in order to serve as 
collateral for the new loan. This is, however, not without problems if the assets 
are fruit gardens or fields of industrial crops. Banks typically lack the skills and 
tools required to accurately assess the value of such assets. This in turn causes the 
banks to be reluctant to lend to these types of enterprises, which in turn restrict 
their opportunities to grow and/or force them to consult higher priced informal 
sources of credit. 
2. Another problem associated with Decree 178 occurs when cooperatives in rural 
and mountainous areas approach the formal system for credit. As the modes of 
production employed by these cooperatives are typically labour rather than 
capital, they often lack the assets required to obtain credit. In addition, Article 14 
of this Decree only permits enterprises to borrow if they can present medium to 
long-term projects, which the cooperatives typically have, difficulties in doing. A 
final option stipulated in Article 20 of Decree 178 would be to borrow on trust 
(vay tyn chep), but this requires that the customers can establish that they have 
had positive profits in the last two years (Clause 2, Article 20) leading up to their 
application for credit. This requirement is often very difficult for cooperatives and 
small enterprises to satisfy. 
3. Article 20, Decree 178 and Section 1, Chapter IV of Circular 06/2000/TT- 
NHNNI stipulate that customers who lack the required assets to obtain a loan 
must provide a plan of the investment project, which established that they are 
capable of repaying their debt or have projects in accordance with regulations by 
the SBV. However, SOCBs are typically very reluctant to finance small scale 
enterprises due to their perceived lack of prestige and the limited skills possessed 
by SOCBs in these areas Thus, SOCB credit to small and medium sized 
enterprises will typically only be given when the proposed project, in accordance 
with SBV regulations, have a guarantee issued by a social institution. 
4. Clause 3, Article 5 of Circular 06/2000/TT- NHNNI stipulates that an asset which 
is to be used as a guarantee must be owned by the legal entity which requests and 
signs for the loan. This, however, may represent a problem for the owners of 
small enterprises, who might have a personal savings account. Under Decree 
176/1999/ND-CP on registry fee and improved competitiveness and Decree 
08/2000/ND- CP on guarantee transaction, such accounts cannot be registered as 
owned by their company. As a consequence a personal savings account cannot be 
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registered and counted as a guarantee for loans. This implies that the savings 
patterns of households and individuals, who frequently use their own funds for 
business purposes, are not taken into account. 
The Government is currently conducting a revision of Decree 178 on credit guarantees 
with the intent of making it more flexible towards private sector behaviour and 
preferences. However, the examples cited above make it clear that the current legislation 
is not always designed with the specific characteristics and constraints of small and 
medium sized enterprises in mind. 
Additional examples of other areas where recent measures seek to reduce preferential 
treatment given to SOEs in the financial system include: Instruction 417 addressing the 
collateral requirements for loans to SOEs, Circular No. 3 on the write-off and 
rescheduling of non-performing loans to SOEs, and Instruction No. 9 on the extension of 
maturity of loans at risk. In addition, the government has agreed to further level the 
playing field for foreign banks by allowing them to offer foreign currency deposits and 
lending to exporters. 
 
6.2.2.3 SOCBs in the National Target Programmes 
A National Target Programme is a long-term (5-20 years) governmental programme 
implemented to achieve one or several broader developmental objectives. According to 
Article 2, Decision 42/2002/QD-TTg, March 2002 a National Target Programme is “A 
project within a national program is understood as a project consisting of a range of 
activities, which will be conducted in order to reach one or more specific targets clearly 
defined in the program with already determined resources and timing”.  
Prior to 1998 there was a total of 21 concurrent National Target Programmes, but 
Decision No.05/1998/QD-TTg in 1999 cut the number of National Target Programmes to 
seven. In May 2001, the government issued Decision No71/ 2001/ QD-TTg, which 
approved the following seven National Target Programmes for the 2001- 2005 period: 
• Programme on the elimination of hunger. The objective is to reduce the percent of 
poor households to below 10 percent of all households in part by providing basic 
infrastructures to poor communes. This includes creating jobs for 1.4 – 1.5 
million people per year. 
• Programme on population and family planning. The objective is to reduce the 
annual population growth rate to 1.16 percent by 2005. 
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• Programme on the prevention of epidemic diseases such as HIV/AIDS. 
• Programme of Culture aimed at preserving and developing cultural values with a 
symbolic value to the nation.  
• Programme on education and training 
• Programme on providing pure water and environmental cleaning up in rural areas. 
Over the period 1998 – 2002, a total of 20,892 billion VND was invested in the seven 
National Target Programmes. Of these 9,316 billion VND (approximately 45 percent) 
was financed over the state budget. A total of 5,080 billion VND (approximately 24 
percent) was financed through credit extended by the banking sector, while 3,516 billion 
VND (or 17.1 percent) was mobilised through non-bank domestic sources such as mass 
organisations.  
In addition, the National Target Programmes operate according to special mechanisms 
and rules in terms of both mobilisation and allocation of resources within the banking 
sector. As a consequence, the National Target Programmes directly stipulate the terms 
and conditions under which the target population and institutions can access credit from 
the banks used to implement the Programmes. These banks include the Vietnamese Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development, the Bank for the Poor, and the People’s Credit 
Fund. Information on the terms and conditions of the credit extended by the banking 
sector to the government is, however, not available. This makes it impossible to identify 
with certainty whether a surplus generated in the SOCBs is in fact being used to finance 
the seven National Target Programmes. 
Based on the information in Sections 6.2.2.1 to 6.2.2.3 we can thus conclude, that: 
• The private sector demand for credit is likely to have outgrown that of the state-
owned enterprises over the last decade. However, the demand for credit by state-
owned enterprises is unlikely to decrease further over the coming years as the 
government intends to maintain control of a large number of capital-intensive 
enterprises. In this context it is important to note that the final allocation of credit 
between the private and the state-owned enterprises depends not only on their 
respective demand for credit but also on the attractiveness and strength of their 
applications for credit, and not least the criteria used by the banks to decide upon 
credit allocation. 
• Although the overall principle of the government is to secure equal access to 
credit to all sectors and enterprises regardless of ownership, a brief review of 
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selected issues has indicated that especially the access of small to medium sized 
private enterprises is restricted by the current legislation. If one adds to this the 
anecdotal evidence suggesting a bias against private sector applications for credit 
among SOCB staff, the likely result is increased demand for informal finance 
among private enterprises and/or a lower rate of growth in the private sector.  
• The existence of large National Target Programmes, which are in part financed 
through credit extended by the banking sector, is likely to reduce the overall 
amount of credit available. Whether or not these programmes also receive an 
indirect subsidy through terms and conditions under which the government have 
access to these funds is unclear given the present evidence.  
These observations will have to be kept in mind, when we subsequently turn to look at 
the data on actual allocation of credit by the banking sector. 
 
6.2.3 SOCB Allocation of Credit 
Figure 6.1 indicates that the credit ratio of the private sector has been increasing rapidly 
from below 10 percent in 1990 to nearly 30 percent in 1998. The drop from just above 40 
percent in 1996, i.e. the year before the East Asian Financial Crisis, can also be noted. 
 
Figure 6.1: Credit to state- and non-state owned enterprises (shares in percent) 
Source: IMF (1999) 
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As depicted in Table 6.3, a similar pattern and development is found when looking at the 
ratio of credit in foreign currency.  
Table 6.3: Foreign currency credit to state and non-state enterprises (shares in percent) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
SOEs 81.7 76.3 75.8 78.8 72.2 
Private sector 18.3 23.7 24.2 21.2 27.8 
Of which:  
Cooperatives 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 
Shareholding and limited liability companies 7.7 9.8 7.4 12.1 10.8 
Joint-venture and foreign-invested companies 4.7 11.4 14.5 17.1 15.0 
Individuals, households  6.2 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.9 
Source: IMF (1999)  
 
Table 6.3 shows that the overall increase in the share of credit in foreign currency which 
is allocated to the private sector is not universal across the different entities that make up 
the private sector. Hence, while credit to joint-ventures and foreign invested companies 
have almost quadrupled over the relatively short period, the credit allocated to individuals 
and households have been reduced to below a third of its 1994 level.  
Moreover, although the ratio of banking credit of the private sector has increased 
considerably from 1990, the above analysis has indicated that difficulties and obstacles 
still restrict private enterprise access to capital from the SOCBs. In this context, Table 6.4 
documents that the SOCB ratio of state and non-state credit differs substantially from that 
of the JSBs. This suggests that some degree of exclusion of private enterprises might be 
taking place. 
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Table 6.4: Lending to non-state institutions (share in percent of total lending) 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
JSBs 58.2 62.6 61.5 67.5 71.4 
SOCBs 32.6 74.0 42.5 44.6 42.1 
Source: IMF (1999)  
 
The SOCBs enjoy advantages of lower input costs as well as high volume and extensive 
branch networks. The restrictions on private sector access to these banks therefore 
represent a significant disadvantage compared to more privileged state-owned 
enterprises. In 2001, the total value of credit issued was VND 218,900 billion, of which 
medium and long-term credit (i.e. with a maturity that exceeds one year) only accounted 
for 37 percent. The majority of the medium- and long-credit was, however, directed to 
State investment projects of high priority resulting in a shortage of this type of credit to 
the private sector. 
Among the SOCBs it is mainly the Vietcombank and the VBARD, which lend to private 
enterprises. The reason is that these two banks have an extensive branch network at the 
district and village levels. Moreover, the respective areas of specialisation, which to a 
large extent date back to what was stipulated during the mono-bank era, are in sectors, 
which have seen rapid growth following the initiation of the Doi Moi reforms.  
In conclusion, returning briefly to the typology of outcomes presented in Table 6.2, it 
would appear that Vietnam has opted for outcome 3 rather than outcome 2 as the 
intermediate stage between a centrally coordinated to a market-based (in effect 
decentralised) economy.  
As mentioned previously, opting for outcome 3 implies that while the SOBs are allowed 
to pursue an overall objective of profit maximisation vis-à-vis their non-government 
customers, the government still reserves the right to stipulate the terms and conditions 
under which the SOEs receive credit. This in effect amounts to the government 
transforming bank profits made on private customers into subsidies to the SOEs. As a 
consequence, any direct subsidies given to SOEs over the state budget can be reduced by 
the indirect subsidies channelled through the SOBs, and the extent and nature of subsidies 
given to the SOBs are less transparent to both outsiders and to the government itself. In 
addition, as established in Section 6.2.1, choosing this intermediate outcome is either 
unsustainable (if the equitisation and privatisation of the SOBs is allowed to continue) or 
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will block the attempts to further the process of equitisation and privatisation of the 
SOBs. Given the combination of internal and external pressure upon Vietnam to continue 
and accelerate the Doi Moi reforms, neither of these situations appears attractive. The 
Vietnamese government should therefore carefully consider to abolish gradually all 
implicit and indirect subsidies given to the SOEs through the banking sector. 
 
6.3 Financial Services to the Agricultural Sector 
The Doi Moi reforms initiated in 1986 and in particular the Land Laws adopted in 1988 
have led to a radical transformation of the Vietnamese agricultural sector.45 The 
acceptance of the private family farms as the principal unit of agricultural production and 
the gradual introduction of rural non-farm enterprises resulted in a rapid and sustained 
increase in agricultural production for both domestic and export markets (the latter 
consisting mainly of rice, coffee, pepper and cashew). The drive to obtain and expand the 
full potential of the agricultural sector has in turn increased the pressure to establish a 
viable, market-based financial system for the rural farms and enterprises. 
Following the initiation of the Doi Moi reforms the increased demand for financial 
services to the rural areas quickly led to the establishment of new specialized institutions 
predominantly directed towards servicing rural populations.46 The government 
furthermore increased pressure on existing banks and mass organizations to increase their 
outreach in rural areas. This strategy has borne fruit. The share of rural households 
having access to credit rose from 9 percent in 1992 to 30 percent in 1994. 
The current estimate is that about 60 percent of rural households have access to formal 
and semi-formal financial services47 - an impressive increase in outreach in just little over 
a decade. The segments of rural populations who are still un- or under served with 
                                                 
45 The decollectivisation process was in fact initiated with Decree No. 100 already in 1981. It permitted the 
delegation of production responsibilities to individuals. It was, however, not the intention to replace 
production cooperatives with family based production units at this stage.  
46 This includes the Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) in 1990, the 
gradual establishment of Peoples Credit Funds (PCFs) from 1993 and onwards, and the Vietnamese Bank 
for the Poor (VBP) in 1996. 
47 In this context, ‘formal institutions’ refer to institutions under the jurisdiction of national banking laws, 
while ‘semiformal institutions’ covers all formal institutions, which are not subject to banking supervision. 
The PCF system is an example of a semiformal institution.  
 147
financial services include the ultra poor, people in remote areas,48 and people who are not 
members of a mass organization.  
The most important formal financial institution serving the rural areas is the Vietnamese 
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (the VBARD). Given its importance to this 
sector the VBARD is first considered separately in Section 6.3.1. Subsequently, Sections 
6.3.2 to 6.3.5 consider a number of problems related to the tension created between the 
rapid increase in financial sector outreach, on the one side, and the historical legacy of a 
policy directed and tightly controlled mono-bank system, on the other. This has resulted 
in a number of structural problems, which urgently need to be addressed if the positive 
development in the agricultural sector is to continue. The three problems, which will be 
considered in detail here, are: 
1. The lack of competition between financial institutions in effect serving separated 
segments of the rural population (Section 6.3.3). 
2. The regulated and in some cases heavily subsidized interest rates, which among other 
things stifle financial innovation and restrict the formal institutions from obtaining 
sustainability (Section 6.3.4). 
3. The limited mobilization of savings, which restricts the resource base and the 
outreach of the financial sector (Section 6.3.5).  
Addressing these problems will involve profound structural changes in the rural financial 
sector. Long-term political commitment and allocation of resources is imperative. Failure 
to address either of these problems is, however, likely to have an adverse effects on the 
efforts of the agricultural sector to remain competitive both nationally and internationally. 
 
6.3.1 VBARD 
The VBARD was established on 26 March 1988 under the Law on Credit Institutions, 
and it has subsequently played a major role in the provision of investment capital to 
agriculture and rural areas. In terms of customers, the VBARD is the largest bank in 
Vietnam. In 2001, bank customers included 6,000 enterprises and 7.5 million business 
households. The VBARD also has the densest network of branch offices in Vietnam and 
a staff of more than 24,000 people. Total credit in 2001 was VND 60,054 billion, of 
                                                 
48 Three of the seven regions in Vietnam continue to lag behind. This includes the Northern Mountains and 
Midlands, the Central Highlands and the North Central Coast. 
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which medium and long-term credit accounted for almost 43 percent or VND 25,684 
billion. Looking more closely at the distribution of VBARD credit in 2000, it can be seen 
that VND 37,818 billion or 63 percent was given to households in rural sectors, 21 
percent or VND 12,614 billion went to SOEs, while privately owed enterprises received 
VND 3,211 billion amounting to 5.3 percent of total credit. 
Only VND 92 billion or 0.15 percent went to the collective sector. A survey of a number 
of agricultural cooperatives shows that the majority of the surveyed cooperatives faced 
difficulties accessing credit from the VBARD because they lacked the assets required. In 
fact, many heads of cooperatives had to use their own assets as collateral to borrow 
capital for the cooperatives. 
Classifying the lenders by their principal economic activity, the credit provided by 
VBARD in 2001 was allocated as follows (with shares of total credit in parenthesis) 
• Agriculture: VND 29,306 billion (48.8 percent). 
• Forestry: VND 390 billion (0.65 percent). 
• Aquaculture and salt industry: VND 4,329 billion (7.21 percent) 
• Industry: VND 5,224 billion (8.7 percent) 
• Trade and services: VND 5,765 billion (9.6 percent) 
• Other industries: VND 15,015 billion (25 percent). 
 
The VBARD is assigned to carry out a number of national policy credit programmes. By 
the end of 2001, the results of implementing the following policy credit programmes 
were: 
• Credit for the project on upgrading houses built on stilts in flooded areas: VND 930 
billion (share of outstanding debts collected: 44 percent); 
• Credit for the project on reducing adverse impacts of storm No. 5 in 1997: VND 841 
billion (share of outstanding debts collected: 27 percent); 
• Credit for the project on reducing adverse impacts of drought in 1998: VND 41 
billion (share of outstanding debts collected: 40 percent); 
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• Credit for the project on reducing adverse impacts of floods in 1999: VND 135 billion 
(share of outstanding debts collected: 42 percent). 
In addition, the VBARD is assigned to allocate capital to a number of government 
development projects. At the end of 2001, total capital granted to these projects was VND 
843.9 billion. VBARD also extends a range of other financial services like lending to 
industrial zones, export processing zones, co-sponsored lending, guarantee and leasing.49 
 
6.3.2 Lack of Competition in Rural Financial Markets 
In Vietnam the lack of competition between formal and semi-formal rural financial 
institutions directly related to government policies and preferences as implemented 
through government controlled financial institutions. This becomes evident through the 
following summary of key characteristics of the three most dominant institutions, the 
Vietnamese Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD), the Vietnamese 
Bank for the Poor (VBP) and the Peoples Credit Funds System (PCF). 
 
Table 6.5: Characteristics of institutions serving the agricultural sector 
 VBARD VBP PCF 
Year of 
establishment 
1988 as a department of 
former mono-bank. Became 
operational in December 
1990. 
 
Established in 1995 as a 
state owned, non-profit 
bank. 
 
The Rural Finance Project 
began in March 1994.  
 
Mission 
statement 
The explicit focus of 
VBARD is on financing all 
types of enterprises in rural 
areas 
The explicit intention is to 
eliminate hunger and 
alleviate poverty through the 
provision of small loans to 
poor households 
The objective is to supplant 
the failed credit cooperatives 
and to restore confidence in 
the formal financial sector. 
Number of 
clients 
Above 4 million About 2.2 million Approximately 0.7 million 
Customer 
profile 
About 90 percent of all 
formal credit to rural 
households was handled by 
Only people classified as 
poor are eligible for loans. 
Monthly income is 
The following is known 
about the composition of 
members of PCFs: 66 
                                                 
49 The VBARD owns and operates two of the financial lease companies mentioned in Section 6.1.1.5. 
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Table 6.5: Characteristics of institutions serving the agricultural sector 
 VBARD VBP PCF 
the VBARD in 1997, 
although this share might 
include some handled by the 
VBP. 
converted into rice value. 
Cut off values are: Urban 
areas less than 25 kg per 
person, rural areas under 20 
kg, and in mountainous 
areas less than 15 kg 
percent are farmers, 20 
percent are rural traders and 
11 percent are rural artisans 
and small-scale 
entrepreneurs. 
15 founding members of a 
LCF have to buy shares 
amounting to VND 3,333 
million per person, which 
can be paid in instalments 
over a number of years. 
Rank-and-file members have 
to buy a qualification share 
amounting to VND 50,000 
Number of 
branch 
offices 
End of 1996 VBARD had 
2,564 branch offices. In 
addition, mobile banking 
units are operating 
transaction offices at the 
commune level. The 
VBARD is one of the largest 
networks in Vietnam and the 
largest provider of credit to 
the rural sector. 
Use infrastructure and staff 
of the VBARD. VBP 
furthermore collaborates 
with other organizations 
(ministries, mass 
organizations, etc) for 
screening, supervision and 
support for the groups 
 
In September 1998 there 
were 988 People’s Credit 
Funds established in 35 of 
Vietnam’s provinces.  
The total number of 
members exceeded 600,000 
in September 1998. 
Portfolio of 
financial 
products 
supplied 
Only short to medium term 
credit has been available. 
Short-term lending accounts 
for two-thirds of all credit in 
2001. 
Possible collateral is: land-
use-rights, real estate and 
durable consumption goods 
Only one product: A 2-5 
year loan without collateral. 
Interest is payable in 
monthly instalments but the 
principal should not be paid 
before the end of the loan 
period. 
In most cases credit is not 
handed over in cash but in 
kind. 
The loans are small loans 
mainly geared toward 
production. Only consumer 
goods are accepted as 
collateral – not land use 
rights.  
 
The mission statements and the mode of operation of the reviewed institutions provide an 
explanation for the lack of competition between the rural financial institutions. Exercising 
significant direct control over all three institutions, the government has laid down an 
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explicit division of labour towards providing financial services for all income segments 
of the rural population. 
In addition, the local communes, people’s committees and mass organisations play a 
crucial role in the identification, screening and follow-up on clients for each type of 
institution. The result is that the initiative to form joint-liability groups and/or to contact 
potential lenders comes from the institutions themselves. This is a top-down approach 
which originates in a desire to divide the market between the institutions in order to 
extend their outreach. The segments served by the three institutions can be summarized 
as follows: 
VBARD Up until 1995 the primary clientele of VBARD was the medium and well-
to-do farmers, who could provide collateral. Starting from 1995 the 
VBARD introduced joint-liability groups where small loans are processed 
via groups. In 1997 about 150,000 joint liability groups are supported. This 
initiative has to some extent made VBARD credit available to less-well-off 
households, but the majority of the clients still remain in the upper income 
segments of the rural population. 
VBP As indicated by its name and the requirement to lend only to people 
classified as being poor, the VBP serves the less well off segments. The 
restriction to supply only one financial product has, however, been found to 
restrict the ability of VBP to reach the very poor. These destitute 
households have frequently been found to regard VBP loans of typically 
VND 1-2 million as being too large. The reports of poor households 
actually turning down loan offers are, according to the ADB, ‘legion’. In 
addition, many poor households oppose the special repayment structure of 
VBP loans. Many households assess that the postponement of the payment 
of the principal until the end of the loan period represent too high a risk; 
many would in fact prefer small and frequent instalments of both principal 
and interest.  
Another factor contributing to the exclusion of the very poor from the 
formal financial system are the transactions costs when applying for a loan. 
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PCFs The PCFs require borrowers to buy shares, and the implicit screening 
mechanisms have been built in through the use of local peoples committees 
and the practice to pay out loans in kind. This implies that the PCF system 
predominantly caters for the better off households – in effect excluding 
poor households who are left with a choice between the VBP and informal 
finance. 
 
In evaluating the potential negative effects of this lack of competition it is, however, 
important to point out that financial sector analysts are divided on the question of how 
important increased financial sector competition is.  
One group of analysts is of the opinion that lack of competition will have adverse effects 
on financial sector performance and development, including limited financial innovation, 
lack of incentives to reduce costs and poor quality of services. Another group of analysts 
points to panel data analyses (Demirgüz-Kunt & Detragiache 1998), which suggest that 
banking sector fragility often increases as a result of the erosion of franchise values that 
frequently follow from financial sector liberalisation. The key problem is that the 
countries in question frequently fail to build an appropriate institutional framework for 
the supervision and regulation of the financial sector. As a result governments find it 
difficult to curb and control bank behaviour. Banks whose franchise values are eroded 
shift to riskier business strategies in an attempt to gamble for their resurrection. In many 
developing countries the end result is costly financial sector crises.  
The dispute over whether or not financial sector liberalisation is beneficial has led to the 
emergence of alternatives to financial liberalisation and increasing competition. Hence, 
Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) propose an alternative strategy of financial 
restraint. One basic aspect of their model is that creating profit opportunities for banks 
will result in banks becoming more stable institutions with better incentives for 
monitoring borrowers. This in turn will reduce the moral hazard problems when banks 
imprudently gamble for their survival. As a result overall financial sector stability will 
improve.  
The question of which approach will be suitable for the Vietnamese rural financial sector 
is not an easy one to answer. The overall lack of transparency in the financial sector (in 
combination with non-standardised accounting procedures) obstructs attempts to evaluate 
the frailty of the individual institutions.  
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6.3.3 Interest Rate Regulation 
Interest rates in the institutions serving the rural sector are heavily subsidized and subject 
to close government control. The provision of subsidized interest rates has for a long time 
been a point of discussion between the donor community and the government of 
Vietnam. 
The donor community points to international experience with subsidized rural credit 
programmes in LDCs, which have resulted in massive loan losses, low savings 
mobilisation and heavy losses to both governments and international donors. In addition, 
subsidised credit programmes have been found to lead to lacklustre market discipline. 
They have also had detrimental effects on lending behaviour and managerial 
competencies and incentives. This has, among other things, led the donor community to 
refrain from refinancing the VBP. 
The government of Vietnam, on the other hand, has maintained subsidised interest rates 
as part of a policy to ensure equitable growth, redistribution of wealth and poverty 
alleviation. The government indicated willingness to reconsider existing policies during a 
consultative donor meeting in December 2000. This will, however, take time, implying 
that evaluating the effects of subsidizing interest rates remains highly relevant. The 
following negative effects of operating with subsidised interests rates can be identified: 
Damaging perceptions of credit. The subsidized low interest rates lead to a rush for 
loans from VBP and VBARD. While there is no evidence that subsidized loans saturate 
the demand for credit, the cheap loans reinforce a common impression that the low 
interest loans are a right and not a contractual agreement. In addition, the perception that 
loans at a higher rate are exploitative makes a shift back to market-based rates 
increasingly difficult (ADB 2002). 
Obstructing the mobilisation of savings. The cap on lending rates (in combination with 
the generally high operating costs, which follow from expanding outreach in rural areas) 
implies that banks have limited margins. This makes it difficult for them to raise savings 
rates without incurring a loss. 
Lowering the quality of financial services. The above-mentioned low margins lead to 
transformation of the credit culture, which make it cruder and stripped of additional 
services. This has a detrimental effect upon the innovative, timely and balanced provision 
of financial services. In addition, banks seek to shift obligations (preparation and training 
of customers, pre-screening of loan applicants, collection of borrower payments, and 
client supervision) on to clients or their intermediary structures (mass organizations) in 
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order to save costs. This leads to less focused development of skills and knowledge 
within the financial institutions. 
On the positive side, it has been pointed out that subsidizes interest rates imply that the 
psychological barrier of poor households toward taking a loan is lowered. This may be 
true in some cases. It is, however, important to point out that the above-mentioned study 
of borrower transaction costs in the Red River Delta indicates that very poor households 
(who typically need small loans) are likely to prefer a loan from the informal sector.  
In addition, existing evidence indicates that the assumption that the interest rate offered is 
a crucial factor for sustainable lending to poor households is incorrect. The ADB recently 
visited a number of Micro finance credit projects in Vietnam. Everywhere staff 
emphasized that a minimum of guidance and training of the poor was needed in order for 
them to be able make profitable use of loans. This is a lesson, which has emerged from a 
number of projects directed at providing credit to poor households, including the much 
publicized and copied Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. One German NGO (Misereor) 
operating in Vietnam has introduced a special training margin of 0.1 percent, which is 
built into the interest rate to cover the cost of training and guidance. This is a model 
which the affiliated lenders are reportedly quite satisfied with.  
In conclusion, the significance of the reduction of the psychological barrier towards loans 
in poor households is doubtful, and one can conclude that the effects of operating with 
subsidized interest rates are likely to be predominantly negative. 
 
6.3.4 Savings Mobilization 
Mobilizing savings was not a focus area for financial institutions until the late 1980s and 
subsequent attempts to strengthen the performance in this area have generally been 
moderately successful, at best. Total domestic savings channelled through the formal 
system have risen from 16 percent to 23 percent of GDP in the period from 1993 to 1999. 
However, this is insufficient vis-à-vis the need to extend outreach of financial services to 
remote and mountainous areas. The same can be said for the possibility of obtaining 
long-term sustainability. Neither of these aims can be obtained as long as government 
funding is the main source of funding. In addition, total domestic savings in Vietnam as a 
share of GDP remains far below that of other countries in the region, and considerable 
fluctuation in the total savings as a share of GDP has been recorded.  
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The general picture of limited success in mobilizing savings can be attributed to both 
supply and demand factors, which are, in some areas, mutually reinforcing.  
On the supply side, the historical legacy of negative real interest rates during the mono-
bank era and the collapse of the rural credit cooperatives in 1990-91 have implied that the 
Vietnamese can be characterized as being deeply suspicious of banks. They prefer to 
keep money in assets with a high degree of liquidity. This can be illustrated with the 
1992-93 Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS). Here it was found that only about 7.4 
percent of total savings was deposited in banks. Some 44 percent was invested in gold. 
Another 20 percent went into real estate, and more than 10 percent was kept in cash.  
On the demand side, government financing of the rural financial institutions, in 
combination with the low interest rate margin dictated by the government, reduces 
incentives to mobilize savings.  
However, turning focus to the performance at the institutional level reveals considerable 
differences across the major state-controlled institutions. The PCF system has been the 
most successful in mobilizing savings. By the end of 1996 – only two years after coming 
into operation – the average savings per member amounted to US$ 170. This is 
remarkable given the fact that average per capita income in rural Vietnam at that time 
was approximately US$ 100. Part of the explanation is that the founding members and 
the majority of the rank-and-file members belong to the upper income quintiles. 
However, one should also notice the following factors, which undoubtedly contributed to 
the relatively successful mobilization of savings: 
• Deposit insurance is available for deposits with terms exceeding three months. 
• The deposit rate offered is higher than those of other financial institutions. 
• The proximity and relative autonomy of the PCF in combination with the partial 
local ownership and involvement in management is likely to lessen otherwise 
widespread distrust towards formal financial institutions. 
• The accessibility and local presence make it convenient to deposit and/or 
withdraw funds. In addition, paper work and bureaucracy is kept to a minimum. 
Turning to VBARD and VBP, the track record, however, turns less positive. Generally, 
both VBARD and VBP do not envisage savings and savings accounts as an essential 
element of their business plan and mode of operation. Consequently, savings are not a 
prerequisite for obtaining loans, and savings do not automatically enter the assessment of 
a potential borrower in the two institutions. 
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6.4 Concluding Remarks 
Chapter 6 has provided a brief overview of the most significant formal and informal 
financial institutions active in the Vietnamese financial market. In addition, we analysed 
existing constraints and inherent tensions in the process of transforming the state-owned 
commercial banks into autonomous institutions guided by market principles and forces. 
Introducing a very simple typology of intermediate outcomes for this transformation, the 
Vietnamese approach can be characterised as allowing the SOBs to pursue an overall 
objective of profit maximisation vis-à-vis their non-government customers. At the same 
time, the government reserves the right to stipulate the terms and conditions under which 
the SOEs receive credit. This in effect amounts to the government transforming bank 
profits made on private customers into subsidies to the SOEs. As a consequence, any 
direct subsidies given to SOEs over the state budget can be increased by the indirect 
subsidies channelled through the SOBs. Moreover, the extent and nature of subsidies 
given to the SOBs are less transparent to both outsiders and to the government itself. In 
sum, this approach is neither sustainable nor in accordance with the process of 
equitisation and privatisation of the SOBs.  
Turning to a more specific analysis of the financial sector performance vis-à-vis the 
agricultural sector, it was found that the government has in effect laid down an explicit 
division of labour between the different financial institutions which provide financial 
services to the rural population. In addition, the local communes, people’s committees 
and mass organisations play a crucial role in the identification, screening and follow-up 
on clients for each type of institution. The result is that the initiative to form joint-liability 
groups and/or contact to potential lenders come from the institutions themselves. This 
reflects a top-down approach, which most likely originates in a desire to divide the 
market between the institutions in order to extend their outreach. 
The competition and segmentation on the rural financial markets is further hampered by 
the widespread practice of offering subsidized interest rates. While this approach is 
chosen to improve development opportunities for the rural population, the net effects of 
this policy are likely to be negative and detrimental to the overall purpose of improving 
the livelihood of rural populations. In addition to restricting the mobilisation of savings, 
the practice of subsidizing interest rates damages customer perception of credit, lowers 
the overall quality of financial services, and reduces the quality of investment projects 
financed through the financial sector. All this runs counter to the government desire to 
develop and create growth opportunities for the agricultural sector. 
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7 Conclusion 
The eclectic nature of the topics and issues analysed in this report renders attempts to 
reach an overall conclusion difficult. Yet, the recent gradual reactivation of more 
comprehensive and fundamental financial sector reforms in many respects represents the 
end of the beginning rather than the beginning of the end of reforms. The majority of the 
fundamental and far-reaching reforms are still at an initial stage and have yet to be 
considered. Thus, the official commitment and resolve towards reforms in Vietnam 
remains to be fully tested. The Vietnamese government holds the key to further reforms, 
but one can identify at least two reasons for the persistent government reluctance towards 
further liberalising the financial sector.  
1. The financial sector represents a nexus of control reaching almost all sectors 
in the economy. This enables the government to raise subsidies (see Section 
6.2) and allocate funds to special programmes and state-owned enterprises 
(see Section 6.3). 
2. The non-performing loans in the financial sector and the state-owned banks in 
particular represent ‘an uncollected bill’ for lack of efficiency and/or failures 
in especially the state-owned enterprises in the past. Depending on their true 
magnitude, addressing and resolving the problem of non-performing loans 
held by the SOCBs can result in the destabilisation of both the financial sector 
and the economy at large (see Section 5.5). While this should not be accepted 
as an excuse for failing to address the problem in a gradual and transparent 
manner, it is clear that the Vietnamese government will think twice before 
risking squandering its hard-gained performance legitimacy (see Section 3.2). 
Both these factors are domestic in nature, which makes it clear that any desire and 
perceived need for in depth reforms have to come from within the Vietnamese 
government itself. This does not, however, imply that all reforms are blocked and that 
non-governmental agencies and observers should refrain from doing anything.  
An important decision, which has been touched upon in a number of contexts, is whether 
Vietnam should opt for the market-based approach (as in the US) or the German-inspired 
bank-based model. As illustrated by the descriptions included in this report the 
Vietnamese equities and securities markets are nascent or non-existing. This makes the 
option of a market-based system a long-term prospect rather than a realistic alternative. In 
addition, various analyses, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1994) and Levine (2002), recommend 
an intermediate approach for developing countries. Thus, instead of perceiving it as a 
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choice between two competing systems, early developers and countries in transition 
should seek to establish a strong institutional regulatory and supervisory framework. This 
should enable their typically bank-based system to establish and grow prior to a gradual, 
long-term adaptation and development of a more market-based system. Levine (2002) is 
able to support the recommendation with recent cross-country empirical analyses. They 
indicate that ‘neither market-based nor bank-based financial systems are particularly 
effective at promoting growth’. Instead, Levine suggests that developing and transitional 
countries should aim at strengthening the rights of investors and the efficiency of contract 
enforcement. He argues that it is ‘less useful to distinguish financial systems by whether 
they are bank-based or market-based than it is to focus on the specific laws and 
enforcement mechanisms that govern both debt and equity transactions.’  
The view that the specific laws governing financial sector activities are of importance is 
generally in accordance with observations and policy recommendations made in this 
report, including that:  
• The Vietnamese legislation is equal to or outperforms that of other countries of 
the region. However, the autonomy and power to rapidly implement these laws is 
lacking in relative terms.  
• The type of activities banks can engage in Vietnam is relatively restricted. Banks 
in Vietnam are, for example prohibited from engaging in securities, insurance and 
real estate markets. These activities are permitted or only somewhat restricted in 
most other developing countries.  
• The accounting standards of banks in Vietnam are below the average level of 
developing countries.  
• The requirements about the amount of capital that bank must hold are very 
restrictive in Vietnam compared to other countries in the region.  
Moreover, this report has focused on the enforcement mechanisms and powers of the 
central regulatory and supervisory institution in the Vietnamese financial market, namely 
the SBV. It is concluded that the SBV at present cannot effectively develop and execute 
national monetary policies. It is still operationally and politically dependent upon support 
from other government agencies. Hence, although some experts view the 1998 Law on 
the State Bank as a step backwards in terms of restricting stipulated independence 
compared to the situation prior to the passing of the law, it appears more likely that lack 
of especially political but also operational independence are at present the more binding 
constraints. 
 159
As a consequence, it is recommended that the pursuit of increased central bank 
independence in Vietnam should focus more on the indirect route. This entails a gradual 
build-up and strengthening of a non-governmental lobby for an independent central bank. 
The preliminary plans for the equitisation of the large state-owned banks represent an 
important step in this direction, as does the continued presence of foreign banks in 
Vietnam. In addition, it is recommended that the Vietnamese government consider 
complementing the indirect approach with more direct measures directed at limiting local 
interference in credit institution activities. This should aim at improving the overall 
transparency and predictability of the political interference, which takes place. In 
addition, the government should consider the creation of a separate institution responsible 
for financial sector supervision. This would most likely strengthen the autonomy and 
independence of both the SBV in the conduct of its remaining central bank duties and the 
new supervisory agency. The latter would not share a common background and former 
affiliation with some of the principal objects of supervision and control, namely the 
SOCBs. Whether or not the Vietnamese government is prepared to commit itself to these 
developments is an open question. It is, however, important that they are considered and 
discussed in relation to the planned evaluation of supervisory practices of the State Bank 
of Vietnam. 
The role of historic factors and path dependency has been identified and analysed 
throughout in this study. Not surprisingly, important historic influences were identified in 
almost all areas discussed ranging from the French legal tradition in Chapter 4 to the 
legacy of central coordination in Chapters 3, 5 and 6. In this context, it is important to 
stress that the presence of historical determinants does not necessarily imply that direct 
actions to undo the past and/or change historic structures should not be considered. In 
many cases, the presence of specific historic influences is mentioned. Policy-makers and 
market participants should take them into account in planning, leading to more indirect 
reactions.  
In conclusion, the analysis presented in this report underlines that liberalising financial 
markets is not solely a question of limiting and/or restricting government influence, in 
some areas such as, for example, the regulation and supervision of the financial markets. 
It might in fact be that the opposite is true, namely that the influence and power of 
government controlled institutions should be increased and strengthened, but through 
different channels of influence. 
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